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Résumé
Dans ma thèse doctorale, j’étudie trois facteurs importants qui caractérisent
le commerce international : les diﬀérences technologiques entre les pays, les
barrières à l’entrée sous la forme de coûts fixes et la migration internationale.
Le premier chapitre analyse si les diﬀérences technologiques entre les pays
peuvent expliquer la spécialisation dans le commerce international entre les
pays. Pour mesurer le niveau de la spécialisation, je calcule les index de con-
centration pour la valeur des importations et des exportations et décompose
la concentration totale dans la marge de produits extensive (nombre de pro-
duits commercialisés) et la marge de produits intensive (volume de produits
commercialisés). En utilisant des données commerciales détaillées au niveau
du produit dans 160 pays, mes résultats montrent que les exportations sont
plus concentrées que les importations, que la spécialisation se produit prin-
cipalement au niveau de la marge intensive du produit, et que les économies
plus grandes disposent d’importations et d’exportations plus diversifiées, car
elles commercialisent plus de produits. Compte tenu de ces faits, j’évalue la
capacité du modèle Eaton-Kortum, le principal modèle de la théorie ricar-
dienne du commerce, pour représenter les preuves empiriques. Les résultats
montrent que la spécialisation à travers l’avantage comparatif induit par les
diﬀérences de technologie peut expliquer les faits qualitatifs et quantitatifs.
De plus, j’évalue le rôle des déterminants clés de la spécialisation : le degré
de l’avantage comparatif, l’élasticité de la substitution et la géographie.
Une implication de ces résultats est qu’il est important d’évaluer jusqu’à
quel point la volatilité de production mesurée par la volatilité du PIB est
motivée par la spécialisation des exportations et des importations. Étant
donné le compromis entre l’ouverture du commerce et la volatilité de pro-
duction, les bénéfices tirés du commerce peuvent s’avérer plus faibles que
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ceux estimés précédemment. Par conséquent, les politiques commerciales
alternatives telles que l’ouverture graduelle au commerce combinée à la di-
versification de la production pour réduire la concentration de l’exportation
peuvent se révéler être une meilleure stratégie que l’approche du laissez-faire.
En utilisant la relation entre la taille du marché et l’entrée de firmes et pro-
duits, le deuxième chapitre évalue si les barrières à l’entrée sous la forme de
coûts fixes à exporter sont au niveau de la firme ou au niveau du produit. Si
les coûts fixes se trouvent au niveau de la firme, la firme multiproduits a un
avantage de coût de production par rapport aux autres firmes parce qu’elles
peuvent diviser les coûts fixes sur plusieurs produits. Dans ce cas, le com-
merce international sera caractérisé par peu de firmes qui exportent beaucoup
des produits. Si les coûts fixes sont au niveau du produit, l’entrée d’un pro-
duit est associée avec l’entrée de plusieurs firmes. La raison est qu’une fois
que la première firme entre et paye les coûts fixes du produit, elle crée un eﬀet
d’entrainement qui réduit les coûts fixes pour des firmes rivales. Dans ce cas,
le commerce international sera caractérisé par plusieurs firmes qui vendent
des variétés diﬀérentes du même produit. En utilisant des données détaillées
provenant de 40 pays exportateurs à travers 180 marchés de destination, mes
résultats montrent que les barrières à l’entrée se trouvent principalement au
niveau du produit. Un marché plus large favorise l’expansion d’un plus grand
nombre d’entreprises au sein d’une catégorie de produit plutôt que de perme-
ttre aux entreprises produisant plusieurs produits de croître dans une gamme
de produits. En regardant la diﬀérence entre le nombre d’exportateurs au
sein d’une catégorie de produit dans des destinations données, je trouve que
le taux d’entrée de firmes augmente significativement après qu’un produit en-
tre la première fois dans le marché. J’en déduis donc que le premier entrant
réduit les coûts fixes pour les firmes suivantes. Mes recherches démontrent
également que malgré une plus grande compétition sur le marché du pro-
duit, les entreprises disposent de revenus d’exportation supérieurs et sont
plus susceptibles de rester sur les marchés internationaux. Ces résultats sont
cohérents avec l’hypothèse que l’eﬀet d’entrainement incite l’entrée de firmes
rivales et permettent aux entreprises de produire à plus grande échelle.
Cette recherche dévoile un nombre de conclusions importantes. D’abord,
les politiques commerciales encouragent l’entrée de nouveaux produits, par
exemple, en promouvant des produits dans les marchés de destination entraî-
nant ainsi des retombées qui se traduiront par un taux de participation plus
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élevé de l’entreprise et une croissance de l’exportation. Deuxièmement, les
consommateurs du pays importateur peuvent bénéficier de prix plus bas pour
le produit en réduisant les barrières techniques du commerce. Troisièmement,
lorsque l’on eﬀectue des expérimentations politiques sous la forme de réduc-
tion des coûts commerciaux, il est de coutume de considérer uniquement une
baisse des coûts marginaux et d’évaluer les répercussions sur le bien-être du
consommateur. Cependant, un élément important des accords commerciaux
est la réduction des barrières techniques au commerce grâce à la négociation
de normes communes pour un produit. Négliger l’existence des barrières à
l’entrée et les conséquences des réaﬀectations de l’industrie aﬀaiblit l’impact
des réformes commerciales.
Le troisième chapitre prend en compte le rôle de l’information dans la fa-
cilitation du commerce international. Les immigrants réduisent les coûts
de transaction dans le commerce international en fournissant des informa-
tions sur les possibilités d’échange avec leur pays d’origine. En utilisant des
données géographiques détaillées sur l’immigration et les importations aux
États-Unis entre 1970 et 2005, je quantifie l’incidence qu’ont les nouveaux
immigrants sur la demande pour les importations de biens intermédiaires
aux États-Unis. Pour établir le lien cause à eﬀet entre le commerce et la mi-
gration, j’exploite l’important aﬄux d’immigrants d’Amérique centrale après
l’ouragan Mitch. Les résultats montrent que l’augmentation de dix pour cent
d’immigrants a fait croître la demande pour les importations de biens inter-
médiaires de 1,5 pour cent. Mes résultats sont robustes aux problèmes de la
causalité inverse ou la décision d’émigrer est causée par des opportunités de
faire du commerce.
Mots-clés : coûts fixes, eﬀets d’entrainement, taille du marché, théorie
ricardienne, concentration d’exportation, concentration d’importation, mi-
gration, réfugié politique, ouragan Mitch
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Abstract
In my PhD thesis I study three factors that shape international trade pat-
terns: technological diﬀerences across countries, entry barriers in the form of
fixed costs and international migration.
The first chapter analyses whether technology diﬀerences across countries
can explain specialization patterns in international trade. To measure spe-
cialization, I compute concentration indexes for the value of exports and im-
ports and decomposes the overall concentration into the extensive product
margin (number of products traded) and intensive product margin (volume
of products traded). The results show that exports are more concentrated
than imports, specialization occurs mainly in the volume of trade and larger
economies have more diversified exports and imports because they trade
more products. I then evaluate the ability of the Eaton-Kortum model,
the workhorse model of Ricardian trade theory, to account for the observed
facts. The results show that technology-induced specialization through com-
parative advantage can explain the qualitative and quantitative facts. The
key determinants of specialization are the degree of comparative advantage,
the elasticity of substitution and geography.
Based on the relationship between entry and market size, the second chapter
evaluates whether fixed costs are at the firm or at the product level. Within
an empirical framework, I argue that fixed costs at the firm level induce a
cost advantage for multi-product firms and international trade will be char-
acterized by few firms selling many products. On the other hand, if fixed
costs are at the product level, product entry is accompanied with lots of
firms entry and international trade will be characterized by many firms sell-
ing diﬀerent varieties of the same product. Using detailed product level data
from 40 exporting countries to 180 destination markets, the results indicate
xthat entry barriers operate at the product level. The key implication of the
product fixed cost is that the firm that pays the fixed cost creates a positive
externality that lowers entry costs for rival exporters and increases firm entry.
Looking at firm entry within products across time and destinations, I find
evidence consistent with these spillover eﬀects. Combined these results have
important implications for the eﬀects of trade policy on market structure and
on the resulting gains from trade in the exporting as well as in the importing
country.
The third chapter considers the role of migration in facilitating international
trade. Immigrants can increase international trade by shifting preferences
towards the goods of their country of origin and by reducing bilateral trans-
action costs. Using geographical variations across US states for the period
1970 to 2005, we quantify the impact of immigrants on intermediate goods
imports. We address endogeneity and reverse causality - which arises if mi-
gration from a country of origin to a US state is driven by trade opportunities
between the two locations - by exploiting the exogenous allocation of refugees
within the US refugee resettlement program. Our results are robust to an
alternative identification strategy, based on the large influx of Central Ameri-
can immigrants to the United States after hurricane Mitch. We find that a 10
percent increase in recent immigrants to a given US state raises intermediate
imports from those immigrants’ country of origin by 1.5 percent.
Keywords : Fixed costs, spillovers, market size, Ricardian trade theory, ex-
port concentration, import concentration, migration, political refugees, hur-
ricane Mitch
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1Introduction
We live in a more and more globalized world where countries increasingly ex-
change their economic resources. Deeper international economic integration
expands the global goods, capital and labor markets. The costs and benefits
of international exchange continue to be widely discussed and are among the
most pressing issues in a globalized world. This thesis contains three chap-
ters that study several relationships that are important for understanding
the full impact of economic globalization around the world: i) determinants
of the pattern of trade; ii) entry barriers to international trade; and iii) the
eﬀects of migration on international trade.
In the first chapter, titled “Specialization patterns in International Trade”,
I assess the ability of a standard workhorse model of international trade to
explain the pattern of trade. To start with, I document new facts on the
pattern of international specialization by looking at export and import con-
centration. To measure specialization, I compute concentration indexes for
the value of exports and imports and decompose the overall concentration
into the extensive product margin (number of products traded) and the in-
tensive product margin (volume of products traded). Using detailed product-
level trade data for 160 countries, I find that exports are more concentrated
than imports, specialization occurs mainly on the intensive product mar-
gin, and larger economies have more diversified exports and imports because
they trade more products. Based on these facts, I evaluate the ability of
the Eaton-Kortum model, the workhorse model of modern Ricardian trade
theory, to account for the observed patterns. The results show that spe-
cialization through comparative advantage induced by technology diﬀerences
can explain the qualitative and quantitative facts. Also, I evaluate the role of
the key determinants of specialization: the degree of comparative advantage,
the elasticity of substitution and geography.
2These results have important policy implications. Excessive specialization
results in a high degree of export concentration implying that only few prod-
ucts are responsible for the majority of export revenue and import expendi-
ture. Given that openness to trade induces specialization, globalisation will
increase output volatility and therefore the likelihood that product specific
shocks have aggregate eﬀects on output volatility and/or negative eﬀects on
the terms of trade. The implied trade-oﬀ between openness to trade and
output volatility suggests that benefits from trade may actually be lower as
previously estimated. As a result, alternative trade policies such as gradual
openness to trade combined with diversification of production to lower export
concentration may represent a better strategy than a laissez-faire approach.
The second chapter, titled “Entry barriers to International Trade: product
versus firm fixed costs“, focuses on the importance of fixed costs to export
in shaping the international trade pattern. Fixed costs to export create
entry barriers that restrict trading opportunities between countries. In the
presence of these costs, market size will matter because larger markets ease
the relevance of fixed costs by allowing firms to slide down the average cost
curve and produce at a more eﬃcient scale. I use the relationship between
the extensive margins of exports and destination market size to evaluate
whether fixed costs operate at the firm or at the product level. If fixed
costs are at the firm level, multi-product firms have a cost advantage and
dominate international trade. If fixed costs are at the product level, many
firms export diﬀerent varieties of the same product. Using detailed product
level data from 40 exporting countries to 180 destination markets, the results
indicate that entry barriers operate at the product level. The key implication
of the product fixed cost is that once a firm or a group of firms decides to
pay the fixed costs, subsequent exporters of those products do not need to
pay this fixed cost. Looking at firm entry within products across time and
destinations, I find evidence consistent with the spillover eﬀect. Once a
product enters a destination market for the first time, the firm entry rate
increases significantly the following two years before gradually slowing down.
Further evidence shows that the eﬃciency gains in production through lower
product fixed costs outweigh the competition eﬀects from more firm entry.
A number of important conclusions emerge from this research. First, trade
theory based on increasing returns to scale explains entry behaviour of firms
3and products into international markets. Second, trade policies encourag-
ing new product entry, such as advertising products in destination markets
through export promotion agencies, rather than firm entry could potentially
lead to spillover eﬀects that translate into higher level of firm participation
and export growth. Third, when conducting policy experiments in the form
of a reduction in trade costs, it is standard in the literature to consider only
reductions in marginal costs and evaluate the resulting impact on consumer
welfare. However, an important aspect of free trade negotiations is the reduc-
tion of technical barriers to trade by establishing common product standards,
see the current EU-US free trade negotiations. Neglecting the existence of
entry barriers and the resulting industry reallocations underestimates the
impact of trade reforms.
The third chapter, titled “The causal impact of migration on U.S. interme-
diate goods’ trade: Evidence from a natural experiment“, focuses on the
role of migrants in international trade.International migrants can increase
international trade flows via two distinct mechanisms. First, migrants shift
preferences towards their origin country’s products, thus creating demand for
imports of those goods by their host country. Second, migrants reduce trans-
action costs between countries, either by carrying information about relevant
market characteristics or by attenuating frictions due to imperfect contract
enforcement. Using geographical variation across U.S. states for the period
1970 to 2005, we quantify the impact of immigrants on intermediate goods’
imports. In particular, we follow a gravity approach and regress the log of
intermediate imports on the log of recent immigrants. We address reverse
causality, and more broadly endogeneity, and find evidence of a significantly
positive eﬀect of immigrants on U.S. intermediate imports. To estimate a
causal relationship, we exploit the large influx of Central American immi-
grants to the U.S. after hurricane Mitch. Our results are robust to using
an alternative identification strategy, based on the exogenous allocation of
refugees within the U.S. refugee resettlement program. We find that a 10
percent increase of recent immigrants to a given U.S. state increases imports
from those immigrants’ origin country by 1.5 percent. Overall, our results
suggest that immigrant networks play an important role in promoting trade
across countries.
4Chapter 1
Specialization patterns in
International Trade
51.1 Introduction
The pattern of specialization is at the core of international trade theory. A
consequence of international trade is that countries do not need to produce
all their goods, instead they can specialize in the production of certain goods
in exchange for others. Trade theory oﬀers diﬀerent explanations of how
countries specialize in the number and sales volume of goods. Assessing
the empirical relevance of the underlying theory is of vital interest since it
not only allows evaluating the gains from trade through specialization but
also informs how the trade pattern aﬀects the structure of an economy. For
example, a high degree of specialization increases the likelihood that product
specific shocks have aggregate eﬀects in terms of output volatility and/or an
impact on the terms of trade.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. Firstly, it uncovers new facts on the
pattern of specialization by looking at export and import concentration. It
decomposes the overall level of concentration into a measure for the extensive
and intensive product margin and documents concentration levels for exports
and imports on all margins. The extensive product margin indicates the
degree of specialization in the number of goods traded. The concentration
index on the intensive margin measures specialization in the volume of goods
traded. Secondly, the paper evaluates the Eaton and Kortum [2002] model’s
ability to account for the observed specialization patterns. Specifically, it
tests the model based on three basic questions about specialization: What
explains the level of specialization in exports and imports? What determines
the gap between specialization in exports and imports? Does specialization
occur on the intensive or extensive product margin?
Based on detailed product-level trade data for 160 countries, the results show
that, on average, countries specialize more in exports relative to imports, with
Gini coeﬃcients of 0.98 and 0.91 respectively. The decomposition reveals
that specialization of exports occurs predominately on the extensive mar-
gin. Countries receive their export revenues from few products. At the same
time, countries import a wide range of products but concentrate their expen-
diture towards a small number of products. Hence specialization of imports
is driven by the intensive margin. The diﬀerence between the concentra-
tion levels of exports and imports is due to the extensive margin. Countries
specialize in exporting few goods and diversify on imports by acquiring vari-
6ous products from abroad. Focusing on cross-country diﬀerences, I find that
larger economies have more diversified imports and exports. This is mostly
along the extensive margin, i.e. large economies export and import a wider
product range.
Having documented the observed specialization pattern, I employ a standard
Ricardian trade model developed by Eaton and Kortum [2002] to evaluate
its ability to reproduce the stylized facts. To incorporate the fact that goods
cross borders multiple times, my analysis relies on Alvarez and Lucas [2007]
version of the Eaton and Kortum model. A key implication of this model
is that it uncovers how comparative advantage due to technology diﬀerences
determines specialization endogenously on both the extensive and the inten-
sive product margins. Furthermore, it identifies geography together with the
elasticity of substitution and the degree of absolute and comparative advan-
tage as the main determinants of specialization. A higher level of technology
increases a country’s absolute advantage and diversifies the extensive mar-
gin of exports by broadening the product range it exports. The degree of
comparative advantage heightens the sensitivity of concentration to changes
in unit costs, thereby dictating specialization on both margins. Trade costs
decrease comparative advantage and increase specialization on the extensive
and intensive margin. A higher elasticity of substitution provides for better
substitution between intermediate goods and allows countries to concentrate
their expenditure in low price sectors. As a consequence, concentration on
the intensive margin increases. Note that the model characterizes import
concentration on all margins.
To calibrate the model, I follow Waugh [2010] and use data and the structure
of the model to infer trade costs, technology and the elasticity of substitution.
Not surprisingly, the simulated results show that the model produces the
observed specialization pattern qualitatively with countries being specialized
in exports and diversified in imports on all margins. More importantly, the
simulated model also reproduces the degree of concentration on the extensive
versus the intensive margin for both, exports and imports. However, the
obtained levels for exports are too high in comparison to the data. Focusing
on the variation across countries, the simulated model replicates the fact that
larger economies are more diversified in exports but fails to account for the
observed cross-country pattern of imports.
7This paper contributes to the international trade literature that analyses the
relationship between the pattern of trade and specialization in commodities.
Leamer [1984], who tested whether the structure of trade can be explained
by the availability of resources, started an empirical literature on specializa-
tion by relating the pattern of trade to factor endowments motivated by the
Hechscker-Ohlin theorem, see, for example, Bowen et al. [1987], Trefler [1995]
and Schott [2003]. On the other hand, MacDougall [1951], Balassa [1963],
Golub and Hsieh [2000] and Costinot et al. [2012] use trade data to test the
Ricardian prediction that countries export relatively more of the commodi-
ties they are relatively more productive in. Unlike these papers, my analysis
does not intend to explain why countries specialize in a certain commodity
or group of commodities. Instead, it uses the level of concentration in trade
data to shed light on the factors that drive specialization in the number and
the volume of goods traded. The levels of concentration in each trade direc-
tion contain information on the pattern of trade and as such they provide a
new quantitative test of the extent of specialization observed in the data.
The analysis presented in this paper is also related to a growing literature
in quantifying the importance of Ricardian comparative advantage in ex-
plaining trade patterns using the Eaton-Kortum framework, see, for exam-
ple, Chor [2010], Shikher [2011], Levchenko and Zhang [2011] and Costinot
et al. [2012]. These papers specify a multi-sector Ricardian model with both
inter- and intra-industry trade in order to derive implications on the sectorial
level. In contrast, I abstract from intra-industry trade and attach a sectoral
interpretation to the continuum of traded goods within the standard Eaton-
Kortum framework. Given this notion, the number of traded sectors arises
endogenously and is not assumed to be fixed as in the previous papers. While
the standard model has been primarily used to explain bilateral trade flows
and trade volume, (see, for example, Eaton and Kortum [2002], Alvarez and
Lucas [2007] and Waugh [2010]), I focus on the implications on the pattern
of trade and analyze how geography, tastes and absolute and comparative
advantage induce countries to specialize in narrow sectors. In particular, I
characterize the models predictions on export and import concentration on
the intensive and extensive product margin and highlight the implications on
the specialization pattern.
At this point, it is important to note that the Ricardian model shares with
other models of international trade, most notably monopolistic competition
8models based on Krugman [1980] and Armington models like Anderson and
Van Wincoop [2003], the ability to develop quantitative predictions about
specialization patterns on the intensive and extensive product margin. How-
ever, the underlying mechanisms of generating the specialization pattern dif-
fer. In monopolistic competition and Armington models, tradable goods are
diﬀerentiated by location of production since each country is the sole pro-
ducer of a good. Thus, countries specialize completely and import all other
goods. In the Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum [2002] each homoge-
neous good is produced by more than one country and producers directly
compete with imports for the lowest price. Because multiple countries ex-
port and produce the same goods, the Eaton and Kortum model generates
incomplete specialization.
Finally, my investigation adds to the empirical growth literature that ana-
lyzes the relationship between income and trade patterns on the intensive
and extensive product margins, see Hummels and Klenow [2005] and Cadot
et al. [2011]. Like the previous papers, I study cross-country diﬀerences by
decomposing the trade pattern into extensive and intensive margins. Simi-
lar to their analysis I quantify the contribution of each export margin and
relate the outcome to income diﬀerences across countries. In addition, I ap-
ply the decomposition to imports and use the resulting empirical evidence
to test the ability of the Eaton-Kortum model to explain the relationship of
income diﬀerences and the concentration of exports and imports along both
margins. While Hummels and Klenow [2005] stress that models with Krug-
man firm-level product diﬀerentiation can explain why larger economies ex-
port a larger number of goods, my analysis shows that the Ricardian model
of Eaton-Kortum based on constant returns to scale oﬀers an alternative
framework to describe the observed patterns. The novel approach of link-
ing cross-country variation of export and import concentration to test the
Eaton-Kortum model sheds light on how the interaction between preferences,
technology and geography establishes trade patterns on the intensive and ex-
tensive product margin. As such, the Eaton-Kortum framework can provide
theoretical guidance for future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
presents the empirical evidence of import and export concentration. Section
3 lays out the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the calibration that
allows the model to replicate the empirical facts. Section 5 estimates trade
9costs and presents the simulation results based on the estimated trade costs.
Section 6 discusses the robustness of the results while section 7 concludes.
1.2 Empirical evidence and data
The starting point of my analysis is an empirical assessment of the observed
specialization patterns in world trade using detailed product level trade data.
Before describing the data and the empirical evidence, we examine the prop-
erties of the concentration measurements used, which form the basis of the
qualitative and quantitative tests of the model.
1.2.1 Concentration measurements
I compute two measures of specialization for product level sales, the Gini
coeﬃcient and the Theil index. The Theil index has the advantage of being
decomposable into an extensive and intensive product margin measure. For
concreteness, I focus on exports - concentration measures for imports are
entirely analogous. The two measurements are defined as follows. Let k
index a product among the N products in operation in the world economy,
let Rk be the corresponding export sales revenue, say, in a given country.
The export Gini in this country is defined as :
G =
2
N
(
PN
k=1 kRk)PN
k=1Rk
  N + 1
N
(1.1)
where export revenues of product k, Rk, are indexed in increasing order, i.e.
Rk < Rk+1, and N denotes the total number of products in the world. A Gini
coeﬃcient of zero expresses complete diversification across trade revenues,
i.e. (1) a country exports all products and (2) the revenues are the same
across them. An index of one expresses complete specialization in which case
export revenues stem from one product only. Alternatively, the Theil index
is a weighted average of the log diﬀerence from the mean export revenue (R¯)
and defined by the following formula
T =
1
N
X
k2N
Rk
R¯
ln
✓
Rk
R¯
◆
(1.2)
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The index takes the value of zero in the case of complete diversification and
ln(N) in the case of complete specialization. Cadot et al. [2011] decom-
pose the Theil index into a measure for the intensive and extensive product
margin, T = T ext + T int. The extensive Theil index (T ext) captures the con-
centration in the number of products (extensive product margin) whereas
the intensive Theil (T int) measures the concentration in the sales volume of
products (intensive product margin). The intensive Theil index is given by:
T int =
1
Nx
X
k2Nx
Rk
R¯x
ln
✓
Rk
R¯x
◆
(1.3)
and the extensive Theil index is
T ext = ln
✓
N
Nx
◆
(1.4)
Nx denotes the number of exported products and R¯x represents the mean
value of exported products.
1.2.2 Data
To build my empirical evidence, I use the Comtrade data set collected by
the United Nations and choose the 6 digit HS 1992 product classification
scheme as the preferred level of disaggregation. I follow Hummels and Klenow
[2005] and refer to import flows of the same 6-digit product from diﬀerent
trading partners to diﬀerent varieties of the same product. I assume that
the tradable goods sector corresponds to manufactures defined to be the
aggregate across all 34 BEA manufacturing industries, see Feenstra et al.
[1997]. 1 Using a correspondence table provided by Feenstra et al. [1997], I
identify 4529 tradable manufacturing products. The baseline sample covers
160 countries representing all regions and all levels of development between
1992 and 2009 (18 years). It includes 129 developing countries, defined by the
World Bank as countries with per capita GDP under $16,000 in constant 2005
PPP international dollars. In total, the sample consists of 2880 observations
(country-years).
1. This is a simplification, but it is reasonable as a first-order approximation because,
for all countries in the sample, this represents on average 76 percent of all merchandise
imports; the median is 91 percent.
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Note the data contains import and export flows within 6 digit product cat-
egories. The model I am testing is Ricardian and does not feature trade
between varieties of the same product. To establish a mapping between the
model and the data, I net out the within product component by considering
net trade flows instead of gross trade flows. 2 To measure the importance
of trade between products and trade between varieties, I follow Grubel and
Lloyd [1975] and calculate the percentage share of trade between products
with respect to total trade. I find an average value of 81 percent across coun-
tries. The overall share of total net trades flows with respect to total gross
trade flows is 65 percent. Both findings suggest that the majority of trade
flows between countries in this sample is across products. 3
Based on net trade flows at the product level, I first calculate the corre-
sponding concentration indexes on all margins for each year and then take
the average over the whole sample period. Because the concentration indices
employed are independent of scale, the calculation on a year-to-year basis
avoids the need to deflate the data. Figure 1.1 plots the mean export against
the mean import concentration for each country together with the 45 degree
line. In terms of overall concentration, Figures 1.1(a) and 1.1(b), the vast
majority of observed levels lie above the 45 degree line highlighting the fact
that exports are more concentrated than imports for almost all countries.
On the intensive product margin, Figure 1.1(c), the specialization level of
exports is similar to imports with slightly higher levels of concentration for
exports. Figure 1.1(d) plots the results for the extensive product margin
with countries exporting fewer products than they import.
Table 1.1 summarizes the sample statistics with the average year-by-year in-
dices over the 2880 country-year pairs. As implied by Figure 1.1, exports
are more concentrated than imports on all margins. With respect to overall
2. I compute total net exports at the 6 digit product level and consider a country as
an exporter of that product if net exports are positive and an importer otherwise.
3. In the appendix I present an alternative approach to account for observed intra-
industry trade in the data. The basic idea is to develop a measurement device that enables
the model to characterize trade within and across products. The suggested procedure
converts the product units in the model to product units in the data and allows examining
specialization patterns based on gross trade flows. In the rest of the paper, I follow the
net trade flow approach. I present the estimation and results of the alternative procedure
in the appendix.
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Table 1.1 – Mean concentration indexes over 2880 country-year pairs
Gini Theil Exports (X) Theil Imports (M)
Exp Imp Ext. Int. Total Ext. Int. TotalMar. Mar. Mar. Mar.
Level of 0.98 0.91 2.60 2.13 4.73 1.10 1.61 2.71concentration
% share of overall 55% 45% 40% 60%concentration
concentration, the summary statistics reveal high levels of export and import
concentration with a Gini coeﬃcient of 0.98 for exports and 0.91 for imports.
In the case of exports, the high level of concentration is due to the fact that
countries export few products and hence specialization is primarily driven by
the extensive margin. For imports, the decomposition favors an alternative
explanation. Countries import a fairly wide range of products but concen-
trate their trade in the value of few products. The share of the intensive
margin with respect to overall concentration is 60 percent. Focusing on the
gap between export and import concentration, Table 1.1 shows that diﬀer-
ences between exports and imports are mainly explained by the extensive
margin with a Theil of 2.60 for exports versus 1.10 for imports. The Theil of
1.10 on the extensive margin implies that, on average, a country net imports
a 33.3 percent of all products. On the other hand, the extensive Theil of 2.60
indicates that a country net exports 7.4 percent of the product space. In
terms of the intensive margin, a country receives roughly 50% of its export
revenues from 1% of the products it exports and spends 50% of its import
expenditure on 2% of the products it imports. Overall, these results are con-
sistent with the idea that openness to trade spurs countries to specialize in
few exporting sectors and diversify the importing sectors.
Turning to cross country diﬀerences, the empirical evidence shows that larger
economies diversify more than smaller economies. Figure 1.2 plots the log
of the mean levels of concentration as a function of market size including
the best linear fit for all margins. Market size is measured by the log of
the average relative GDP to the United States (USA = 0) over the periods
1992 to 2009. As Figures 1.2(a) and 1.2(b) show, the overall Theil index de-
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creases with respect to relative GDP, i.e. smaller economies specialize more.
This relationship is more pronounced for exports than for imports with an R
square of 0.58 compared to 0.41. The decomposition reveals that specializa-
tion on the intensive margin does not vary with market size for both, exports
(Figures 1.2(e)) and imports (1.2(f)). The main driver of specialization dif-
ferences across countries is the extensive margin. Particularly robust is the
linear relationship on the extensive margin for exports with an R square of
0.75. Bigger economies are more diversified because they export more prod-
ucts, which is consistent with Koren and Tenreyro [2007]’s observation that
larger economies are more diversified because they produce and export more
products. The relationship between market size and specialization on the
extensive margin of imports follows a L shape pattern. As the size of an
economy increases, countries diversify on imports until reaching a certain
market size after which concentration is roughly equal across countries.
At this point, the key qualitative and quantitative facts have been estab-
lished. First, exports are more specialized than imports on all margins. Sec-
ond, the extensive margin drives concentration of exports and the intensive
margin for imports. Third, the target levels of concentration are displayed in
Table 1.1. Fourth, the cross-country patterns imply a negative relationship
between market size and specialization caused by the extensive margin, i.e.
larger economies export and import more products. The rest of the paper
evaluates the Ricardian model’s ability to account for these stylized facts.
Next, I present the relevant parts of the Alvarez and Lucas [2007] extension
of the Eaton-Kortum framework.
1.3 Model
The Eaton–Kortum model is Ricardian, with a continuum of goods produced
under a constant-returns technology. In this paper, we focus on the Alvarez
and Lucas [2007] model, which builds on the Eaton Kortum framework. I
derive the relevant theoretical predictions on the pattern of trade and evalu-
ate the importance of the key model parameters for specialization of imports
and exports.
Consider a world economy with I countries, where each country produces
tradable intermediate goods as well as non-tradable composite and final
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goods. Following Alvarez and Lucas [2007], define x = (x1, ..., xI) as a vector
of technology draws for any given tradable good and refer to it as “good x”
with x 2 RI+. The production of an intermediate good in country i is defined
by:
qi(xi) = x
 ✓
i si(xi)
 qmi(xi)
1  .
Technology xi diﬀers between goods and is drawn independently from a com-
mon exponential distribution with density   and a country specific technol-
ogy parameter  i, i.e. xi ⇠ exp(1/ i). Denote the wage by wi and the price
of the intermediate aggregate good by pm,i. The intermediate good sector
is perfectly competitive. Intermediate good producers minimize input costs
and sell the tradable intermediate good at price
pi(xi) = Bx
✓
iw
 
i p
1  
mi .
where B =    (1   ) (1  ). The continuum of intermediate input goods x
enters the production of the composite good qi symmetrically with a constant
elasticity of substitution (⌘ > 0)
qi =
ˆ 1
0
q(x)1 1/⌘ (x)dx
 ⌘/(1 ⌘)
.
The produced aggregate intermediate good qi can then be allocated costless
towards the production of final goods or being used as an input in the pro-
duction of intermediate goods. Similarly, labor, as the only primary factor
input, can be used either to produce intermediate or final goods. Finally,
consumers draw their utility linearly from the final good. All markets are
perfectly competitive. Since these features are not central to the implica-
tions I derived in this paper, I omit them. The interested reader is refereed
to Alvarez and Lucas [2007] for the full description of the model.
1.3.1 General equilibrium
Once a country opens to international goods markets, the intermediate goods
are the only goods traded. Final goods are not traded and labor is immobile
between countries. Due to trade costs, factor prices do not equalize across
countries. The intermediate goods needed to produce the composite good
are acquired from the producer of good x in the country that operates at
lowest unit costs.
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Trading intermediate goods between countries is costly. We define “Iceberg”
transportation costs for good x from country i to country j by ij where
ij < 1 8 i 6= j and ii = 1 8i. As in Alvarez and Lucas [2007], we also
consider tariﬀs. !ij is the tariﬀ charged by country i on goods imported from
country j. Tariﬀs distort international trade but do not entail a physical loss
of resources. Incorporating the trade costs, composite good producers in
country i will buy the intermediate good x from country j that oﬀers the
lowest price
pi(x) = Bmin
j
"
w j p
1  
mj
ij!ij
x✓j
#
. (1.5)
Equation 1.5 shows that whether country i specializes in the production
of good x depends on the productivity realizations, factor prices and trade
costs. If country i does not oﬀer a good at lowest costs in the local market,
the good is imported. Following Alvarez and Lucas, the resulting price index
of tradable goods in country i is
pmi = (AB)
0@ IX
j=1
 
w j p
1  
mj
ij!ij
! 1/✓
 j
1A ✓ (1.6)
where A =  (1 + ✓(⌘   1)) is the Gamma function evaluated at point (1 +
✓(⌘   1)). Next, we calculate the expenditure shares for each country i. Let
Dij be the fraction of country i’s per capita spending pmiqi on tradables that
is spent on goods from country j. Then, we can write total spending of i on
goods from j as
pmiqiDij =
ˆ
Bij
pi(x)qi(x) (x)dx
where Bij defines the set of goods country j attains a minimum in equation
1.5. Note that Dij is simply the probability that country j is selling good x
in country i at the lowest price and calculated to be
Dij = (AB)
 1/✓
 
w j p
1  
mj
pmiij!ij
! 1/✓
 j. (1.7)
Equation 1.7 shows that in this model the sensitivity of trade between coun-
tries i and j depends on the level of technology  , trade costs !, geographic
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barriers  and the technological parameter ✓ (reflecting the heterogeneity of
goods in production) and is independent of the elasticity of substitution ⌘.
This result is due to the assumption that ⌘ is common across countries and
does not distort relative good prices across countries. Note also that by the
law of large numbers, the probability that country i imports from country
j is identical to the share of goods country i imports from j. In this sense,
trade shares respond to costs and geographic barriers at the extensive mar-
gin: As a source becomes more expensive or remote it exports/imports a
narrower range of goods. It is important to keep in mind that the number
of intermediate input industries that enter the production of the composite
good is fixed. Each country uses the whole continuum of intermediate goods
to produce composite goods. There are no gains of trade due to an increased
number of varieties. Welfare gains are realized through incomplete special-
ization. Domestic production competes with imports and countries specialize
through the reallocation of resources made available by the exit of ineﬃcient
domestic producers.
Finally, to close the model, we impose that total payments to foreigners
(imports) are equal to total receipts from foreigners (exports) for all countries
i
Lipmiqi
IX
j=1
Dij!ij =
IX
j=1
LjpmjqjDji!ji (1.8)
The previous equation implies an excess demand system which depends only
on wages. Solving this system, describes the equilibrium wage for each coun-
try together with the corresponding equilibrium prices and quantities. Next,
I describe the predictions on export and import concentration on both mar-
gins.
1.3.2 Concentration of exports and imports
In the model, the pattern of trade is established by domestic producers com-
peting with importers for selling intermediate goods in the local market. If
foreign producers sell a particular good at a lower price than domestic pro-
ducers, the good will be imported from the cheapest source. Given the equi-
librium price, p(x), and quantity, q(x), the total expenditure that country i
spends (c.i.f.) on imported good x, RiM(x), is:
17
RiM(x) = Lipi(x)qi(x) x /2 Bii
where Bii ⇢ RI+ is the set of goods where country i obtains the minimum
price at home. Equivalently, domestic producers export their good to all
foreign markets where they oﬀer the minimum price. The set of exporting
goods is simply a collection of the set of goods country i exports to any
destination j, x 2 [Ij 6=iBji. As a result, (f.o.b.) export revenue sales of good
x, Ri,X(x), are given by:
RiX(x) =
IX
k 6=i
Lkpk(x)qk(x)ki!ki x 2 [Ij 6=iBji
Given the described pattern of trade, the concentration index for imports
is identified. To show this, I decompose the overall concentration into a
concentration measure for the intensive and extensive product margin. Using
equation 1.3, the Theil index for the concentration of imports on the intensive
production margin can be written as:
T intiM =
ˆ
x/2Bii
RiM(x)
R¯iM
ln
✓
RiM(x)
R¯iM
◆
 (x)dx
In the appendix I show that the distribution of import expenditures follows
a Fréchet distribution with shape parameter 1/✓(⌘   1) and scale parameter
si. Solving the integral, the intensive Theil index of imports for country i
becomes:
T intiM = ln ( (1 + ✓(1  ⌘))) 
ˆ 1
0
ln
 
u( ✓(1 ⌘))
 
e udu (1.9)
where  (.) stands for the Gamma function. Import specialization on the
intensive margin is independent of equilibrium prices, trade costs, geogra-
phy and the level of technology  . It is solely determined by preferences
(i.e the elasticities of substitution) and heterogeneity in production (i.e. the
degree of comparative advantage). A higher elasticity of substitution (⌘)
increases specialization by allowing producers in the composite intermediate
good sector to better substitute cheap for expensive products and concen-
trate expenditure towards these sectors. Similar, an increase in the degree of
comparative advantage (✓), which corresponds to a higher variance of pro-
ductivity realizations and therefore an increase in unit price diﬀerences across
goods, heightens the degree of concentration.
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To compute the concentration of imports on the extensive margin, note that
the set of goods produced is disjoint form the set of goods imported. Con-
sequently, we can express the share of goods imported as 1 minus the share
of goods produced, (1   Dii). The Theil index for the extensive margin of
imports is equal to :
T extiM = ln
✓
N
NiM
◆
=   ln(1 Dii) (1.10)
where
Dii = (AB)
 1/✓
✓
wi
pmi
◆  /✓
 i
and depends on the level of technology and equilibrium prices.
To assess the level of specialization in exports, I simulate the model within
a discrete product space in the following section. I then calculate the export
concentration index on the intensive margin according to equation 1.3. The
extensive Theil index on the extensive margin is given by the inverse share
of the number of goods exported, NiX , with respect to the total number of
simulated goods, N .
T extiX = ln
✓
N
NiX
◆
Having outlined the pattern of trade and the corresponding implications on
the specialization pattern of exports and imports, the next section discusses
the simulation of the model. It contains special cases of equilibria designed
to spell out step-by-step the main implications of the model on export and
import concentration and in further instance on specialization.
1.4 Calibration and simulation
To simulate the theoretical model, which assumes an infinite amount of
goods, I "discretize" the Fréchet distribution of total factor productivity
and calculate the respective trade value for each product x. Concerning the
remaining parameters of the model, I use the same values as Alvarez and
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Lucas [2007]. I assume a variance of individual productivities ✓ = 0.12, an
elasticity of substitution of intermediate goods ⌘ = 2, an eﬃcient labor share
in the production of non-tradable final goods ↵ = 0.75 and an eﬃcient labor
share in the tradable goods sector of   = 0.5. The simulation contains a to-
tal of I = 160 countries. In the following subsections, I analyze import and
export concentration in special cases of the equilibrium by assuming diﬀer-
ent trading schemes. Doing so builds intuition of how taste, technology and
geography determine specialization. To illustrate the impact of each factor
separately, it is instructive to start the analysis by assuming symmetric coun-
tries and introduce heterogeneity across countries later on. Finally, I show
that for a particular configuration of trade costs the Eaton-Kortum model is
able to replicate the specialization patterns observed in the data.
1.4.1 Symmetric countries
All countries are identical with respect to their size Li = L and technology
parameter  i =  . Trade costs are symmetric and set to ij =  8 i 6= j with
ii = 1 and !ij = 1 8i, j. I solve for the equilibrium wage in each country, all
goods prices and the value of imports and exports. Due to symmetry, wages
and composite good prices equalize across countries. Trade costs distort
international trade. In comparison to free trade, firms will not be able to
buy good x from the cheapest producer world wide and rely more on home
production. The corresponding trade share matrix D is symmetric and the
(i, j) element is given by:
Di,j =
()1/✓
1 + (I   1)()1/✓ 8i 6= j and Di,i =
1
1 + (I   1)()1/✓
where Dij is the set of goods country j exports to country i and Dii the set
of goods country i produces at home. In free trade,  = 1, each country’s
intermediate good producers specialize in a distinct set of goods equal to
the relative size of the economy and export all products produced, Dii =
Dij = 1/I. The corresponding share of imported products is 1   Dii =
(I   1)/I. Hence, the more countries participate in international trade, the
more countries specialize in exports and diversify in imports. In this case,
Ricardian specialization forces are strongest and the gap between export and
import concentration reaches a maximum.
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Concentration on the Extensive Margin Including trade costs the con-
centration index of imports equals the share of goods country i imports from
all countries in the world and is given by:
T extiM =   ln((1 Dii)) = ln(1 + (I   1)()1/✓)  ln((I   1)()1/✓)
Concentration at the extensive margin of imports increases with trade barri-
ers  and decreases with the number of trading partners I 1 and the degree
of comparative advantage ✓. Regarding exports, the extensive Theil index is
given by the number of products exported to any destination divided by the
total number of products in the world. Note that the randomness of the pro-
ductivity distribution implies that in this model there is no fixed hierarchy
of export destinations as in Melitz [2003], i.e. goods that are exported to the
k+1 “most popular” destinations are not necessarily exported to the k most
popular destinations. 4 To count the number of products exported, define
the set of products exported as the union of the set of products exported
to each destination, Uex = [Ij 6=iBji. Because the set of products exported
to destination j overlaps with the set of products exported to destination
k, Bji \ Bki 6= ;, I apply the Inclusion Exclusion principle to avoid double
counting. As I show in the appendix, under the assumption of symmetry,
the extensive Theil index of exports is given by:
T extiX =   ln
 
I 1X
k=1
( 1)k 1
✓
I
k
◆
ak
!
where the share of products exported to k destinations, ak, is given by:
ak =
()1/✓
k + (I   k)()1/✓
The concentration of exports at the extensive margin increases with geo-
graphical barriers, the degree of comparative advantage and the number of
trading partners. In general, a larger number of trading partners increases
competition between production and imports in the domestic market result-
ing in the production of fewer goods at home and an increase in the number
4. In the basic version of the Melitz [2003] model, exported goods obey a hierarchy, see
Eaton et al. [2011]. Any good sold to the k + 1st most popular destination is necessarily
sold to the kth most popular destination as well. In that model the total number of
exported goods would simply be all the products exported to the most popular destination,
i.e. the destination with the lowest trade costs.
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of goods imported. Also, more trading partners increase competition among
exporters in foreign markets forcing countries to specialize more on the ex-
tensive margin of exports. Impediments to trade, i.e. a reduction in , and a
higher degree of comparative advantage, ✓, reduce import competition and,
as a result, fewer goods are exported and imported. Notice that in the spe-
cial case of free trade all goods produced are exported and concentration
of production equals concentration of exports. With trade costs, countries
export a subset of produced goods leading to more concentration of exports
relative to production.
Concentration on the Intensive Margin As noted previously the dis-
tribution of import expenditure follows a Fréchet distribution where the con-
centration indexes depend on the elasticity of substitution (⌘) and the degree
of comparative advantage (✓). Consequently, given ✓ and the concentration
of imports observed in the data, I can pin down the elasticity of substitution.
Concerning the distribution of export revenues across products, the simula-
tion shows that it depends positively on the elasticity of substitution (⌘),
the degree of comparative advantage (✓) and geographical barriers (). The
number of trading partners has non-monotone eﬀects on the concentration of
exports at the intensive margin. Few trading partners increase concentration
because high revenue generating exports sell in more markets. However, as
the number of trading partners increases, the degree of competition in the
export markets also increases and low revenue generating products do not
sell in foreign markets anymore. Thus, after a threshold level, concentration
among export revenues reduces with the number of trading partners. In the
case of free trade, countries export all their goods to all destinations and,
given that preferences are identical, export and import concentration on the
intensive margin equalize. 5
5. The intuition behind this result is that preferences are such that the import ex-
penditure distribution is the same for each trading partner. In the appendix, I show in
detail that the expenditure distribution of bilateral trade, Eij(x), between importer i and
exporter j is the same for each source country j, i.e. Eij(x) = Ei(x), 8j 2 I. Further-
more, the bilateral import expenditure distribution, Ei(x), is Fréchet with common shape
parameter 1/(✓(⌘ 1)) and country specific scale parameter si. The shape parameters are
identical because preferences are common across countries. Note that the bilateral import
expenditure distribution of country i, equals the export revenue distribution of country
j. In free trade, the exporting country ships the exact same goods to all countries. As a
consequence, overall export revenue distribution of country j is equal to the import expen-
diture distribution of each country scaled up by the number of trading partners. Since the
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Table 1.2 – Simulated export and import concentration indexes for benchmark
parameters.
Gini Theil Exports (X) Theil Imports (M)
Parameters Exp. Im.
Ext. Int.
Total
Ext. Int.
Total
Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar.
(⌘ = 2, = 1) 0.99 0.09 5.01 0.01 5.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
(⌘ = 7.1, = 1) 0.99 0.72 5.01 1.91 6.92 0.01 1.61 1.62
(⌘ = 7.1,  = 0.7) 0.99 0.77 5.04 1.18 6.22 0.10 1.61 1.71
(⌘ = 7.1,  = 0.7, NT=10) 0.98 0.86 2.47 2.45 4.92 1.09 1.61 2.70
Data 0.98 0.91 2.60 2.13 4.73 1.10 1.61 2.71
The results presented in Table 1.2 show that the free trade calibration of Al-
varez and Lucas [2007] is able to replicate the qualitative fact that, overall,
exports are more concentrated than imports. While the simulated overall
level of export concentration attains the degree of specialization observed in
the data, in the benchmark free trade parametrization countries diversify ex-
cessively in imports. Focusing on the decomposition reveals the underlying
reason: countries import too many goods and the value of those goods is
too evenly distributed. Using the fact that for a given value of ✓, import
concentration on the intensive margin can be determined by the elasticity of
substitution, I calibrate ⌘ = 7.1 to match the level observed in the data 6.
As row 2 of Table 1.2 shows, this allows composite good producers to better
substitute between intermediate inputs and alters the level of import con-
centration.
To reduce the gap between export and import concentration caused by the
extensive product margin, I follow Alvarez and Lucas [2007] and introduce 42
percent symmetric trade costs to all trading partners,  = 0.7. Row 3 of Table
1.2 shows the results. Impediments to trade reduce the number of products
exported and imported and concentration on the extensive margin increases
concentration indexes are independent of scale, the concentration of exports and imports
on the intensive margin equalize.
6. This value is consistent with previous ones found in the literature, see Broda and
Weinstein [2006].
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for both. Note that higher trade costs lower the level of concentration on
the intensive margin of exports. Due to the increase in trade costs, only
eﬃcient producers remain exporters allowing them to distribute their export
revenues more evenly across products and trade partners. Although the gap
between export and import concentration narrows slightly, the diﬀerence
is still substantial. The reason for this is that the degree of competition
countries face in export and domestic markets is too high. Creating trading
blocks by introducing infinite trade costs with countries outside of the block
limits the number of trading partners (NT ) and reduces competition in all
markets. The fit of the model improves on all dimensions, fourth row of Table
1.2. Less competition in the domestic market increases the survival rate of
domestic producers and reduces the amount of goods imported. Infinite trade
costs reduce the number of countries competing in a particular market and
increases the probability to export to any of them. As a result, the gap
between export and import concentration diminishes. Note that revenues
of exporting industries are now geographically more concentrated and hence
specialization on the intensive margin of exports intensifies.
In sum, with the introduction of symmetric trade costs, the model can repli-
cate the mean levels of concentration observed in the data. The key param-
eters are the elasticities of substitution ⌘ and the trade cost function . In
particular, by creating trade blocks, which amounts to introduce zeros in the
bilateral trade matrix, we can calibrate the model to explain the pattern of
specialization at the mean.
1.4.2 Asymmetric countries
In this section I analyze the eﬀects of cross-country heterogeneity on special-
ization. The empirical facts imply a negative relationship between specializa-
tion and market size. For this reason, I introduce heterogeneity in technology
 i and size Li to reflect the observed GDP diﬀerences in the data. To start
with, consider the model’s free trade equilibrium relationship between wages,
size and technology:
wi =
✓
 i
Li
◆✓/( +✓)
(1.11)
Using equation 1.11, I back out the level of technology,  i = (wiLi)( +✓)/✓ L  /✓i ,
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as a function of GDP (wiLi) and labor endowment (Li). To calibrate  , I
use GDP and population data from the Penn World table. I follow Waugh
[2010] and proxy labor endowment with data on a country’s population and
normalize the obtained parameters for  i and Li relative to the United States.
Concentration on the Extensive Margin Plugging in the equilibrium
wage into equation 1.7, I get the corresponding trade share matrix D with
the (i, j) element given by:
Dji =
wiLiPI
k=1wkLk
8j (1.12)
Equation 1.12 shows that under the assumption of free trade country i’s
share of number of products exported is equal to its relative level of GDP
with respect to world GDP. Hence, larger economies export more and import
less products compared to smaller economies. This result is at odds with the
empirical evidence. In the data, larger economies export and import more
products. In the next section, I introduce trade costs and argue that they
have to be asymmetric in order to replicate the empirical observations.
Concentration on the Intensive Margin On the intensive margin, un-
der the assumptions of homogenous tastes across countries and free trade,
export and import concentration equalize. In this case, export and import
concentration on the intensive margin depend only on ✓ and ⌘ and are unaf-
fected by the introduction of heterogeneity in technology and country size.
1.4.3 Asymmetric trade costs
To reconcile the cross-country concentration diﬀerences for imports, I in-
troduce asymmetric trade costs. In particular, I consider trade costs as a
function of a fixed export cost (exj) or a fixed import cost (imi). The next
paragraphs show the diﬀerent implications of each eﬀect.
1.4.3.1 Importer fixed eﬀect
Under the assumption of a fixed import cost, country i faces the same cost
of importing independent of the origin country j. The trade cost matrix
becomes i,j = imi 8j 6= i and i,i = 1 8j = i. Due to asymmetric trade
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costs, wages and composite good prices do not equalize. The trade share
matrix is asymmetric and given by:
Dji = (AB)
 1/✓
 
w i p
1  
mi
pmjimj
! 1/✓
 i 8i 6= j and Dii = (AB) 1/✓
✓
wi
pmi
◆  /✓
 i
Focusing on the expression for the share of goods that country j imports
from country i, Dj,i, shows that higher import costs reduce the fraction of
goods that arrive in destination j (imj #) and decrease the number of goods
country j imports from i. Solving for the equilibrium and assuming that
price diﬀerences across countries are approximately equal to the import cost
diﬀerences, the corresponding share of goods imported is approximately equal
to:
(1 Dii) t
⇣
1  C1im 
1
✓
i wiLi
⌘
(1.13)
where C1 is a constant independent of country i. Equation 1.13 shows that
an importer fixed eﬀect can counterbalance the fact that larger economies
import less under the assumption that they face lower costs to import. Lower
import costs increase the share of goods imported, (@(1   Dii)/@imi > 0),
and lead to a reduction in the unit cost of production through a lower price
index of tradable goods, which in turn increase the competitiveness abroad.
1.4.3.2 Exporter fixed eﬀect
In the case of an exporter fixed eﬀect, each country pays a country specific
cost to export, which is independent of the importing country i, i,j = exj
8j 6= i and i,i = 1 8j = i. The trade share matrix is asymmetric and given
by:
Dji = (AB)
 1/✓
 
w i p
1  
m,i
pmjexi
! 1/✓
 i 8i 6= j and Dii = (AB) 1/✓
✓
wi
pm,i
◆  /✓
 i
Here the expression for Dji implies that a higher export cost reduces the frac-
tion of the good that arrives in destination j (exi #) and decreases the number
of goods country i exports to any destination j. Solving for the equilibrium
and assuming that composite good prices across countries are approximately
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equal, one can show that the share of goods imported is approximately given
by:
(1 Dii) t
⇣
1  C2ex
 1
✓
i wiLi
⌘
(1.14)
where C2 represents a constant independent of country i. Equation 1.14
shows that the share of goods imported is decreasing in the country spe-
cific exporting costs, (@(1   Dii)/@exi > 0). Lower exporting costs lead
to higher domestic wages, increase unit costs of production and result in a
larger share of imported goods. Hence, an exporter fixed eﬀect can rec-
oncile the fact that larger economies import more by assuming that (1)
larger economies face lower costs to export and (2) the relationship be-
tween GDP and the export cost is more pronounced than relationship be-
tween GDP and the share of goods imported, (@(1   Dii)/@wiLi > 0) )
((@(1 Dii)/@exi) (@exi/@wiLi) > @(1 Dii)/@wiLi).
The main diﬀerence between the import cost and the export cost in terms
of import concentration lies in the implication on the price level of tradable
goods. One can show that the export cost implies a nearly constant price
level of tradable goods across countries. As a result, unit cost diﬀerences
between countries are predominantly driven by wage diﬀerences. On the
contrary, the import cost leads to large cross-country price level diﬀerences
with smaller economies facing a higher tradable price level. In this case, unit
cost diﬀerences are driven by wage as well as price level diﬀerences. Based
on Waugh [2010]’s results that countries have similar price levels of tradable
goods, I focus only on the case of the exporter fixed eﬀect for the rest of my
analysis.
In sum, the introduction of asymmetric trade costs in form of a country
specific cost to export or import allows the model to replicate the import
specialization pattern across countries, in particular when larger economies
face relative low costs to either export or import. Waugh [2010] argues that
trade costs have to be asymmetric, with poor countries facing higher costs to
export relative to rich countries, in order to reconcile bilateral trade volumes
and price data. While both our approaches highlight the importance of
asymmetric trade costs in explaining trade data, our analysis diﬀers. Waugh
uses the Eaton Kortum model to explain bilateral trade volumes and price
data whereas I look on the models implications on the specialization pattern
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Table 1.3 – Simulated export and import concentration indexes for asymmetric
countries.
Gini Theil Exports (X) Theil Imports (M)
Parameters Exp. Imp.
Ext. Int.
Total
Ext. Int.
Total
Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar.
(⌘ = 7.1,  = 1) 0.99 0.73 5.75 1.91 7.66 0.007 1.61 1.62
(⌘ = 7.1,  = ex) 0.99 0.85 8.08 1.68 9.76 1.09 1.61 2.70
(⌘ = 7.1,  = ex, NT=10) 0.98 0.85 2.59 2.67 5.26 1.10 1.61 2.71
Data 0.98 0.91 2.60 2.13 4.73 1.10 1.61 2.71
of exports and imports. In this respect, the results presented in this paper
provide further evidence on the importance of asymmetry in trade costs when
studying trade volumes and trade patterns across countries.
Row 1 of table 1.3 presents simulations results in the case of asymmetric
countries and free trade. Note that in relation to the symmetric country case
introducing technology diﬀerences increases the mean level of concentration
for exports and decreases the level of concentration for imports. The under-
lying reason is that the technology distribution is skewed towards less pro-
ductive countries and these countries export fewer and import more goods.
Beside these changes, the results are similar to the symmetric case. While
exports are more concentrated than imports, the simulated level of concen-
tration for exports (imports) is too high (low) compared to the data. The
reason is excessive specialization (diversification) on the extensive margin of
exports (imports).
In terms of cross country diﬀerences, calibrated GDP diﬀerences in combina-
tion with zero or symmetric trade costs lead to the false prediction that larger
economies import less goods. To reconcile the empirical evidence, I introduce
country specific costs to export with larger economies facing relatively lower
export costs. In particular, I calculate the implied export cost from equation
1.14 by replacing the share of goods produced at home by the extensive Theil
index of imports observed in the data , Dii = 1 exp( TExtM ). Row 2 of table
1.3 shows the results of the corresponding mean concentration levels. While
the model matches the cross country concentration pattern, the mean level of
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export concentration is twice as high as in the data. Excessive competition
in the export markets leads to high levels of concentration on the extensive
margin of exports. To counter the competition eﬀect, I create trading blocks
between countries (i.e. limiting the number of trading partners NT = 10) . I
assume that countries within a block trade with countries whose market size
is similar. 7 Trade blocks conditional on market size improve the fit of the
model. The obtained concentration levels match the data on all dimension.
Row 3 of Table 1.3 presents the results. Countries are more concentrated
in exports than in imports on all margins, the intensive margin dominates
in terms of overall concentration and the simulated concentration levels are
close to the target levels. In terms of the cross country pattern, Figure 1.3
plots the simulated (in red) and the empirical (in blue) concentration levels
against GDP for both margins. The figure shows that the country specific
export cost in combination with technology and endowment diﬀerences can
replicate the across country evidence on all margins. Bigger economies are
more diversified because they import/export more products and concentra-
tion patterns on the intensive margin are insensitive to market size.
In the previous section I analyzed special cases of the equilibrium to study the
diﬀerent factors that determine specialization in the Eaton Kortum model.
The key determinants are the degree of comparative advantage, the elasticity
of substitution and asymmetric trade costs. However, I treated trade costs
as free parameters and showed that for a particular configuration of trade
costs, the model is able to reproduce concentration levels at the mean as well
as the cross-country specialization pattern for both exports and imports. In
the next section, I estimate trade costs and technology parameters based
on bilateral trade shares using the model’s structure and check whether for
given trade shares, the model is able to generate the observed specialization
pattern in the data.
1.5 Estimating trade costs from bilateral trade
shares
The starting point of the estimation of technology and trade costs is a struc-
tural log-linear “gravity” equation that relates bilateral trade shares with
7. The precise trade cost configuration is given in the appendix.
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trade costs and structural parameters of the model. To derive the relation-
ship, simply divide each country i’s trade share from country j, see equation
1.7, by country i’s home trade share. Taking logs yields I   1 equations for
each country i :
log
✓
Dij
Dii
◆
= Sj   Si + 1
✓
log(ij) +
1
✓
log(!ij) (1.15)
in which Si = log(w  /✓i p
 (1  )/✓
mi  i) presents the structural parametersof
the model. In order to estimate trade costs  and technology   implied by
equation 1.15 I use data on bilateral trade shares across 160 countries. I
calculate the corresponding bilateral trade share matrix by the ratio of total
gross imports of country i form country j, Mij, divided by absorption Absi
Dij =
Mij
Absi
.
Absorption is defined as total gross manufacturing output plus total imports,
Mi, minus total exports, Xi. To compute absorption, we use gross manufac-
turing output data from de Sousa et al. [2012]. Combined with trade data
from Comtrade, we get the expenditure share, Dij, which equals the value
of inputs consumed by country i imported from country j divided through
the total value of inputs in country i. Note that instead of focusing on a
particular year, I compute the expenditure share for each year of the period
1992 - 2009 and then take the average expenditure share over the sample
period. 8
In total there are only I2   I informative moments and I2 parameters of
interest. Thus, restrictions on the parameter space are necessary. To create
them, I follow Eaton and Kortum [2002] and assume the following functional
form of trade costs.
log (ij) = bij + dk + !ij + exj + ✏ij
Trade costs are a logarithmic function of distance (dk) a shared border eﬀect
between country i and j (bij), a tariﬀ charged by country i to country j and
8. The resulting sample consists of 160 times 159 potential observations if each country
trades with all other countries. In our sample the total number of observations is 9649
implying a large number of zeros in the bilateral matrix. For this reason, I conduct a
robustness test where I estimate the model with the Poisson estimator proposed by Silva
and Tenreyro [2006]. The appendix presents the results.
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Table 1.4 – Estimation Results
Summary Statistics
Observations TSS SSR R2
9649 2,60E+05 4,67E+04 0.82
Geographical barriers
Barrier Parameter estimate Std. error % eﬀect on cost
[0,375) -4,89 0,10 79,93%
[375,740) -5,76 0,06 99,60%
[750,1500) -6,78 0,04 125,62%
[1500,3000) -7,98 0,03 160,66%
[3000,6000) -9,05 0,02 196,42%
[6000,max) -9,81 0,03 224,64%
Tariﬀ -0,23 0,10 5,47%
Shared border 1,37 0,09 -15,19%
an exporter fixed eﬀect (exj). Tariﬀ (!ij) represents the weighted average ad
valorem tariﬀ rate applied by country i to country j. The distance function is
represented by a step function divided into 6 intervals. Intervals are in miles:
[0, 375); [375, 750); [750, 1,500); [1,500, 3,000); [3,000, 6,000); and [6,000,
maximum]. ✏ij reflects barriers to trade arising from all other factors and is
orthogonal to the regressors. The distance and common border variables are
obtained from the comprehensive geography database compiled by CEPII.
To recover technology, I follow Waugh [2010] and use the estimated trade
costs, ˆ, and structural parameters, Sˆ, to compute the implied tradable good
prices, pˆm, by rewriting equation 1.6 in terms of Sˆ:
pˆmi = (AB)
 
IX
j=1
eSˆj (ˆij!ij)
1/✓
! ✓
From the obtained prices and the estimates Sˆi, I get the convolution of wages
and technology, log(w  /✓i  i). Then, given the bilateral trade shares, Di,j,
and the balanced trade condition in equation 1.8, I follow Alvarez and Lucas
[2007] and calculate equilibrium wages according to the following equation.
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Liwi(1  sfi) =
IX
j=1
Lj
wj(1  sfj)
Fj
Dji!ji
where sfi is the labor share in the production of final goods
sfi =
↵(1  (1   )Fi)
(1  ↵) Fi + ↵(1  (1   )Fi)
and Fi is the fraction of country i spending on tradable goods net of tariﬀ
expenses.
Fi =
IX
j=1
Dji!ji
The obtained equilibrium wages together with tradable good prices, deter-
mine the implied technology levels  ˆ for each country given the structural
estimates of the gravity equation.
Table 1.4 summarizes the regression outcome of the gravity equation. In
terms of fitting bilateral trade flows, I obtain an R2 of 0.82 slightly lower
than the R2 of 0.83 reported by Waugh. The obtained coeﬃcients on trade
costs are consistent with the gravity literature, where distance and tariﬀs are
an impediment to trade. The magnitudes of the coeﬃcients reported in Table
1.4 are similar to those in Eaton and Kortum [2002] and in Waugh [2010],
which consider a similar sample of countries without tariﬀs. The overall size
of the trade costs in terms of percentage are similar to those reported in
Anderson and Van Wincoop [2004].
Having identified trade costs and technology, see Table 1.6 for the estimated
technology parameters, I simulate the Eaton and Kortum model to test
whether the calibrated version can replicate the concentration levels observed
in the data. Table 1.5 presents the mean concentration levels for the sim-
ulated countries. The results show that the calibrated model replicates the
fact that countries are more specialized in exports than in imports on all
margins. Focusing on the obtained levels reveals that countries concentrate
excessively on exports with respect to the data. The simulated concentra-
tion levels are almost twice as high as the ones observed in the data. Mean
export (import) concentration on the extensive margin is 4.83 (0.84) com-
pared to 2.60 (1.10) in the data. This implies that in the simulated model
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Table 1.5 – Simulated concentration level with exporter fixed eﬀect
Gini Theil Exports (X) Theil Imports (M)
Exp. Imp.
Int. Int.
Total
Ext. Int.
Total
Model Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar.
Simulation
0.99 0.89 4.83 3.32 8.15 0.84 1.61 2.45
59% 41% 34% 66%
Data
0.98 0.91 2.60 2.13 4.73 1.10 1.61 2.71
55% 45% 40% 60%
countries export (import) 0.8 (43.2) percent of the product space compared
to 7.4 (33.3) precent in the data.
Figure 1.4 plots the corresponding cross country pattern for simulated and
empirically observed concentration levels against the log of GDP. The model
replicates the empirical pattern with export concentration decreasing in mar-
ket size. However, the simulated concentration levels on the extensive mar-
gin are too high, particularly for smaller economies. Countries specialize
excessively on the number of products exported. On the importing side, the
calibrated model is unable to replicate the L shape relationship between mar-
ket size and concentration. The relationship does not reveal any particular
pattern. However, simulated countries tend to import more goods than in
the data. Turning the attention to the intensive margin, Figures 1.4(e) and
1.4(f), the results show that, consistent with the data, the model predicts no
relationship between concentration and market size. In sum, the calibrated
model is able to replicate the qualitative pattern for exports but produces
relatively high levels of concentration compared to the data, particularly on
the extensive margin.
A potential reason for the excessive concentration in exports lies in the un-
derlying productivity distribution. While the model reproduces the bilateral
trade volumes, it fails to capture the underlying distribution of trade volume
across products. To shed light on why countries trade too few products, I
follow Haveman and Hummels [2004] and plot the empirical and the simu-
33
lated density of the number of exporters and importers per product. 9 Figure
1.5 shows the results. In the case of exports, simulated countries export their
goods to too many destinations. The assumed productivity distribution gen-
erates such eﬃcient producers that even firms facing high trade costs can
sell their products to many destinations in the world. As a consequence, the
number of exporting countries per product is small. In the data (in blue)
more than a third of the products are exported by 25 or more countries.
In the simulation (in red) no product is exported by more than 25 coun-
tries. Turning the attention to imports, Figure 1.5(b) shows that, contrary
to exports, the simulated distribution of the number of countries importing
a product is closely related to the empirical one. The distributions are simi-
lar at the mean, however, the empirical distribution is more dispersed. The
average number of importing countries per product is 70 in the data and 75
in the model.
1.5.1 Discussion of results
There are several potential reasons why the model is not able to reproduce
the cross country pattern of import concentration on the extensive margin.
Note that the model implies that expenditure shares equal to product shares
in the tradable sector. The product share, ⇡i, is defined as the number of
products imported, Ni,M , divided by the total number of HS codes, N :
⇡i =
Ni,M
N
(1.16)
and the expenditure share, mi, equals the total value of imports, Mi, divided
by domestic absorption, Absi.
mi =
Mi
Absi
(1.17)
Figure 1.6 plots the empirical relationship between the two shares. The red
line marks the 45 degree line where the two are equal. Notice that countries
below the 45 degree import a lot of goods and spend relative little on those
9. To get the empirical distribution of the number of exporters and importers per
product, I count for each HS code the number of countries that net export or net import
the product. Similarly, the model implied distribution represents the number of exporters
and importers for each simulated product.
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goods, whereas countries above the 45 degree line import few goods and
spend a lot on them.
One potential reason why expenditure shares do not equal product shares in
the tradable sector could be that not all manufacturing products are trad-
able. When calculating expenditure shares, then ideally one wants to use
absorption of the tradable sector instead of absorption of the manufacturing
sector. If indeed the size of non-tradables within the manufacturing sector
varies between countries, then size diﬀerences between countries can explain
why countries do not align along the 45 degree line. For example, countries
below the 45 degree have a higher product share than expenditure share im-
plying that these countries spend relatively little per good. If these countries
have a relatively large non-tradable sector in manufacturing, then the re-
sulting downward bias in the measurement of import expenditure shares can
explain why those countries spend relatively little on imported goods.
In addition to potential size diﬀerences of the non-tradable sector, relative
prices of non-tradables diﬀer across countries. For example, suppose that
trade increases productivity but that productivity gains, in accordance with
the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, are greater in the tradable than in the
non-tradable sector. Then, relatively higher productivity in the tradable sec-
tor leads to a rise in the relative price of non-tradables. As a result, import
expenditure shares with respect to tradables are in fact lower than computed
import shares with respect to expenditure on tradables and non-trabables.
Alcalá and Ciccone [2004] argue that computing expenditure shares with re-
spect to GDP using real GDP instead of nominal GDP eliminates distortions
due to cross-country diﬀerences in the relative price of non-tradable goods.
For this reason, I experiment with computing absorption with respect to
gross manufacturing production by deflating gross manufacturing produc-
tion by the Purchasing Power Parity index from the Penn World table. The
obtain results show that indeed countries that lie below the 45 degree line
have a higher PPP index. However, the resulting concentration pattern of
imports does only change slightly.
A third potential reason of why countries are not aligned along the 45 degree
line can be that not all countries make use of all intermediate goods. When
calculating the share of goods imported, I divide the total number of net
products imported by the total number of HS codes, which is common to all
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countries. If countries do not make use of all tradable goods (for example
they do not have the underlying technology to use a particular intermediate
good), then the calculated import product share for these countries is down-
ward biased. Ethier [1982] argues that countries may diﬀer in the number
of intermediate tradable goods used for production due to increasing spe-
cialization in the production process. He supposes that the production of
intermediate goods features increasing returns to scale external to the firm
and these returns depend upon the level of technology and the size of the
market.
To shed light on the role of market size on the total number of products in
the economy, we impose equality between product shares and expenditures
shares, (⇡i = mi). Given this assumption, we can rewrite this equation as:
Mi
Ni,M
=
Absi
N
(1.18)
implying that the average per product import expenditure equals the average
per product tradable expenditure. Since the number of tradable goods is the
same for all countries, we expect that the elasticity of the average per product
import expenditure with respect to market size is 1. Figure 1.7 plots the
relationship. Note that the figure reveals a strong positive correlation with
a R2 = 0.84 and an elasticity of 0.6, significantly diﬀerent from 1. Ethier’s
argument that larger economies have a higher degree of specialization and
use a larger number of intermediate inputs in the production of tradable
goods can explain why the elasticity is below 1. In this case, the number of
tradable goods would be country specific and increases with market size.
Non-homothetic preferences may represent an alternative explanation for the
fact that some countries spend, on average, relatively more on few imported
goods. Note that according to equation 1.18, the ratio of the per product
import expenditure with respect to per product tradable expenditure should
be one. This result relies on the assumption of homothetic preferences. Fig-
ure 1.8 plots the log of the ratio against the log of GDP per capita. The
figure shows a negative correlation of -0.67 with a R2 = 0.23. Hence, richer
economies tend to spend on average less per imported product relative to the
average tradable product. This evidence is consistent with non-homothetic
preferences, where poorer countries spend relatively more per imported good
compared to rich ones.
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1.6 Robustness checks
The first part addresses concerns on the robustness of the empirical observed
concentration indexes. In particular, the level of disaggregation as well as
the classification scheme chosen may aﬀect the empirical concentration mea-
sures and the decomposition of the intensive and extensive margin. For this
reason, I re-calculated the concentration indexes on all margins by defining a
product as the equivalent of a 4 digit SITC code instead of a 6 digit HS code.
The implied product space changes significantly as it comprises only 642
products compared to 4529 products using 6 digit HS codes. Also, the SITC
classification scheme diﬀers from the HS classification scheme by grouping
products based on economic functions rather than their material and physi-
cal properties for tariﬀ purposes as in the HS system. Table A.1 reports the
calculated concentration indexes based on SITC together with the implied
correlation between HS based and SITC based concentration indexes. Note
that the empirical estimates of the SITC industry classification are very sim-
ilar to the 6 digit HS code sample. The correlation coeﬃcient between the
SITC and HS Gini indexes is 0.95 for exports and 0.88 for imports. In terms
of the level of the index, the obtained SITC Gini is slightly lower that the
HS Gini because of the higher level of aggregation. However, the qualitative
results remain the same. Exports are more concentrated than imports on
all margins and the intensive margin dominates concentration for imports
and the extensive margin for exports. The obtained shares of the intensive
margin in terms of overall concentration are almost identical to the standard
sample with 46 percent for exports and 66 percent for imports. Also, the
cross country concentration patterns feature a negative log linear relation-
ship between concentration on the extensive margin and market size for both
exports and imports. In sum, the obtained results on the 4 digit SITC level
support the empirical evidence based on the 6 digit HS classification and
highlight the level of generality the results apply.
Finally I want to address the discrepancy of the product space between the
data and the model caused by intra-industry trade. In the main part of the
paper I establish correspondence between the model and the data by netting
out within product trade and considering only trade across products. This
approach leaves valuable information unused and may bias the results be-
cause intra-industry trade flows occur predominantly between OECD coun-
tries and to a lesser extend between developing countries. In an alternative
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approach, I deal with intra-industry trade by developing a “measurement
device” that enables the model to characterize trade within and across prod-
ucts. The basic idea is that in reality the true state of the world is indeed
Ricardian, i.e. varieties are in fact products, but the data are not suﬃciently
disaggregated to capture the true product level. Instead, these “Ricardian
products” are aggregated into sectors according to a classification scheme, i.e.
HS codes. The suggested procedure converts the measurement of product
units in the model to product units in the data and allows to examine gross
trade flows. Because the classification scheme is unobserved, I assume that
varieties are randomly assigned to an HS code following a Poisson process.
Using the structure of the model, I can then estimate the Poisson parame-
ter and characterize the “measurement device”. I obtain a value of 0.94 for
the Poisson parameter implying that, on average, one “Ricardian product”
comprises an HS product category. Based on this result, I apply the Poisson
process to group simulated Ricardian products randomly into artificial HS
codes for which I calculate the implied concentration indexes. The results,
presented in detail in the appendix, show that this approach leads to similar
results as the net trade flow approach. In particular, it implies a similar
value for the elasticity of substitution, ⌘ = 7.4 (compared to ⌘ = 7.1 in the
net trade sample), and an exporter fixed eﬀect to reconcile the cross-country
concentration pattern on the extensive margin.
1.7 Conclusion
I have argued that export and import concentration in combination with a
decomposition into an extensive and intensive product margin concentration
measure provide new quantitative and qualitative evidence on specialization
patterns in world trade. Based on detailed trade data, my calculations show
that exports are more concentrated than imports on all margins and spe-
cialization is dominated by the extensive product margin for exports and
by the intensive product margin for imports. The extensive product mar-
gin explains the gap between export and import concentration and drives
specialization diﬀerences across countries. Larger economies diversify more
because they export and import more products. Furthermore, I show that
the Eaton Kortum model is consistent with the observed patterns and partly
replicates the stylized facts as well as the cross-country diﬀerences qualita-
tively and quantitatively. Overall, my results stress the importance of the
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role that geography and absolute as well as comparative advantage play in
determining the pattern of specialization.
By looking through the lenses of export and import concentration, this pa-
per analyses how openness to trade changes the production structure of an
economy and how these changes relate to income. My results show that the
relationship between income diﬀerences and concentration diﬀerences across
countries is primarily driven at the extensive margin. This relationship has
important macroeconomic policy implications. Specialization increases a
country’s exposure to shocks specific to the sectors in which the economy
concentrates. As a result, the likelihood that product specific shocks have
aggregate eﬀects in terms of output volatility and/or a negative impact on
the terms of trade increases with openness. Diversifying along the extensive
margin reduces such risks whereas specialization along the intensive margin
by exporting industries that have already a comparative advantage to more
destinations intensifies the risk. Analyzing this question is an avenue for
future research.
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Figure 1.1 – Average export versus import concentration for the period 1992 to
2009 for 160 countries
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Figure 1.2 – Average export and import concentration versus the log of average
relative GDP with respect to the United States for the period 1992 to 2009 for 160
countries.
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10−6 10−4 10−2 100
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
   USA   
   CHN      JPN   
   GER   
   IND      GBR   
   FRA   
 ITA   
   RUS   BRA  
   MEX     ESP      CAN   
   KO    
   IDN     AUS      TUR    NLD      IRN     PO     TH   ARG  
   SAU   
   BEL    PAK 
 ZAF     SWE      AUT  CHE   EGY      UKR   
   COL   
  GRC     MYS 
   PHL   
  PRT   NO      CZE     VEN    NGA    DNK ROM   SGP   VN    ARE  FI   
   BGD   
 CHL     DZA      PER    IS       HUN      IRL     KAZ      CUB   
   NZL     IRQ   
   KWT   
  MAR   
   SVK    BLR   
   LBY      SRB   ECU DOM
   GTM   
   SDN   
  BGR  LKA     SY    
   HRV   TUN   
   QAT   
   UZB   
   SVN   
   OMN     YEM   LTU  BNCRI K       AZE    ETH   SLV     AGO    LUX   TZA URY    CMR  BOL
   NPL
   J  LV    CIV      UG    
   TKM   
   GH   PAN    H D   
   JOR   
   PRY   
   TTO   
 BIH  
   EST      CYP   
   B       KHM   
   GEO   
   AFG      ZAR   
   SEN   
   ZMB   
  MKD     DG   
 ALB   HTI  
   ARM   
   NIC   BFA    MOZ      ISL   LI     LAO   
   MUS   
   KGZ   
   MDA   
   BEN      TCD    MLT 
   MWI   
  RWA   
   MNG   
   BRB 
   NER   
   GNQ   
 COG
   TG    
   SWZ    SUR   MRT    FJI   
   ERI     SLE      BDI   
   BMU   CAF 
  ZWE   BLZ      DJI      SYC   
   GMB      CPV      ATG   
   VUT   WSM     GNB      COM   
   KIR   
   PLW   
   STP   
   USA   
   CHN   
   JPN      GER   
   IND   
   GBR   
   FRA   
   ITA   
   RUS      BRA   MEX   
   ESP    CAN
   KOR   
 IDN   AUS   
   TUR   
   NLD   
   IRN   
L
   THA   
   RG  
SAU    BEL   
   PAK   
ZAF   
  
   CHE   
   UKR   
 COL RC
   MYS   
   PHL   
   PRT    CZE   VEN 
  NGA
 
   ROM   
SGP   
 VNM  RE   
   FI
   CHL
D A
   PE    
   I R   
  HUN  IRL   
 KAZ   
  
   IRQ   
K T   
   MAR   
  SVKBLR
LBY 
   SRB   
 ECU  DOM   
   GTM
 SDN   
   BGR   LKA
 SY  
   HRV 
   TUN 
QAT      UZB   
   SVN  
  OMN      YEM   
   LTU   
  LBN 
   CRI   
   KE    
 AZE   
 ETH 
   SLV 
AGO  
  LUX     TZA   
   URY   
  BOL 
NPL   
   JAM 
   LVA   
   CIV   
   UGA  
      
   GHA  
   PAN   
   HND   
   JOR 
   PRY   
   TTO BI  
   EST   
  CYP  H
   KHM   
   GEO   
   AFG   
  S N
   ZMB  
   MKD   
   MD   ALB
   HTI     ARM   
   NIC   
 BF  
MOZ   
   ISL   
   I  
   L O 
   MUS   
      
   MDA
   BEN   
   TCD   
   M T   
   MWI  
   RW
   MNG  
   BRB   
    
   GNQ   
   COG
   TG   
   SWZ 
   SUR   
     
   FJI   
   ERI   
   BDI
   BMU   
  CAF  
   ZWE   
   BLZ   
   DJI   
   SYC    GMB
   CPV   
   ATG   
   VUT   
   W M 
     
   COM   
   KIR   
   PLW   
   STP   
    Total Theil Index 
        Data versus simulation
Log of GDP relative to the US
Im
po
rt 
Co
nc
en
tra
tio
n
 
 
Red − Simulated Data
Blue − Empirical Data
(b) Overall concentration of imports
10−6 10−4 10−2 100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
   USA   
   CHN      JPN   
   GER   
   IND      GBR      FRA    ITA    RUS
   BRA      MEX   
   ESP   
   CAN      KOR   
   IDN   
   AUS     TUR     NLD  IRN     POL   
   THA      ARG   
   SAU   BEL    PAK  Z F    SWE   AUT   CHE   EGY      UKR   COL 
   GRC   MYS 
   PHL   
   RT   
   NOR    CZE 
   VEN    GA DNK  ROM SGP   VN     ARE    FI B D   
  CHL   
   DZA PERISR
   HUN    IRL  
   KAZ      CUB   
  NZL  
   IRQ      KWT   
   MAR     SVK     BLR  LBY  
 SRB  
  ECU     DOM     GT       SDN BG LKA  
   SYR  
   HRV    TUN   
   QAT      UZB   
   SVN   OM   YEM      LTU  
   LB    
   CRI   KE   AZE    ETH   SL    
  AGO  
  LUX     TZA   URY   CMR      BOL   NPL      J  LVA     CIV   
   UGA    TKM   
  GH  
 PAN HND   JOR RY   TTO      BIH   
   EST   
   CYP     BHR   KHM   GEO
   AFG      ZAR SEN
   ZMB    MKD   D   ALB    HTI  
   ARM   
   NIC      BFA   MOZ
   ISL      LI    LAO      MUS   KGZ   MDA
   BEN   TCD   
   M T      MWI   R A NG   BRB  
   NER   GNQ COG
   TGO      SWZ      UR   MRT FJI      ERI   SLE     BDI      BMU      CAF    ZWE     BLZ  
   DJI   
   SYC    GMB
   CPV      ATG      VUT   
   WSM   
   GNB   
   COM   
   KIR    PLW  
   STP   
   USA   
   CHN      JPN      GER   
   IND   
   GBR   
   FRA   
   ITA
   RUS   
   BRA   
   MEX   
   ESP   
   CAN   
   KOR      IDN   
   AUS   
   TUR   
   NLD   
   IRN   
   POL 
   THA   
   ARG  
   SAU   
   BEL   
   PAK   
   ZAF   
   SWE      AUT
   CH    
   EGY   
   UKR  
   COL   
   RC   
   MYS   
   PHL      RT   
   NOR   
   CZE   
   VEN   
   NGA   
   DNK  
  ROM   SGP      VNM   
   AR    
   FIN   
   BGD   CHL 
   DZA   
PE  
 I R   
   HUN   
   IRL  
   KAZ   
   CUB   
   NZL   
   IRQ   
   KWT   
   MAR  
   SVK   
  BLR   
   LBY   
 SRB 
  ECU   
   DOM   
   SDN   
   BGR  
   LKA 
   SY     HRV
   TUN 
   QAT   
   UZB   
   SVN   
 OMN   
   YEM   
   L    
   LBN   
   CRI   
   KEN
   AZE   
   ETH   
   AGO   
   LUX   
   TZA   
   URY   
   CMR   
  BOL   
 NPL 
   JAM   
   LVA   
I
   UGA      TKM   
 GH    
 PAN  
   H D      JO   
   PRY   
   TTO   
   BIH
   EST   
   CYP  
B R     E    
   AFG  
   ZAR   
   SEN   
   ZMB   
   MKD   
DG
   AL    
   HTI   
   ARM 
   N C  
   BF    
   MOZ   
   LI   
   LAO  
   MUS 
KGZ 
   MDA   
   BEN   
   TCD   
   MLT
   MWI   
   RWA   
   MNG      BRB 
   NER   
   GNQ   
   COG   
      
   SWZ   
   SUR    MRT   
   FJI   
   ERI   
   SLE 
   BDI   
   BMU   
   CAF   
   ZWE   
   BLZ   
   DJI     SY     GMB
   CPV   
   VUT   
   WSM   
   GNB   
  COM   
   PLW   
   STP   
    Extensive Theil Index 
        Data versus simulation
Log of GDP relative to the US
Ex
po
rt 
Co
nc
en
tra
tio
n
 
 
Red − Simulated Data
Blue − Empirical Data
(c) Extensive margin of exports
10−6 10−4 10−2 100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
   USA   
   CHN      JPN   
   GER   
 IND   
   GBR   FRA  ITA   
   RUS   
   BRA   MEX     ESP      CAN   
   KOR      IDN   
   AUS     TUR      NLD      IRN    PO    THA   ARG      SAU      BEL      PAK      ZAF    SWE      AUT 
   CHE   EGY   UKR    COL 
 GRC  MYS   PHL     RT   NO    CZE    VEN   NGA     DNK ROM  SGP     VNM      ARE  FI   
   BGD   
   CHL DZA    PER   ISR      HUN     IRL   
   KAZ   
   CUB   
   NZL   
   IRQ   
   KWT   
   MA     SVK 
   BLR      LBY   
   SRB    ECU    DOM    GT
   SDN   
   BGR   LKA  SYR 
   HRV      TUN     QAT  
   UZB   
   SVN    OMN     YEM    LTU   BNCRI 
   KEN      AZE      ETH   
   SLV    AGO
   LUX     TZA     URY      CMR      BOL
   NPL   
 J   LV    CIV      UG    
   TKM   GHAPAN    H D      JOR    PRY TO   
   BIH   
  ES    
   CYP      BH       KHM   
   GEO      AFG      ZAR    SEN  MB     MKD   D   ALB   
   HTI   
   ARM   
  NIC      BFA   MOZ
   ISL    MLI   
   LAO   
 US      KGZ    MDA      BEN   
   TCD   
   MLT    MWI 
   R A      MNG 
 BRB     NER      GNQ      COG      TG       SWZ      SUR      MRT   
   FJI      ERI   
   SLE    BDI     BMU      CAF      ZWE      BLZ  
   DJI    SY     GMB      CPV   
   ATG      VUT   
   WSM      GNB      COM      KIR      PLW   
   STP   
   USA   
   CHN   
   JPN      GER   
   IND   
   GBR      FRA   
   ITA   
   RUS     BRA  MEX   ESP   
  CAN   
   KOR   
   IDN   TUR   NLD   IRN   POL THA   
   RG   
   SAU
   B L   
   PAK   
 ZAF    SWET 
   UKR   
   COL 
   GRC   
 YS 
   PRTNOR
  
   VEN 
 N A
   DNK    ROM 
   SGP  
   VNM   
 AR    
  FI
  CHL     DZA    PE  IHU   IRL
   KAZ   
   CUB   
   NZL  
   IRQ   
 KWT   
   MAR    SVK
 BLR   
 LBY   
   SRB      ECU  
 DOM
   GTM
   SDN   
   BG    
   LKA  
      
   HRV      TUN 
  QAT   
   UZB   
   SVN      OMN  
  YEM   
   LTU   
   LB    
   CRI   
   KEN   
   AZE   
   ETH
   SLV  
  AGO   
   LUX   
   TZA  
   URY   
CMR
BOL
NPL   
   JAM      LVA
   CIV     UGA  
   TKM   
   GHA  
   P N     HND
   JO       RY   TTO
 BIH  
   EST   
   CYP   
   BHR 
   KHM      GEO   
   AFG   
   ZAR   
   SEN      ZMB  
   MKD  
   MDG 
   ALB
   HTI   
   ARM  
   NIC   
   BFA   
   ISL   
   LI  
   LAO   
   MUS   
   K Z   
   MDA   
   TCD   
   MLT
  WI   
   RWA   
 MN
   BRB
 NER  
   GNQ   
 COG
   TGO  
   SWZ 
   SUR  
      
   FJI   
   ERI   
   SLE   
   BDI   
      
   CAF   
   ZWE   
   BLZ   
   DJI   
   SYC   
   GMB   
   CPV   
   ATG   
   VUT   
   GNB   
   COM   
   KIR   
   PLW   
   STP   
    Extensive Theil Index 
        Data versus simulation
Log of GDP relative to the US
Im
po
rt 
Co
nc
en
tra
tio
n
 
 
Red − Simulated Data
Blue − Empirical Data
(d) Extensive margin of imports
10−6 10−4 10−2 100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
   USA   
   CHN      JPN   
   GER   
   IND      GBR   
   FRA   
 ITA   
   RUS   
   BRA   
   MEX  ESP      CAN      KOR   
   IDN    AUS   
   TUR  
   NLD   IRN   
   POL   
   THA   
   ARG      SAU BEL  
   PAK   
   ZAF   SWE     AUT      CHE    EGY UKR   COL 
   GRC   
   MYS 
   PHL  
   RT   
   NOR   
   CZE   
   VEN   
   N A   
   DNK   
 ROM      SGP  
   VNM      ARE      FIN      BGD      CHL   
   DZA   
   PE    ISR   
   HUN     IRL   
   KAZ   
   CUB   NZL  IRQ      KWT      MAR  
   SVK   
  BLR
 LBY 
   SRB   ECU 
   DOM   
  GTM     SDN   BG  
   LKA   
  SY    HRV  
   TUN   QAT  
   UZB    SVN  
   OMN 
   YEM   
   LTUBN  CRI KE    
   AZE   
 ETH  SL    AGO LUX
   TZA   
   URY   
   CM
   BOL     NP
   JAM   
  LVA
   CIV      UGA   
   TKM   
   GHA   
   PAN  
   H D   
   JOR
   PRY   TTO BIH     EST  CYP   B R  K M
   GEO   
   AFG  ZAR   S NMB
   MKD   
   MD      ALB    HTI 
   ARM   
  NIC     BF
   MOZ   
   ISL
   MLI   
LAO   MUS KGZ 
 MDA  
   BEN  
  TCD   MLTWI   
   RWA   
   MN
   BR  NER   GNQ     COG   T       SWZ     UR 
   MRT   
   FJI   
   ERI   
   SLE   
   BDI     B U   
 CAF   ZWE 
   BLZ   
   DJI     SYC      GMB      CPV    ATG   
   VUT 
   WSM  
   GNB   
   COM      KIR   
   PLW      STP     CHN   
   JPN   
   GER   
   IND   
   GBR   
   ITA   
   RUS
 BRA     MEX   
   ESP   
   CAN   
   KO    
   IDN
      
  TUR   
   NLD   
   IRN   
   POL   
 THA 
   ARG   
   SAU   
   BEL   
 PAK 
   ZAF   
 S E  
   AUT   
 CHE   
   EGY   
   UKR  
 COL 
   GRC  
  MYS      PHL   
   OR
   CZE     VEN
NGA  
   D K   
   ROM 
   S P   
   VNM  
   ARE   
   FIBGD  
  CHL   
   DZA  
PER
   IS
   HUN   
   IRL   
   KAZ 
   CUB    NZL   
   IRQ   
   KWT   
SVKLBY   
   SRB   
   ECU  
  DO
   GTM 
   BGR   
   LKA      SYR   
   HRV   
  
   QAT      UZB   
   SVN   OM   YEM   LTU 
   LB    
   CRI   
   AZE      ETH      SLV   
   GO   
LUX   TZA   
    
   CMR   
   BOL      NPL   
   JA    
LV   CIV   UG
   TKM   
   GHA   
   PAN  HND   JOR   
 RY   
   TTO   
   BIH   
   EST         
   BHR   
GE
   AFG   
   ZAR   
  SEN   
   ZMB   
   MKD   
MDG   
   ALB   HTI   
   ARM   
  BFA
   MOZ  
   ISL  
LI
L   
   MUS  
   KGZ
 D
   BEN   
   TCD   
   MLT   
 MWI 
   RWA   
  MNG
   BRB   
   NER  
 GNQ    COG   
   T
   SWZ  
   SUR   
   MRT   
   FJI   
   ERI
   SLE   
   BDI   
   MU     CAF   
   ZWE   
   BLZ   
   DJI   
   SYC   
   GM   
   CPV   
   ATG   
   VUT   
   WS   
   GNB   
   COM   
   KIR   
   PLW   
   STP   
    Intensive Theil Index 
        Data versus simulation
Log of GDP relative to the US
Ex
po
rt 
Co
nc
en
tra
tio
n
 
 
Red − Simulated Data
Blue − Empirical Data
(e) Intensive margin of exports
10−6 10−4 10−2 100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
   USA      CHN     JPN      GER    IND      GBR     FRA  ITA
   RUS      BRA   
   MEX  ESP      CAN   KOR   
   IDN      AUS      TUR      NLD IRN    PO     THA  ARG 
   SAU   
   BELPAK
   Z F    SWE   AUT CHEGY UKR   COL    GRC  MYS     PHL    PRT   NO  CZE   VENA     DNK  ROM SGP  V  AR     FI       BGD   CHL  DZA PE
   ISR    HU    IRL  K  CUB NZL  IRQ   
   KWT   
   MAR 
   SVK BLR
   LBY     SRB      ECU   DOM
 GT   SDN   
   BG    LKA  SYR  HRV    TUN   QA
   UZB   
   SVN  
 OM    YEM    LBNCRI
   KE       AZE
   ETH    SLV AGO  LUX TZA   URY     CM       BOL NP J LV   CIVUG   
   TKM   
   GH    PAN   H D   JO     RY 
   TTO   
  BI    ES
  CYP
   B      K M
   GEO   
   AFG   ZAR   
   SEN   
  ZMB  
  MKD  
 D
   ALB 
 HTI   
  ARMNICBFA   MOZ    ISL 
   LI  LAO  
   MUS   
   KGZ
   MDA 
  BEN   TCD   MLT  
   MWI   
   RWA
   MN
   BRB
 NER   GNQ   
   COG     TG      SWZUR   MRT FJI     ERI  SLE   BDI   M     CAF 
   ZWE   BLZ    DJI SY      GMB   CPV     ATG   VUT   W   GNB      COM  
   KIR   
   PLW   
   STP   
   USA   
 CHN   
 
   ER   
   IND   
      
   FRA   
   ITA   
   US    BRA    MEX   
                 I   
AUS   NLDIRN 
   POL   
   THA     SAU   
   BEL   
     ZAF   
   CHE   
   EGY   
   UKR   COL
 GRC 
   MYS   
   PHL   
 NOR   CZE VEN     
   ROM  
   SGP   
   
   ARE   
I  
   DZA   
PE
   ISR   
   HUN   
   IRL   
AZ  
   CUB   
  NZL  
   IRQ    KWT   
 MARSVK
   BLR   
 LBY   SRB   
ECU
   BGR     SY    HRV   
   QAT   
   UZB   
   SVN   
   OMN 
   YE   LTU  
 LB  K N   
 
  SLV  AGO 
   LUX
TZ
   URY   CM
   NPL   
 A
   LVA  
 CIV   
 TKM
   GHA
   PAN   
HND J
   PRY   
   TTO  
   BIH      EST  
   CYP   
BH   KHM   
 GE  
AFG  
   ZAR   
   SEN   
   Z B
   MKD  D   LB   HTI  
 ARM
 
  MOZ     ISL  
   LAO   
US
   KGZ   
   MDA   
   BEN 
   TCD   
   MLT   
   MWI
   RWA      MN   BRB   
   NER  
  GNQ   COGT   S Z 
   SUR   
   FJI   
   ERI      SLE  
   BDI
   BMU   
   CAF       BLZ
   DJI  
   SYC   
   GMB  
   CPV   
   ATG   
  VUT   
   WSM
   GNB   
   COM   
   KIR   
   PLW   
   STP   
    Intensive Theil Index 
        Data versus simulation
Log of GDP relative to the US
Im
po
rt 
Co
nc
en
tra
tio
n
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(f) Intensive margin of imports
Figure 1.3 – Simulated (in red) and empirical observed (in blue) export and
import concentration versus GDP across 160 countries. The simulation uses pa-
rameterized trade costs to match the data using a country specific export cost.
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Red − Simulated Data
Blue − Empirical Data
(a) Overall concentration of exports
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Red − Simulated Data
Blue − Empirical Data
(b) Overall concentration of imports
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Red − Simulated Data
Blue − Empirical Data
(c) Extensive margin of exports
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Red − Simulated Data
Blue − Empirical Data
(d) Extensive margin of imports
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Red − Simulated Data
Blue − Empirical Data
(e) Intensive margin of exports
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Figure 1.4 – Simulated (in red) and empirical observed (in blue) export and
import concentration versus GDP across 160 countries. The simulation is based on
estimated trade costs form bilateral trade shares including an exported fixed eﬀect.
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Figure 1.5 – The simulated (in red) and empirical observed (in blue) share of the
number of products traded against the number of trading countries.
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Figure 1.6 – The import expenditure share versus the import product share.
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Figure 1.7 – The log of average per product import expenditure against log of
Absorption.
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Figure 1.8 – The log of the ratio of average per product import expenditure with
respect to average per product tradable expenditure against log of GDP per capita.
47
1.9 Tables
Table 1.6 – Country-Specific Technology and Trade Costs estimates
Country Exporter FE Standard error Precent cost Si Standard error ( US/ i)✓
USA 6,36 0,18 -53,47 0,84 0,13 1
AFG -0,46 0,25 5,53 -3,06 0,19 193,42
AGO -1,96 0,23 26,79 -0,97 0,16 23,5
ALB -3,31 0,23 48,53 -0,12 0,16 9,63
ARE 2,98 0,19 -30,12 -0,71 0,14 2,6
ARG 2,19 0,19 -23,01 1,54 0,14 2,24
ARM -3,14 0,22 45,55 0,2 0,16 9,61
ATG 1,12 0,45 -12,28 -3,72 0,3 12,93
AUS 3,29 0,19 -32,75 0,98 0,13 1,2
AUT 2,03 0,19 -21,83 1,24 0,13 0,77
AZE -3,41 0,22 50,25 1,12 0,16 12,2
BDI -3,45 0,24 51,47 -0,45 0,16 49,84
BEL 5,53 0,18 -48,63 -0,89 0,13 0,85
BEN -3,11 0,23 45,41 -0,38 0,15 45,53
BFA -4,45 0,23 70,73 0,6 0,15 36,85
BGD 0,96 0,2 -10,19 0,27 0,14 10,69
BGR 0,05 0,19 -0,59 1,01 0,14 2,79
BHR -0,83 0,32 10,52 0,26 0,23 1,87
BIH -3,57 0,24 53,34 1,1 0,17 6,66
BLR -1,40 0,21 18,12 2,1 0,15 2,17
BLZ -0,26 0,26 3,53 -1,77 0,18 8,17
BMU -1,26 0,41 16,48 -1,91 0,28 5,66
BOL -1,84 0,22 24,88 0,39 0,15 10,01
BRA 3,17 0,19 -31,64 1,71 0,13 2,22
BRB -1,49 0,23 20,33 -0,91 0,16 5,95
CAF -2,05 0,26 28,12 -1,11 0,19 21,31
CAN 4,10 0,18 -38,98 0,43 0,13 0,99
CHE 4,79 0,19 -43,90 -0,76 0,13 0,9
CHL 2,13 0,2 -22,51 0,48 0,14 2,34
CHN 5,11 0,18 -45,86 1,57 0,13 2,22
CIV -0,12 0,2 1,13 0,06 0,14 8,73
CMR -2,10 0,2 28,96 0,78 0,14 8,12
COG 0,87 0,23 -9,83 -2,63 0,17 16,64
COL -0,04 0,19 0,63 1,13 0,13 5,89
COM -3,06 0,29 44,10 -1,78 0,19 42,22
CPV -3,16 0,32 46,15 -0,66 0,2 16,29
CRI 0,32 0,21 -3,62 0,06 0,15 3,43
CUB -1,47 0,2 19,41 0,86 0,14 9,57
CYP 0,61 0,19 -6,89 -0,44 0,14 3,51
CZE 1,13 0,19 -12,91 1,37 0,13 1,04
DJI -1,23 0,28 16,32 -2,99 0,2 50,23
DNK 2,57 0,18 -26,76 0,97 0,13 0,8
DOM -1,12 0,2 14,60 0,65 0,14 3,72
DZA -2,29 0,2 31,68 0,61 0,13 17,61
ECU -0,18 0,2 2,25 0,57 0,14 6,51
EGY 0,42 0,19 -4,75 0,83 0,13 9,14
ERI -4,87 0,26 79,16 0,12 0,19 43,83
ESP 3,76 0,18 -36,45 0,81 0,13 1,19
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Country Exporter FE Standard error Precent cost Si Standard error ( US/ i)✓
EST 1,75 0,21 -19,23 -1,36 0,14 2,27
ETH -1,73 0,2 23,10 -0,6 0,13 70,73
FIN 1,77 0,19 -19,42 1,73 0,13 0,59
FJI -1,88 0,25 25,42 -0,36 0,17 5,57
FRA 4,56 0,18 -42,30 1,05 0,13 0,8
GBR 4,86 0,18 -44,32 0,57 0,13 1,06
GEO -0,54 0,21 6,46 -1,25 0,15 15,46
GER 4,74 0,18 -43,54 1,17 0,13 0,65
GHA 1,14 0,2 -12,49 -1,78 0,14 17,47
GMB -1,69 0,24 23,14 -1,99 0,17 30,89
GNB -3,13 0,38 45,90 -0,89 0,27 34,18
GNQ -3,99 0,28 61,56 0,39 0,19 3,92
GRC 0,73 0,19 -8,59 0,93 0,13 2,5
GTM -1,41 0,21 18,61 0,41 0,14 6,43
HND 1,26 0,24 -13,99 -2,49 0,17 9,19
HRV -0,60 0,19 7,28 0,92 0,13 2,53
HTI -3,14 0,32 45,77 -0,5 0,23 26,46
HUN 0,43 0,19 -5,15 1,49 0,13 1,26
IDN 4,30 0,19 -40,26 0,21 0,13 4,69
IND 3,76 0,18 -36,12 1,03 0,13 6,78
IRL 3,90 0,18 -37,55 -0,47 0,13 0,78
IRN -1,18 0,2 15,38 1,94 0,15 7,13
IRQ -3,12 0,3 44,88 -1,13 0,21 224,32
ISL 0,08 0,21 -1,09 -0,18 0,15 1,15
ISR 1,26 0,19 -14,17 1,11 0,14 1,26
ITA 3,96 0,18 -38,00 1,27 0,13 0,8
JAM 0,76 0,21 -8,32 -1,7 0,15 6,45
JOR -0,60 0,2 7,39 0,24 0,14 5,19
JPN 4,91 0,18 -44,65 1,95 0,13 0,48
KAZ -0,28 0,21 3,08 1,08 0,15 4,17
KEN -0,24 0,2 3,22 -0,06 0,14 20,53
KGZ -3,04 0,24 43,58 0,39 0,16 10,95
KHM -2,22 0,29 30,65 0,71 0,21 10,91
KIR -2,77 0,39 38,98 -1,68 0,29 20,97
KOR 4,42 0,18 -41,23 1,4 0,13 0,73
KWT -1,70 0,2 23,09 0,84 0,14 3,69
LAO -3,15 0,29 46,04 0,54 0,23 11,92
LBN -0,31 0,19 3,77 -0,23 0,14 7,97
LBY -1,81 0,24 24,19 0,27 0,17 8,88
LKA 0,98 0,2 -11,03 -0,37 0,14 7,75
LTU -0,24 0,2 2,69 0,6 0,14 2,6
LUX 1,44 0,25 -16,07 -0,65 0,2 0,86
LVA -0,64 0,21 7,78 0,3 0,15 2,97
MAR 0,73 0,19 -8,11 0,39 0,14 5,1
MDA -1,11 0,23 14,13 -0,33 0,16 8,17
MDG -0,95 0,22 12,10 -0,93 0,15 20,18
MEX 3,42 0,19 -33,56 -0,1 0,13 3,27
MKD -1,04 0,23 13,26 -0,73 0,15 5,07
MLI -2,42 0,25 33,82 -0,45 0,17 43,51
MLT 0,30 0,22 -3,45 -0,68 0,16 1,64
MNG -2,60 0,27 36,44 -0,51 0,19 10,12
MOZ -1,13 0,21 14,84 -0,55 0,14 18,96
MRT -0,58 0,24 7,23 -2,13 0,17 21,41
MUS 0,95 0,2 -10,48 -0,98 0,14 3,68
MWI -3,87 0,23 59,69 0,29 0,15 34,15
MYS 5,40 0,19 -47,75 -0,74 0,14 1,64
NER -1,89 0,23 25,67 -1,35 0,16 39,78
NGA 0,15 0,21 -1,37 -1,19 0,14 57,57
NIC -1,13 0,22 14,67 -0,78 0,15 10,6
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Country Exporter FE Standard error Precent cost Si Standard error ( US/ i)✓
NLD 5,66 0,18 -49,44 -0,88 0,13 1,02
NOR 1,83 0,19 -19,87 1,02 0,13 0,9
NPL -3,03 0,23 44,04 0,37 0,16 18,27
NZL 2,54 0,19 -26,41 0,58 0,14 1,27
OMN 0,39 0,21 -4,70 -0,59 0,15 6,51
PAK 1,59 0,19 -17,08 0,9 0,14 8,28
PAN 2,82 0,23 -28,76 -2,16 0,17 6,67
PER 0,47 0,2 -5,45 1,17 0,14 3,64
PHL 2,33 0,2 -24,40 0,07 0,14 4,89
PLW -9,10 0,4 197,33 4,52 0,32 0,19
POL 0,87 0,19 -9,93 1,78 0,13 1,57
PRT 1,76 0,19 -19,23 0,7 0,13 1,47
PRY -1,36 0,22 17,79 0,6 0,17 7,95
QAT 0,60 0,21 -7,14 -0,62 0,15 2,69
ROM 0,18 0,19 -2,06 1,73 0,13 2,39
RUS 1,98 0,19 -21,33 1,89 0,13 2,15
RWA -3,73 0,23 57,16 -0,15 0,15 67,74
SAU 1,34 0,19 -14,98 0,36 0,13 4,12
SDN -2,46 0,2 34,35 -0,12 0,13 41,79
SEN -0,69 0,21 8,70 -0,57 0,14 14,97
SGP 6,66 0,19 -55,17 -2,19 0,13 0,98
SLE -0,49 0,49 5,65 -0,94 0,33 22,08
SLV -1,74 0,21 23,31 0,42 0,15 4,95
SRB -1,84 0,21 24,59 1,36 0,15 3,15
STP -2,21 0,33 29,84 -1,89 0,24 30,19
SUR -1,59 0,26 21,12 -0,75 0,18 3,21
SVK 1,67 0,2 -18,39 -0,18 0,14 1,73
SVN -0,38 0,19 4,59 1,09 0,13 1,01
SWE 2,74 0,18 -28,26 1,41 0,13 0,66
SWZ -0,81 0,24 10,26 0,15 0,19 3,87
SYC -1,17 0,28 15,16 -1,46 0,2 3,51
SYR -3,28 0,21 48,21 2,26 0,15 7
TCD -5,68 0,26 98,20 0,93 0,18 52,38
TGO -1,07 0,23 14,05 -1,56 0,15 32,81
THA 5,42 0,18 -47,82 -0,68 0,13 2,93
TKM -4,02 0,26 61,53 1,08 0,19 12,48
TTO -1,00 0,22 12,96 0,46 0,15 2,04
TUN 0,44 0,19 -4,70 0,01 0,14 3,76
TUR 1,92 0,18 -20,57 1,38 0,13 2,55
TZA -0,25 0,2 3,46 -0,88 0,13 30,26
UGA -1,79 0,21 24,15 -0,32 0,14 37,54
UKR 0,91 0,19 -10,55 1,75 0,14 3,01
URY 0,76 0,21 -8,63 0,44 0,15 2,72
UZB -2,14 0,24 29,20 0,68 0,18 12,54
VEN -0,46 0,2 5,82 1,35 0,14 4,18
VNM 2,46 0,19 -25,57 0,24 0,13 6,16
VUT -0,93 0,34 11,75 -2,46 0,23 16,57
WSM -2,40 0,3 32,82 -1,26 0,22 9,02
YEM -2,67 0,22 37,58 0,39 0,15 31,04
ZAF 3,49 0,19 -34,26 0,48 0,13 2,25
ZAR 1,02 0,27 -11,18 -2,97 0,2 58,54
ZMB 1,85 0,26 -19,62 -2,55 0,17 18,9
ZWE -1,06 0,22 13,97 0,16 0,16 9,86
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Chapter 2
Entry barriers to International
Trade: product versus firm fixed
costs
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2.1 Introduction
Fixed costs to export create entry barriers that restrict trading opportunities.
Larger markets ease the relevance of fixed costs by allowing firms to slide
down the average cost curve and produce at a more eﬃcient scale. As a
result more firms enter larger markets. Fixed costs can be of two types:
either at firm or at the product level. The current view of the literature 1 is
that fixed costs to export are mainly at the firm level, for example advertising
a firm brand or setting up a distribution network. Given this cost structure,
multi-product firms have a cost advantage and dominate international trade.
Anecdotal evidence 2 suggests an alternative view where fixed costs operate at
the product level, for example acquiring export/import licenses or technical
barriers to trade. In this case, product entry is accompanied with lots of firm
entry and international trade is characterized by many firms selling diﬀerent
varieties of the same product.
This paper develops an empirical framework to infer the dominant nature of
fixed costs form the diﬀerent eﬀects they have on international trade patterns.
I argue that the elasticities of the number of exporting firms and exported
products with respect to destination market size informs on whether fixed
costs operate at the firm or at the product level. Using detailed trade data
from 40 exporting countries across 180 destination markets, I assess the rele-
vance of fixed costs by testing for diﬀerences in entry elasticities. Within this
framework, I then present empirical evidence consistent with the view that
product fixed costs create spillovers eﬀects that lead to higher firm entry and
give grounds for trade policies promoting exports.
The starting point is to test whether the number of exporters and the number
of exported products vary with market size in a significantly diﬀerent way. In
the case of fixed costs operating at the firm level, a firm pays a common fixed
cost to advertise the firm brand or to create a distribution network in the
export destination for all the products it exports. By spreading the fixed cost
over more products, multi-product firms have a cost advantage over single-
product firms, as in Feenstra and Ma [2007] and Eckel and Neary [2010]. The
presence of spillovers eﬀects through lower per product costs allows the firm
1. see for example Arkolakis and Muendler [2010], Eaton et al. [2011] and Bernard et al.
[2011]
2. see for example Hausmann and Rodrik [2003] and Artopoulos et al. [2013]
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to expand its product range with market size, i.e. economies of scope. As a
result, few firms with many products enter large markets leading to a higher
average number of products per firm. The testable implication is that the
elasticity of products with respect to market size should be higher than the
elasticity of firms.
Fixed costs at the product level are instead costs that firms have to incur
in order to introduce a product into a destination market, i.e. acquiring an
import license, meeting a product standard or advertise a product in the
destination. The key point is that the firm that pays the product fixed cost
creates a spillover to rival firms by lowering the fixed cost for subsequent ex-
porters. Hausmann and Rodrik [2003] argue that export pioneers create an
externality/spillover by making a considerable investment in attempts open-
ing up foreign markets, cultivating contacts and establishing legal standards.
The investment in these costly activities can then be used by domestic ri-
val firms operating in the same product category. The spillover reduces the
rival firms’ fixed costs to export and facilitates entry into export markets.
Due to the higher demand in larger markets, we expect that the export pio-
neer is more likely to create an externality for subsequent exporters in larger
markets because of higher expected export revenues. Given this reasoning,
there is relative more firm than product entry once market size increases.
The testable implication is that the entry elasticity of firms with respect to
market size should be higher than for products.
Using bilateral data for 40 exporting countries in 180 destinations, I find
that the entry elasticity of the number of firms with respect to market size is
significantly higher than the entry elasticity of the number of products. This
holds for a broad set of countries at diﬀerent levels of development. Two
potential explanations for a higher firm than product elasticity are: either
the average number of firms per product increases with market size or the
average number of products per firm decreases with market size. The first ef-
fect points to more product varieties in larger markets and is consistent with
product fixed costs. The second eﬀect suggests that multi-product firms en-
ter in small and large markets. However, in larger markets multi-product
firms export less products compared to the small market because of more
competition from single product firms, see Mayer et al. [2011]. This finding
would be consistent with firm fixed costs. My results show that larger mar-
kets have on average more firms per exported product and that the number
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of products per firm does not vary with market size. This finding supports
the claim that entry barriers operate on the product level.
Next, I build on the previous framework and present supportive evidence for
spillover eﬀects consistent with product fixed costs. Once the export pioneer
pays the product fixed costs and introduces a new product into a destination
market, rival firms benefit from lower fixed costs. To test this implication,
I investigate how firm entry changes over time after a new product is intro-
duced. Also, the willingness of an export pioneer to introduce a new product
depends on the number of product market rivals because of business steal-
ing eﬀects, i.e. more firm entry increases competitive pressure and reduces
prices. When regressing the number of exporters within a product category
in a given destination on export prices and quantities, we expect that the
number of exporters should be negatively correlated with prices and posi-
tively with quantity. The lower price indicates competitive pressure from the
entry of product market rivals. The larger quantity captures the eﬃciency
gains in production through economies of scale, i.e. firms slide down the
average cost curve due to lower fixed costs. Furthermore, firm entry should
depend on the product type. Exporters of diﬀerentiated products face less
competitive pressure from product market rivals.
Using detailed product level data (4912 product categories), the results in-
dicate that the first two years after a product is exported for the first time
to a destination the firm entry rate within the product category increases
significantly. The following years the firm entry rate is lower than the aver-
age entry rate and declines steadily over time. Within a product category,
countries with more firms per export destination have significant lower ex-
port prices and sell a larger quantity. The quantity eﬀect dominates the price
eﬀect indicating that lower fixed costs increase average export revenues of the
firm. Taking the degree of product diﬀerentiation into account, I estimate the
model for diﬀerentiated, less diﬀerentiated and homogenous products sepa-
rately and test for significant diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients. I find
that prices of diﬀerentiated products are less sensitive to firm entry, which
points to lower competitive pressure in diﬀerentiated products. Overall, the
results are consistent with fixed costs operating at the product level and sug-
gest that rival firms benefit from spillovers that lower fixed costs and increase
average export revenues per firm.
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Understanding the nature of fixed costs is an important guide for eﬀective
trade policy among countries. This is because diﬀerent set of policies can
reduce product as opposed to firm fixed costs to encourage exports. For
example, the exporting country can stimulate new product entry by adver-
tising new products in destination markets through export promotion agen-
cies. 3 This may lead to spillover eﬀects that translate into higher level of
firm participation and export growth. By subsidizing part of the product
fixed costs, the government also increases incentives for firms to explore new
export destinations and oﬀsets part of the free riding from rival firms.
More generally, the existence of fixed costs to export implies that trade pol-
icy can aﬀect market structure. When conducting policy experiments in the
form of a reduction in trade costs, it is standard in the international trade
literature to consider only a fall in marginal costs and evaluate the resulting
impact on the patterns of trade and consumer welfare. My results suggest
that fixed costs at the product level are an important entry barrier to in-
ternational trade. In addition, a central aspect of free trade negotiations
is the reduction of these costs by alleviating technical barriers to trade and
establishing common product standards, see the current EU-US free trade
negotiations. Kehoe and Ruhl [2013] provide empirical evidence that trade
liberalization increases product entry and leads to significant growth in ex-
port revenues from these products. Thus, neglecting changes in these barriers
underestimates the impact of trade reforms.
My work contributes to the empirical international trade literature that anal-
yses the relationship between market characteristics, fixed costs and product
entry. Hummels and Klenow [2005] focus on characteristics of the exporting
country when studying the extensive product margin. They suggest that
trade models featuring product fixed costs can reconcile the fact that con-
ditional on exporting a country exports a given product only to a subset
of destination markets. Contrary to them, my argument for market specific
product fixed costs is based on the fact that the number of products increases
significantly in destination market size. In addition, the results in this paper
show that the presence of product fixed costs entail a spillover that facili-
tates firm entry. Hummels and Klenow [2005] also show that a larger the
3. see Görg et al. [2008] and Lederman et al. [2010] for empirical evidence on export
promotion agencies
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economy exports each product to more destinations. Consistent with their
argument, I find higher entry elasticities for larger exporting economies, i.e.
as destination market size increases, larger economies start to export rela-
tive more products than smaller ones. Combined these results suggests that
market specific product fixed costs characterize international trade patterns
and that home market size matters in overcoming fixed costs.
Hausmann and Rodrik [2003] argue that export pioneers create spillovers by
making investments in attempts to open foreign markets, cultivating con-
tacts, establish distribution chains and other costly activities that can be
used by rival firms within the same product category. Rivals may also ac-
quire knowledge about the potential demand of their own products in the
foreign market once they observe the success of the pioneer, see Eaton et al.
[2012]. By analyzing firm entry within products over time and across coun-
tries, I find supportive evidence of these spillovers. In line with lower fixed
costs, firm entry increases significantly the year after an export pioneer in-
troduces a product into a destination. The lower fixed cost allows rival firms
to exploit scale, increase their export revenue and the survival probability in
international markets. These results are consistent with micro evidence of
spillovers among exporters as found in the case of France (Koenig [2009] and
Koenig et al. [2010]) and Argentina (Artopoulos et al. [2013]).
The analysis also contributes to the international trade literature analyz-
ing the empirical relationship between market size and firm entry, for single
product firms, see Helpman et al. [2008], Melitz and Ottaviano [2008], Arko-
lakis [2010], Eaton et al. [2011], and multi-product firms, see Arkolakis and
Muendler [2010] and Bernard et al. [2011]. The paper most closely related
to this one is Eaton et al. [2011]. Using a monopolistic competition model of
heterogeneous firms with CES preferences and fixed costs, Eaton et al. [2011]
argue that the variation in the number of French exporters with respect to
destination market size informs on fixed costs of exporting at the firm level.
This paper builds on their basic empirical insight, looking at the elasticity
of firm penetration, and questions whether fixed costs operate at the firm
or product level. My results suggest that once we depart from Eaton et al.
[2011]’s assumption of one firm produces one product, product fixed costs
oﬀer an alternative view consistent their empirical result.
Arkolakis and Muendler [2010] and Bernard et al. [2011] focus on multi-
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product firms and the determinants of their product scope with respect to
destination characteristics. They generalize the cost structure of Eaton et al.
[2011] by introducing firm specific product fixed costs. In comparison to these
papers, this paper considers product fixed costs that are independent of the
firm. Once an export pioneer pays the product fixed cost and introduces
the product in an export destination, she creates a spillover that lowers fixed
costs for rival firms within the same product category. Note that if fixed costs
are parameterized accordingly, the framework of Arkolakis and Muendler
[2010] and Bernard et al. [2011] can account for diﬀerences in the firm and
product elasticity. The key diﬀerence with respect to this paper is that their
analysis does not allow for spillover eﬀects across firms once new products
enter export markets. Empirical evidence suggests that these spillover eﬀects
are quantitatively important in explaining the entry behavior of firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the con-
ceptual framework. Section 3 presents the methodology together with the
testable implications. Section 4 presents the data with the relevant summary
statistics and the empirical results. Section 5 illustrates an empirical frame-
work to shed further light on the presence of spillovers induced by product
fixed costs. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Empirical framework
I start my investigation with an assessment of the destinations that exporting
firms reach and the characteristics of the destinations that attract many
exporters. First, take the perspective of the largest exporting country in my
sample, Spain, and its firms. Following Eaton et al. [2011], Figure 2.1(a)
plots the log of the number of Spanish firms selling to a particular market d
against the log of destination market size proxied by GDP. The number of
firms selling to a market tends to increases with the size of the market. A
regression line establishes a slope of 0.77 and an R2 = 0.69. Eaton et al. [2011]
interpret the positive relationship between firm penetration and market size
as evidence of market specific fixed cost. Larger markets oﬀer more demand
and thus it is easier for firms to recover fixed costs. As Bernard et al. [2003]
show, other trade models based on variable trade costs without fixed costs
can also account for the fact that firms select themselves into exporting.
However, the authors also note that these models are not able to generate
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Figure 2.1 – Number of Spanish exporting firms and number of Spanish products
exported versus market size in destination d.
Sources: Exporter Dynamics Database World Bank. Figure (1a) number of firms, Figure (1b) number of
6 digit HS products per destination. Market size is absorption of a country’s manufacturing sector. The
slopes of the fitted lines are 0.77 (standard error 0.038) for exporting firms from Spain and 0.63 (0.034)
for exported products from Spain.
both the observed relative size of total revenues of exporters, compared to
non-exporters, and the strong selection with respect to destination market
size into exporting. To account for these empirical regularities, international
trade models assume additional exporting costs in the form of a market
specific fixed costs to export.
An alternative view of the relationship in Figure 2.1(a) is that fixed costs
operate at the product rather than on the firm level. To investigate this
idea further, Figure 2.1(b) repeats the previous graph but instead of the log
number of firms it plots the log number of products that Spain exports to
a destination against the market size of the destination along the horizontal
axis. The number of products exported to a destination increases system-
atically with market size, R2 = 0.65, and an elasticity of 0.63. Following
the argument of Eaton et al. [2011], an explanation that reconciles the re-
lationship in Figure 2.1(b) is the presence of market specific fixed costs at
the product level. Exporting products is only possible at a huge expense in
fixed costs and the demand for most of the products in the destination is not
suﬃcient to export all of them profitable.
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While both figures display a positive relationship between entry and market
size, the slope of the log number of products with respect to market size is
significantly lower than in the case of firms. The diﬀerence in the elasticities
implies that international trade models based on the assumption of one firm
produces one product are inadequate in addressing the number of exporters
and exported products in destination markets. Departing from Eaton et al.
[2011], this paper considers a framework where firms can produce multiple
products and a product can be produced by multiple firms. Within this
framework, I then ask the following questions: To what extent prevent fixed
costs the entry of firms and products in international trade? Are they more
prevalent on the firm or on the product margin? To answer these questions, I
evaluate how the number of firms and products varies with destination mar-
ket size controlling for origin, time and bilateral characteristics. I attribute
diﬀerences in the entry behavior across markets due to fixed cost operating
either at the firm or product level. Before describing the empirical model, I
define the cost structure and derive testable implications.
2.2.1 Fixed cost at the firm level
Under entry barriers to export at the firm level, I consider market specific
fixed costs that the firm needs to pay in order to export its products to
a destination market. Such costs can take the form of information costs
to acquire knowledge about the market in a destination (Chaney [2011]),
advertising costs to establish the firm brand (Arkolakis [2010]) or adaptation
costs in the form of building a distribution network. Additional sources of
adaptation costs can be cost in order to accommodate to business practices
in the export destination (Artopoulos et al. [2013]), or legal fees to establish
eligibility of an exporting firm/company by the importing country (Khanna
et al. [2009]). The key characteristic of the firm fixed cost is that incurring
the cost only benefits the firm.
The presence of fixed costs at the firm level implies cost advantages for multi-
product firms because they can spread these costs across more products, as
in Feenstra and Ma [2007] and Eckel and Neary [2010]. This lowers the
firm’s average costs per product and increases its competitiveness relative to
single product firms. Multi-product firms benefit from economies of scope.
Larger markets oﬀer more demand, increase the cost advantage and attract
relative more multi-product firms than in smaller markets. The presence of
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economies of scope may be one explanation of why multi-product firms are
dominant in international trade. 4
To summarize, in larger markets the expected firm revenue is higher allowing
the firm to run down their average costs curve. The lower costs spurs firm
entry and each firm produces at a larger scale. Given that some of the firms
are multi-product firms, the larger market gives them an additional cost
advantage. As market size increases, relative more products enter because
multi-product firms either expand their product range or participate more
in international trade relative to single product firms. Given this reasoning,
one should observe more product entry in comparison to firm entry resulting
in more products per firm in larger markets.
2.2.2 Fixed cost at the product level
Fixed costs at the product level can take the form of technical barriers to
trade (in the form of products standards or certification procedures to en-
sure the quality) or product advertising. Firms have to pay a fixed costs to
introduce the product in the destination because consumers are not aware of
the product. Technical barriers to trade imply modifications to the oﬀered
product in order to customize it to particular local tastes or legal require-
ments imposed by national consumer protection laws. Costs also arise from
the translation of foreign regulations and/or hiring of technical experts to
explain foreign regulations. Note that the use of technical barriers to trade
is subject to Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade administered by the
WTO.
The key implication of the product fixed costs is that once a product is estab-
lished in an export market, many firms start to export diﬀerentiated varieties
of that product. Incurring the fixed cost to introduce a new product induces
a spillover that lowers fixed costs for all firms within the product category.
One reason is that ex ante consumers are unaware of the existence of the
4. Based on U.S. trade data in 2000, Bernard et al. [2011]) show that firms exporting
more than five products at the HS 10-digit level make up 30 percent of exporting firms and
account for 97 percent of all exports. Looking at Brazilian exporter data in the year 2000,
Arkolakis and Muendler [2010] find that 25 percent of all manufacturing exporters ship
more than ten products at the internationally comparable HS 6-digit level and account for
75 percent of total exports.
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product. Once a firm introduces the product successfully in the destination
market, consumers demand the product allowing firms to export diﬀerenti-
ated varieties of that product. To access the export market, firms can share
the fixed product costs in the form of setting up common distribution net-
works to promote their products jointly (for example, a US car dealerships
that sells diﬀerent brands of German cars). Another form of cooperations are
trade associations formed to foster collaboration between companies within
a specific product category in order to define common product standards, to
advertise their products to foreign consumers or to lobby governments for
favorable trade policy, i.e. through export promotion policies, see Lederman
et al. [2010] and Görg et al. [2008] for the empirical evidence.
Instead of many firms sharing the product fixed cost, also a single firm can
introduce a product into an export market. By doing so, this export pioneer
creates a spillover/externality for other firms producing the same product.
Product market rivals benefit from lower fixed costs because the export pi-
oneer opened up a foreign market, established contacts and/or distribution
chains and invested in other costly activities which they can use. Rival
firms may also acquire knowledge about the potential demand of their own
products in the foreign market once they observe the success of the pioneer.
Khanna et al. [2009] study the concrete example of Metro Group a Ger-
man retail company that fought years to have access to the Indian market.
Once the Foreign Direct Investment permit was granted, rival retail firms
like Wal-Mart and Tesco entered immediately by benefiting from the created
legal framework and the observed business opportunities in the Indian retail
market.
To summarize, under the presence of fixed costs at the product level, the
entry of a product is associated with many firms. Due to the higher demand
in larger markets, we expect more cooperation among firms in paying the
fixed. The first entrant is more likely to create a positive externality for rival
firms in larger markets because the expected firm revenue is higher despite
the following entry of rival firms. The product fixed cost implies that multi-
product firms do not have a cost advantage in larger markets. Under all
scenarios, we expect that there is substantially more firm entry than product
entry once the market size increases. The testable implication is that the
entry elasticity of firms with respect to market size should be greater than
for products implying that the number of firms per product is higher in larger
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markets.
In the next section, I explain how I distinguish empirically the nature of fixed
costs, namely whether they operate at the firm or at the product level. The
key element for this distinction relies on the comparison of firm entry and
product entry elasticities as market size increases.
2.3 Methodology
To analyze the nature of fixed costs, proceed as follows. First, decompose
export revenues from country c to destination d in year t, Xd,c,t, into the
following firm components. Note that the same decomposition also holds for
products.
Xd,c,t = ⇡d,c,tXd,t = Nd,c,tx¯d,c,t (2.1)
Xd,t is the market size measured by GDP of destination d in year t, ⇡d,c,t =
Xd,c,t/Xd,t is the import expenditure of destination d on goods from country
c, Nd,c,t is the number of firms (or the number of products) that export from
c to d and x¯d,c,t is the average export revenue per firm (or per product) from
c to d in t.
To investigate the relationship with exports and market size on the diﬀerent
margins, rewrite equation 2.1 as:
Xd,t =
 
Nd,c,t
⇡bd,c,t
! 
x¯d,c,t
⇡1 bd,c,t
!
and taking logs, we get
logXd,t = logNd,c,t   b log ⇡d,c,t + log x¯d,c,t   (1  b) log ⇡d,c,t (2.2)
Split equation 2.2 into two expressions and evaluate how the extensive mar-
gins (the number of exporters)
logNd,c,t = b log ⇡d,c,t +   logXd,t (2.3)
and the intensive margin (the average export revenue per firm)
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log x¯d,c,t = (1  b) log ⇡d,c,t + (1   ) logXd,t (2.4)
change with market size.
The parameter of interest is  . Consider the following two possibilities:
1. If   = 0: In the absence of fixed costs and given positive demand for
a product or a brand, any firm will find it worthwhile to enter. In
this case, we expect that the number of firms and products does not
change with market size. Models in international trade that feature
this setting are of the Armington type, i.e. Anderson and Van Win-
coop [2003]. In these models only the intensive margin matters since
the number of exporters per market is assumed to be fixed.
2. If   > 0: Under the presence of such costs, firms operate under in-
creasing returns to scale. Firms enter the market until the expected
profit is zero, i.e. expected export revenue equals fixed costs. This
free entry condition determines the number of firms per market. In
larger markets, firms can take advantage of the higher demand by
sliding down the average cost curve and sell at lower prices. Thus, the
number of firms will be increasing in market size .
To assess diﬀerences in firm level and product level entry barriers, we test
for significant diﬀerences in the estimated elasticities with respect to market
size using the following regression specification
logNd,c,t = ↵ + b log ⇡d,c,t +   logXd,t + dc,t + ✏d,c,t (2.5)
which restates equation 2.3 and includes origin country-year dummies. The
import expenditure variable ⇡d,c,t captures the taste that a particular des-
tination d may have for goods from country c. We expect that the higher
the expenditure share, the higher the propensity to export in a market. In
this basic specification, it proxies also for all other factors, like distance, that
determine market entry other than market size. In the robustness section I
enrich the model and include further control variables that maybe correlated
with market size and the entry decision. Equation 2.5 is estimated separately
for products and firms as dependent variables in order to obtain separate en-
try elasticities (gamma parameter) with respect to market size for each of
these two components.
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— If product entry (P ) is larger than firm entry (F ), i.e. ( ˆP >  ˆF ),
then I interpret this as evidence suggestive of fixed costs operating at
the firm level
— If firm entry (F ) is larger than product entry (P ), i.e ( ˆF >  ˆP ), then
I interpret this as evidence suggestive of fixed costs operating at the
product level
If the entry elasticities are not significantly diﬀerent from each other, then
within this framework we cannot distinguish whether fixed costs operate on
the firm or on the product level.
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
To build the empirical evidence, I use the Exporter Dynamics Database from
the World Bank, see Cebeci et al. [2012]. It contains firm characteristics per
destination and per product for 40 exporting countries for the period 1997 to
2010. 5 Following the literature, see Broda and Weinstein [2006], I consider a
6 digit HS code per country as a product category and refer to individual firm
products within the product category as varieties of the same product. Given
this perspective, a product can be exported by multiple firms and a firm can
potentially export multiple products. Firms can be viewed as providing their
brand and the brand in turn provides the platform for specific products to
be launched. The Exporter Dynamic Database does not contain information
on the “Oil and Fuels” sector, HS code 27, leaving a total of 4912 tradable
products for each country.
To examine product and firm entry into export markets, I include distance,
common border, market size, income per capita and total import expendi-
ture as destination characteristics. Distance and border measures come from
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationals (see Mayer
and Zignago [2011]) and are in kilometers from capital city in country i to
capital city in country j, calculated by the great circle method. Openness,
market size and income measurements, defined as GDP and GDP per capita,
are taken from the Penn World Table, see Heston et al. [2009]. Data on total
5. I exclude Botswana, Brazil, Egypt, New Zealand and Kuwait because of missing
firm characteristics by export destinations. The appendix contains a complete list of the
countries used.
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c.i.f. import expenditure spend by destination on exporters goods is taken
from the Comtrade data set collected by the United Nations. 6 In total the
baseline sample covers 40 exporting countries and 180 destination markets.
Table 2.3 in the appendix describes the summary statistics of the combined
dataset. The average number of exporters in a destination across all 40 ex-
porting countries is 344 and the average number of exported products per
destination is 298. Since firms can export multiple products and a product
can be exported by multiple firms we can decompose the extensive mar-
gin of exports further. Line 3 in Table 2.3 shows the average number of
products per firm is 2.5 suggesting that the majority of firms are multi-
product firms. The average number of firms per products is 2.1 implying
that strategic interactions between exporters from the same origin country
are important. An export pioneer has to take into account the eﬀect of a
potential spillover/externality on product market rivals when opening up an
export market. Overall, under the assumption of each firm exports a unique
product we neglect important interaction between products and firms. In the
majority of destinations, a firm sells more than one product and a product
is exported by more than one firm.
Table 2.4 displays the results from the estimation of specification 2.3. Fo-
cusing on columns (1) and (2), we see that both, the number of firms and
products, are increasing in destination market size and import expenditure
share. In comparison to the literature, the firm entry elasticity of 0.40 wrt
to destination market size is significantly lower than values found in other
papers. Bernard et al. [2011] report a value of 0.70 for the United States in
6. To construct import expenditure shares, I use data from the Penn World Table and
the Comtrade database. To avoid any potential measurement errors in the exchange rate
when combining nominal values from the 2 dataset, I compute the import expenditure
share of destination d on goods from country c, ⇡d,c, as follows. Using the Comtrade data
set, I first compute the share of imports with respect to total trade flows. More precisely,
I divide bilateral cif imports, Xd,c, by the sum of total fob exports plus total cif imports
for each country, (Imp +Exp). From the Penn World table, I then take openness defined
as total exports plus total imports divided by GDP. Hence, I can calculate the share of
total cif imports expenditure with respect to GDP as:
⇡d,c =
✓
Xd,c
Impd + Expd
◆✓
Impd + Expd
Xd
◆
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the year 2002 and Eaton et al. [2011] report an elasticity of 0.66 for France
in the year 1992 and 0.68 for Denmark and Uruguay in 1993. 7 The results
are more comparable to Bernard et al. [2011] as I also use total GDP as a
measure of market size whereas Eaton et al. [2011] use manufacturing ab-
sorption. 8 Although there are significant diﬀerences in the point estimate of
the entry elasticity with respect to the literature, all values are significantly
below 1 implying that average export revenues increase with market size. 9
Focusing on diﬀerences in the elasticities with respect to market size, the
entry elasticity for firms is higher than for products suggesting that fixed costs
at the product level are the dominant form of entry barriers, i.e. ( F >  P ).
To test for significant diﬀerences, I estimate equation 2.5 with the dependent
variable being number of firms and the number of products jointly within
a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) model. This estimation method
allows for correlation in the entry determinants of firms and products. I
reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerences at the 1 percent level.
In column (3) and (4) in Table 2.4, I include additional control variables to
see how entry behavior varies with respect to destination characteristics. We
run the following regression
log (Nd,c,t) = ↵ + b1 log (⇡d,c,t) +  1 log (Xd,t) +  1 log (yd,t)
+  2 log (distd,c) +  3 log (bd,c) + dc,t + ✏d,c,t (2.6)
where entry of firms and products depends now on GDP per capita in desti-
7. I do not have data for the countries mentioned and can not compare the results by
running the same regression for the respective countries.
8. If I use manufacturing absorption as a proxy for market size I obtain a firm entry
elasticity of 0.45. Absorption is calculated from gross manufacturing output plus imports
minus exports. Due to data limitations on gross manufacturing output the number of
destinations shrinks to 150.
9. Below, I provide a sensitivity analysis where I investigate diﬀerences in the entry
elasticities. The analysis shows that the entry elasticities increase with home market size
implying that larger economies have higher entry elasticities. The reason why my estimate
of firm entry is lower compared to the literature lies in the fact that my sample consists
predominately of small economies compared to the literature and therefore biasing the
estimate downwards. Taking the estimated relationship between home market size and
entry elasticity from below, the results imply a firm entry elasticity of 0.74 for the United
States and 0.62 for France.
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nation d, yd,t, the distance between trading partners, distd,c, and whether the
countries share a common border, bd,c. We expect that richer countries spend
more per product and hence entry rates should increase in GDP per capita,
 1 > 0. Similarly, sharing a border and being close to each other increases the
demand for products because of lower transportation costs. We expect entry
decrease in distance,  2 < 0, and increase when sharing a border,  3 > 0.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.4 confirm previous results. All coeﬃcients
are statistically significant. Based on equation 2.6, more firms and products
enter in markets with a higher level of GDP per capita. Note that GDP
is the product of population and GDP per capita. Thus, the eﬀect of the
log of population on entry is  1 and the eﬀect of the log of income per
capita is  1 +  1. Since  1 > 0, income per capita is more important than
population for firm and product entry. Distance has a negative eﬀect on entry
implying that less firms enter in distant markets. Overall, column (3) and
(4) show that the entry elasticity of firms is statistically significantly higher
than for products even after controlling for income per capita and geography.
Interestingly, the eﬀects of expenditure shares, distance and sharing a border
on firm entry are not significantly diﬀerent from product entry.
2.4.1 Discussion of results
A firm can produce multiple products and a product can be produced by
multiple firms. Depending on the ratio of firms to products in the small
market, the reason for a higher firm than product elasticity can have two
potential explanations in relation to product and firm fixed costs.
One explanations is that the number of firms per product increases with
market size, which is consistent with fixed costs at the product level. Be-
cause of the low demand in small markets, firms export few products to these
destinations. Also, export pioneers pay the product fixed cost only for prod-
uct categories where they face little competition because subsequent entry
of rival firms due to lower costs would vanish all its profits. Larger markets
oﬀer more demand for each product and the number of firms per product
increases.
An alternative explanations is that the number of products per firm decreases
with market size. Suppose few multi-product firms export many products to
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small markets. As market size increases, more firms are able to pay the
firm fixed cost. Most of these firms are single product firms and they enter
in product categories that multi-product firms export to the small market.
This intensifies competition and forces multi-product firms to reduce their
product range. Mayer et al. [2011] emphasize this mechanism. In this case
the firm elasticity is higher than the product elasticity but the implication
would be consistent with fixed costs at the firm level.
To distinguish between the two eﬀects, I use equation 2.5 and regress the
average number of firms per product and the average number of products
per firm on market size and other destination characteristics. Column (3)
and (4) in Table 2.8 of the appendix contain the results. I find that the
number of products per firm is independent of market size, in accordance
with the findings of Arkolakis and Muendler [2010] in the case of Brazil. On
the other hand, the number of firms per product increases significantly in
larger markets. Higher demand in larger economies reduces average costs of
firms and leads to more entry. These findings support the claim that entry
barriers operate on the product level.
The decomposition of exports into extensive and intensive margin, (equations
2.3 and 2.4), oﬀers an alternative view on the mechanism behind fixed costs.
Consider for a moment a model with free entry. Firms enter the market
until the expected profit is zero, i.e. expected export revenues equal marginal
costs plus fixed costs. This condition determines the number of exporters per
market. The fact that entry elasticities are smaller than 1 implies that export
revenues increase in market size, see equation 2.4. If average export revenues
increase with market size, then the model implies, under the assumption of
constant markups, that revenues are higher in larger markets because fixed
costs are higher, for example setting up a distribution network is costlier. In
this case we would have a positive correlation between entry and market size
because market size proxies for fixed costs. To analyze whether the positive
entry elasticities are triggered by a correlation between market size and fixed
costs, I use additional control variables (Fd,t) that proxy for fixed costs. The
resulting regression equation becomes:
log (Nd,c,t) = ↵ + b1 log (⇡d,c,t) +  1 log (Xd,t) +  1 log (yd,t) +  2 log (distd,c) +
+  3 log (bd,c) +  4 log (Fd,t) + dc,t + ✏d,c,t (2.7)
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We expect that the coeﬃcient  4 is negative, i.e. higher fixed costs decrease
the presence of firms. Important is the coeﬃcient on  1. If  ˆ1 diﬀers from  ˜1
previously estimated in Table 2.4 then fixed costs are correlated with market
size. To assess the relationship between market size and the proxies of fixed
costs, we use the fact that  ˜1 =  ˆ1 + Corr(Fd,t, Xd,t). If larger markets have
higher fixed costs, then the estimated coeﬃcient of market size should be
lower given the presence of fixed costs.
To proxy fixed costs, I include Urban population (% of total), Land area (sq.
km), Container port traﬃc (TEU: 20 foot equivalent units), Rail lines (total
route-km), number of internet and cell phone subscribers (per 100 persons)
and Electric power consumption (kWh per capita) from the World Devel-
opment Indicators dataset provided by the World Bank. Urban population
and land area proxy for retail distribution costs. A higher percentage of
urban population facilitates distribution. On the other hand a larger land
increases the costs to reach consumers. Rail and container port traﬃc proxy
for transportation infrastructure. While transportation costs are also part
of marginal costs, I use them as proxies for infrastructure fixed costs. 10 The
number of internet subscribers controls for networking and communication
costs. Finally, energy consumption proxies for higher retail costs. Due to
missing observations, the sample reduces to 11096 observations.
Table 2.9 in the appendix reports the detailed results for each dependent
variables. Note that better infrastructure proxied by container port traﬃc
and km of rail lines increases entry both entry of firms and products. Land
size and energy consumption reduce the entry of firms and products. A
larger area requires more distribution costs and a higher energy consumption
points to more fixed costs. Note that the elasticities of the number of firms
and products with respect to destination market size decrease significantly.
The reason is that market size is positively correlated with distribution costs,
i.e. larger market have higher fixed costs and thus reduce the importance
of market size on fixed costs. Overall, the firm elasticity is still significantly
higher than the product elasticity suggesting that fixed costs operate pre-
liminary on the product rather than firm level even when we control for
“observable” fixed costs.
10. Removing rail lines and container port traﬃc from regression 2.7 does not change
the results.
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This paragraph contains alternative explanations for the positive relationship
between firm entry and market size. Arkolakis [2010] provides a theory for
firm entry based on marginal costs in form of a market access costs rather
than fixed costs. Arkolakis and Muendler [2010] extend the analysis by re-
laxing the assumption of one firm produces one product. To reconcile the
product and firm margin within the Arkolakis and Muendler [2010] frame-
work, one needs to assume that a firm has to incur a marketing cost for each
product it wants to export to each destination, otherwise firms would ben-
efit from economics of scope. While in Arkolakis [2010] and Arkolakis and
Muendler [2010] firms choose the marketing cost, Chaney [2011] develops a
model based on information frictions. Firms have to search for foreign trad-
ing partners in order to trade. This characterizes a dynamic formation of
an international network of importers and exporters. Because larger markets
have more contacts, the number of exporting firms will increase in markets
size. However, firms have to find buyers implying that the search costs oc-
cur at the firm level and not at the product level. One might expect that
in the case of a match, the exporters will sell all its products. The finding
that product fixed costs are the dominant entry barrier suggests that also
demand considerations are an important factor in the entry decision of firms.
Armenter and Koren [2009] develop a model where demand for products is
uncertain. Eaton et al. [2012] develop a model with search and demand
uncertainty. Exporters have to search for potential buyers in destination
markets. The success in selling to a buyer reveals information about the
appeal of the seller’s product in the market, aﬀecting the incentive to search
for more buyers, so importers learn about the product. The combination of
search and demand uncertainty is likely to replicate the above results.
The key aspect of my analysis is that the product fixed cost is not firm spe-
cific. Bernard et al. [2011] consider product fixed costs at the firm level.
While their analysis focuses on multi-product firms and the determinants of
firm’s product scope after trade liberalization, their model allows for diﬀer-
ences in the elasticities of firms and products with respect to market size.
Parameterized accordingly, the quantitative model of Bernard et al. [2011]
can account for diﬀerences in the firm and product elasticity. The central
diﬀerence with respect to this paper is that their analysis does not allow for
spillover eﬀects across firms once new products enter export markets. In the
following section, I present empirical evidence suggestive of spillovers and
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show that these eﬀects are quantitatively important in explaining the entry
behavior of firms.
2.5 Firm entry within products
In the previous part I presented evidence consistent with fixed costs operating
at the product level. An important implication is that product fixed costs
cause spillover eﬀects that lower costs for subsequent exporters once the
product entered a destination market. To shed light upon this mechanism, I
analyze how firm entry evolves over time after a product enters a destination
for the first time. Based on the results, I then present additional empirical
evidence supportive of product fixed costs inducing spillovers that facilitate
firm entry through lower fixed costs.
Given the definition of product fixed costs, we expect that once a firm suc-
cessfully introduces a product in a destination market many firms will follow.
To test the eﬀect, I investigate how the entry rate of firms from an exporting
country within a product category in a particular country varies over time.
I define entry of a new product k from country c in a destination d at time
t if the product is not exported in any period prior to the year of the first
entry. The first year of product data I observe is 1995 and the first year of
firm entry is 1998. Therefore, I will focus only on products that have not
been exported to a destination prior to 1998. Another issue with the data
is that the dataset does not contain information that is origin - destination
- product - year specific, i.e. we do not know how many exporters from a
particular country sell a particular product in a particular destination in a
given year. To address this problem, I specify 2 regression models. In the
first regression I analyze the firm entry rate aggregated over all products
within a destination. In the second model I consider the firm entry rate per
product aggregated over all destinations.
The first regression model analyzes the entry rate of firms from country c
exporting to destination d at time t:
Nd,c,t =
6X
s=1
↵sls,k,d,c + dc,d + dc,t + dk,t + ✏k,d,c,t
The firm entry rate, nd,c,t, is defined by the number of new exporters. I
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regress the firm entry rate on the a set of dummies, (ls,k,d,c), that capture
the firm entry rate over time after a product is exported for the first time
to a destination. I set the dummy ls,k,d,c equal to 1 if product k from coun-
try c is exported to destination d s years after the product is introduced.
The coeﬃcient ↵s captures the diﬀerence to the average firm entry rate in
year s after the product is introduced. Given this specification, we expect
that the entry rate increases significantly right after a product is introduced
in an export market, i.e. ↵1 > 0. To test whether ↵1 > 0, I include a
large set of control dummies: destination-origin (dc,d), origin-time (dc,t) and
product-time (dk,t) specific dummies. Origin-destination dummies control
for geography. The origin-time dummies control for any origin country spe-
cific eﬀects that generates easier firm entry into international markets, for
example institutions, infrastructure, etc. Product-time dummies account for
product demand eﬀects common across countries .
In the second regression model, I analyze the firm entry rate within a product
group across destinations. I estimate the following equation:
Nk,c,t =
6X
s=1
 sls,k,d,c + dc,k + dd,t + dc,t + ✏k,d,c,t
The firm entry rate, nk,c,t, is defined by the number of new exporters of
product k from country c in year t. I regress the firm entry rate on the same
set of time dummies (ls,k,d,c). The only diﬀerence is that I include origin-
product (dk,c) and destination-time (dd,t) fixed eﬀects instead of destination-
origin (dc,d) and product-time (dk,t) dummies. The origin-product dummies
account for supply side eﬀects. For example, firm entry may be higher be-
cause a country is very productive in producing a particular product. The
destination-time dummies control for macroeconomic conditions in the des-
tination common to all products.
Table 2.5 plots the results of the 2 regression specifications. Average firm
entry is given by the constant. The year dummies describe the estimated
time eﬀects on firm entry after a product is exported for the first time with
respect to the mean. Looking at the coeﬃcient of year_1 and year_2, firm
entry increases significantly the first 2 years and then becomes either negative
(column (1)) or insignificant (column (2)). Dividing the estimated coeﬃcient
by the average, we obtain that the entry rate in a destination increases by 2.5
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percent and by 7 percent within the product group one year after a product
is introduced. Given that the average number of firms per destination is 343,
as shown in the summary statistics, the number of new firms in a destination
increases on average by 8.6 firms. On the other hand, the average number
of exporters per product is 27 implying that 2 additional new firms start to
export after a product is exported for the first time.
Overall, the entry pattern is consistent with the interpretation that part of
the fixed cost is sunk. Once a firm introduces a product into a destination,
firms enter at a significant higher rate the following 2 years. These findings
point to spillover eﬀects from lower fixed costs for following exporters and
are consistent with the definition of product fixed costs. To strengthen the
evidence of spillovers across firms, the next paragraph discusses additional
empirical implications.
Higher firm entry rates after product entry as shown in Table 2.5 may lead
to business stealing eﬀects. An export pioneer who opens up international
markets reduces fixed costs for product market rivals and thus spurs entry.
More entry increases competitive pressure and results in lower prices. Based
on this argument, products with a higher number of exporters per destination
should be negatively correlated with export prices. Also, the willingness of
the pioneer to bear the product fixed cost increases in market size because
of the higher demand in larger markets. If this eﬀect dominates, the pioneer
may not be willing to pay the fixed cost in the small market. We would expect
a negative correlation between the number of exporters per product and the
number of export markets penetrated. Because the number of destinations
does not control for the market size of the export markets penetrated, I also
include the rank of the export market with the largest and the lowest size
as additional control variables. The business stealing eﬀect predicts that
products with lots of firms export only to lower ranked markets, i.e. the
markets with the largest size.
To investigate business stealing eﬀects at the product level, I use the following
regression specification:
logNk,c,t =  1 log p¯k,c,t +  2 log sk,c,t +  3 log q¯k,c,t +
+  4 logMk,c,t + dk + dc,t + ✏d,c (2.8)
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where Nk,c,t is the average number of exporters per destination in product
class k from country c in period t, p¯k,c,t is the unit value our proxy for the
export price of the product, sk,c,t is the survival probability of an exporter re-
maining an exporter the following year, q¯k,c,t represents the per firm average
quantity exported and Mk,c,t stands for the number of destinations product
k is exported to. dk and dc,t are product and country-time fixed eﬀects.
Country-time fixed eﬀects control for institutional diﬀerences and macroeco-
nomic trends that are common across products. Product fixed eﬀects control
for any characteristics that are common across export destinations like de-
mand, substitutability and potentially common fixed costs. 11 Note that the
fixed eﬀects will not capture the eﬀect of pioneers on the product diﬀerentia-
bility and revenues of rivals because these firms operate in diﬀerent product
categories in diﬀerent countries.
Table 2.6 plots the results. The number of firms per destination for a given
product is significantly negative correlated with the average export price.
Since we control for demand by product fixed eﬀects, the number of export
destinations and the firm’s average quantity exported, I consider this as sup-
portive evidence for business stealing eﬀects. Lower fixed costs spur firm
entry and results in more product market competition.
Table 2.6 also shows that contrary to our expectations products with many
firms per destination are exported to more destinations, column (1) and
(2). A potential explanation is that the number of destinations proxies for
comparative advantage. In the Eaton and Kortum [2002] model a country
has a stronger comparative advantage in a product group if that product is
exported to many destinations. Given this interpretation, countries export
a product to many destinations because the average productivity of firms
within this product category is high. Firm export participation is positively
correlated with the number of destinations not because of lower fixed cost
but due to lower marginal costs caused by comparative advantage.
The quantity coeﬃcient in Table 2.6 is significantly and positive. Because of
lower fixed costs, firms slide down the average cost curve, increase production
11. I assume that product demand is common across countries, i.e. that consumers in
diﬀerent destination markets have the same demand for a product. Under this assumption,
product fixed eﬀects will control for demand eﬀect.
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eﬃciency and export on average a larger quantity. Note that the quantity ef-
fect is significantly larger than the price eﬀect implying that eﬃciency gains
from lower fixed costs dominate business stealing eﬀects from more entry.
Artopoulos et al. [2013] provide anecdotal evidence that export pioneers ac-
quire knowledge about foreign markets through their embeddedness in the
business community of destination markets. The generated knowledge dif-
fuses to rival firms within the same sector in the domestic market, lowers
fixed costs to export and increases their eﬃciency. Firm participation and
export sales per firm increase significantly. My finding is consistent with this
argument. An addition implication of the knowledge spillover is that firms
learn to conduct international business allowing them to remain an exporter
in the next period. Including the survival probability of staying an exporter
next period as an additional regressors, confirms this conjecture. Firms ex-
porting products with many rival firms have on average a 22 percent higher
probability of survival in export markets.
Artopoulos et al. [2013] argue that spillover eﬀects are particular pronounced
in sectors with a high degree of product diﬀerentiation. In product categories
that allow for more product diﬀerentiation, firms can react to more product
market competition by upgrading their own product through quality. The
higher the degree of product diﬀerentiation, the lower is the competition
pressure form product market rivals. We expect the negative relationship
between export price and firm entry to be weakened, i.e. diﬀerentiated prod-
uct groups should experience relative more product entry. In regression 2.8,
I control for product diﬀerentiation by including product fixed eﬀects. In
a sensitivity analysis I re-estimate equation 2.8 for diﬀerent types of prod-
ucts classified according to Rauch [1999]’s product diﬀerentiation index. The
three groups are: homogeneous goods, reference priced goods and diﬀerenti-
ated goods. Index 1 refers to homogeneous goods, 2 to reference prices goods
and 3 to diﬀerentiated goods.
Table 2.7 contains the results. I test whether the sensitivity of price on the
number of firms per destination is lower for diﬀerentiated products than for
homogeneous products. In diﬀerentiated product the eﬀect of price on the
number of firms per destination is significantly lower than in the other 2
groups. Also, the probability of staying in export markets and the average
export revenues are higher for firms exporting diﬀerentiated products. This is
additional evidence for the argument of Artopoulos et al. [2013] that positive
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spillover eﬀects are stronger in diﬀerentiated products.
In sum, the results suggest that consistent with product fixed costs, once
a firm introduces a product into a market subsequent exporters face lower
fixed costs. The time analysis shows that most firms enter the year right
after a product was exported the first time. This finding is consistent with
lower fixed costs due to the removal of part of the fixed cost to export. I also
find that the associated spillover form the lower fixed costs leads not only
to higher entry rates but is also accompanied by a business stealing eﬀect,
i.e. the higher firm entry reduces export prices. At the same time, lower
fixed costs allow firm to produce at a more eﬃcient scale and export a larger
quantity. Overall, the larger quantity oﬀsets the negative price eﬀects and
average export revenues per firm increase.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper develops an empirical framework to analyze fixed costs that ex-
porting firms face in order to participate in international markets. The anal-
ysis distinguishes between fixed costs on the firm and product level. In the
first part I study the presence of fixed costs by evaluating how the entry
of firms and products varies with destination market size. The second part
describes potential spillover eﬀects at the firm and product level caused by
fixed costs and presents empirical evidence consistent with these eﬀects.
The results indicate that entry barriers operate at the product level. Taking
cross country evidence into account, product fixed costs are even more impor-
tant relative to firm fixed costs in countries with a large home market. Small
countries have often only one firm within a product category, thus product
fixed costs are identical to firm fixed costs. Overall, the results suggest that
small economies are particularly aﬀected from fixed costs. The low level of
domestic demand implies that firms are not able to benefit from economies
of scale resulting in relative high prices and a disadvantage in comparison to
firms from larger economies. Moreover, because of low demand, few firms
find it profitable to export to them. The limited entry results in even higher
prices due to the lack of competitive pressure.
To investigate the eﬀects of fixed costs on the entry decision of firms further,
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I analyze how firms change their product range with market size. The re-
sults show that the average number of products per firms does not change
with the size of the destination market pointing to no cost advantages of
expanding the product range in larger markets. I consider this as supportive
evidence of product fixed costs. Including information on the timing of entry
of products, I find consistent with product fixed costs that the entry of firm
increases significantly the year after a product is introduced to a destination
market. The higher entry of rival firms indicates lower entry barriers due
to the removal of the product fixed costs. The additional entry introduces
competitive pressure and lowers export prices, i.e. business stealing eﬀects.
The lower fixed cost allows rival firms to produce at a more eﬃcient scale,
increases their export revenues and results in a higher probability of staying
in international markets the next period.
In conclusion, my findings have important policy implications. For the ex-
porting country policies encouraging new product entry, for example advertis-
ing new products in destination markets through export promotion agencies,
rather than firm entry would potentially lead to spillover eﬀects that trans-
late into higher level of firm participation and export growth. By paying
part of the product fixed costs, the government increases incentives for firms
to explore new export destinations and oﬀsets part of the negative eﬀects
due to free riding of rival firms. The importing country can lower product
fixed costs by reducing technical-barriers to trade. As a result, consumer sur-
plus increases because of lower product prices due to competitive pressure.
More generally, the existence of entry barriers to export implies that trade
policy can eﬀect market structure. When conducting policy experiments in
the form of a reduction in trade costs, it is standard in the international
trade literature to consider only a fall in marginal costs and evaluate the
resulting impact on the patterns of trade and consumer welfare. However,
an important component of the current EU-US free trade negotiations is the
reduction of technical-barriers to trade by negotiating common product stan-
dards. Neglecting the existence of entry barriers and the resulting industry
reallocations underestimates the impact of trade reforms.
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Figure 2.2 – The firm entry rate over time after a product is exported to a market
for the first time.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1 – Exporting countries in the sample
Albania Domenican Republic Macedonia Peru
Bangladesh Ecuador Malawi Portugal
Belgium El Salvador Mali Senegal
Bulgaria Estonia Mauritius South Africa
Burkina Faso Guatemala Mexiko Spain
Cambodia Iran Morocco Sweden
Cameron Jordan Nicaragua Turkey
Chile Kenya Niger Uganda
Colombia Laos Norway United Rep. Tanzania
Costa Rica Lebanon Pakistan Yemen
Note: Data from the Exporter Dynamics Database provided by the World Bank
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Table 2.2 – Importing countries in the sample
Afghanistan Denmark Kyrgyzstan Samoa
Albania Djibouti Laos Sao Tome & Principe
Algeria Dominica Latvia Saudi Arabia
Angola Dominican Republic Lebanon Senegal
Antigua & Barbuda Ecuador Liberia Seychelles
Argentina Egypt Libya Sierra Leone
Armenia El Salvador Lithuania Singapore
Australia Equatorial Guinea Macao Slovak Republic
Austria Eritrea Macedonia Slovenia
Azerbaijan Estonia Madagascar Solomon Islands
Bahamas Ethiopia Malawi Somalia
Bahrain Fiji Malaysia South Africa
Bangladesh Finland Maldives Spain
Barbados France Mali Sri Lanka
Belarus Gabon Malta St. Kitts & Nevis
Belgium Gambia, The Marshall Islands St. Lucia
Belize Georgia Mauritania St.Vincent & Grenadines
Benin Germany Mauritius Sudan
Bermuda Ghana Mexico Suriname
Bhutan Greece Micronesia Sweden
Bolivia Grenada Moldova Switzerland
Bosnia & Herzegovina Guatemala Mongolia Syria
Brazil Guinea Morocco Taiwan
Brunei Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Tajikistan
Bulgaria Guyana Nepal Tanzania
Burkina Faso Haiti Netherlands Thailand
Burundi Honduras New Zealand Togo
Cambodia Hong Kong Nicaragua Tonga
Cameroon Hungary Niger Trinidad & Tobago
Canada Iceland Nigeria Tunisia
Cape Verde India Norway Turkey
Central African Republic Indonesia Oman Turkmenistan
Chad Iran Pakistan Uganda
Chile Iraq Palau Ukraine
China Ireland Panama United Arab Emirates
Colombia Israel Papua New Guinea United Kingdom
Comoros Italy Paraguay United States
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jamaica Peru Uruguay
Congo, Republic of Japan Philippines Uzbekistan
Costa Rica Jordan Poland Vanuatu
Cote d‘Ivoire Kazakhstan Portugal Venezuela
Croatia Kenya Qatar Vietnam
Cuba Kiribati Romania Yemen
Cyprus Korea, Republic of Russia Zambia
Czech Republic Kuwait Rwanda Zimbabwe
Note: Data from Comtrade, Penn World Table and CEPII
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Table 2.3 – Summary Statistics
Obser. Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
Nr. of exporters 30164 343,8 39 1112,9 2 28981
Nr. of products 30164 297,1 55 564,8 1 4163
Nr. of exporters/product 30164 2,12 1,46 1,87 1 43,23
Nr. of products/exporter 30164 2,54 1,97 2,87 1 104,80
Av. revenues per exporter 30164 1,29 0,58 4,38 8,92E-06 755,4
Av. revenues per product 30164 1,27 0,49 4,57 2,85E-06 645,6
GDP in destination 1560 451909 65967 1358439 145 14400000
GDP per capita in dest. 1560 13303 92395 14071 192 91707
Expenditure share 30164 0,00125 0,00026 0,00783 1,97E-09 0,40083
Distance 30164 6873 6177 4343 86 19812
GDP in origin country 182 275916 165278 351089 8247 1516755
GDP per capita in origin 182 12105 7978 12090 559 54927
Note: Statistics are aggregated over all export destinations. Average expenditure per firm is total
imports of destination per exporting country divided by number of exporting firms. Average
expenditure per product is total imports of destination per exporting country divided by number
of exported products. Average expenditure per firm and per product as well as GDP are measured
in million International dollars. Expenditure shares are defined as a country’s total value of
imports per exporting country divided by the country’s total expenditure, i.e. GDP. GDP per
capita is measured in International dollars. Distances are in kilometers from capital city in
country i to capital city in country j.
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Table 2.4 – Entry of firms and products with respect to market size
Dependent variable
log(Number log(Number log(Number log(Number
of firms) of products) of firms) of products)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Market Size) 0.403*** 0.317*** 0.439*** 0.357***
[0.0116] [0.0115] [0.00595] [0.00560]
log(Expenditure Share) 0.366*** 0.360*** 0.205*** 0.199***
[0.00631] [0.00724] [0.00475] [0.00478]
log(Distance) -0.828*** -0.847***
[0.0232] [0.0263]
log(GDP per capita) 0.139*** 0.0953***
[0.0113] [0.0113]
Border 0.347*** 0.311***
[0.0225] [0.0290]
Observations 30164 30164 30164 30164
R-squared 0.661 0.618 0.764 0.723
Note: The results from ordinary least squares regressions for the dependent variable
normalized by the import expenditure share are noted at the top of each column projected
on the covariates listed in the first column. All regressions include origin country, time and
origin country-time fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***, **, * marks
statistically significant diﬀerence from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 2.5 – Fixed costs and the number of exporters
per destination
Dependent variable
Firm entry Firm entry
per destination per product
(1) (2)
year_1 0.943*** 0.460***
[0.249] [0.130]
year_2 0.477** 0.312***
[0.257] [0.104]
year_3 0.086 0.292*
[0.446] [0.152]
year_4 -1.264** 0.286
[0.520] [0.172]
year_5 -1.077* 0.209
[0.587] [0.188]
year_6 -0.011 -0.186
[0.642] [0.0.215]
Constant 29.12*** 8.210***
[6.832] [1.459]
Observations 3297489 2703038
R-squared 0,729 0,529
Note: The dependent variable is the number of entrants
divided by the total number of exporters in a destina-
tion (column (1)) or within a product group (column
(2)). The results are based on ordinary least squares re-
gressions. All regressions include origin country - time
fixed eﬀects. The destination specific regression in col-
umn (1) includes product-time and origin-destination
fixed eﬀects whereas the product specific regression in
column (2) includes product-country and destination-
time fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses (clustered by destination time in column (1) and by
product time in column (2) ): ***, **, * marks statis-
tically significant diﬀerence from zero at the 1***, **,
* marks statistically significant diﬀerence from zero at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 2.6 – Fixed costs and the number of exporters per
destination
Dependent variable
log(Av. Nr. Exporters
per destination)
(1) (2)
log(Av. Unit value) -0.01025*** -0.01085***
[0.000703] [0.000702]
Log(Av. Quantity) 0.0399*** 0.0394***
[0.000619] [0.000625]
log(Nr. of destinations) 0.127*** 0.117***
[0.00154] [0.00163]
Survival Probability 0.225*** 0.224***
[0.00443] [0.00443]
Rank of largest market -0.000786***
[3.14e-05]
Rank of smallest market 0.000322***
[4.06e-05]
Observations 201,788 201,788
R-squared 0.495 0.497
Note: The dependent variable is the average number of
exporters per destination. The results are based on ordi-
nary least squares regressions. All regressions include ori-
gin country, product and time fixed eﬀects. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses (clustered by country time): ***,
**, * marks statistically significant diﬀerence from zero at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 2.7 – Fixed costs and the number of exporters per destination
for diﬀerentiated, less diﬀerentiated and homogeneous products
Dependent variable: log(Av. Nr. Exporters per destination)
Diﬀerentiation index 1 2 3
log(Av. Unit value) -0.0389*** -0.0138*** -0.0046***
[0.0033] [0.0016] [0.0005]
Log(Av. Quantity) 0.0145*** 0.0173*** 0.0237***
[0.0017] [0.0005] [0.0009]
log(Nr. of destinations) 0.0333*** 0.0342*** 0.146***
[0.0073] [0.0037] [0.0018]
Survival Probability 0.129*** 0.152*** 0.263***
[0.0147] [0.0081] [0.0055]
Rank of largest market 0.000753*** 0.000990*** 0.000723***
[0.0001] [7.06e-05] [3.61e-05]
Rank of smallest market -0,000273 0.000360*** 0.000295***
[0.0001] [8.49e-05] [4.76e-05]
Observations 9682 40573 151369
R-squared 0,386 0,424 0,532
Note: The dependent variable is the average number of exporters per des-
tination. The product diﬀerentiation index assigns a value of 1 to homo-
geneous goods, 2 to reference prices goods and 3 to diﬀerentiated goods.
The results are based on ordinary least squares regressions. All regressions
include origin country, product and time fixed eﬀects. Robust standard
errors in parentheses (clustered by country time): ***, **, * marks sta-
tistically significant diﬀerence from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively.
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Table 2.8 – Relationship of market size and the number of firms and products including
the decompostion of the extensive margin
Dependent variable
log(Av. Nr. of log(Av. Nr. of
log(Number log(Number Products Firms per
of firms) of products) per firm) per product)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Market Size) 0.439*** 0.357*** 0.0181 0.100***
[0.00595] [0.00560] [0.00979] [0.00292]
log(Expenditure Share) 0.205*** 0.199*** 0.0210*** 0.0269***
[0.00475] [0.00478] [0.00206] [0.00179]
log(Distance) -0.828*** -0.847*** -0.185*** -0.166***
[0.0232] [0.0263] [0.00937] [0.00860]
log(GDP per capita) 0.139*** 0.0953*** 0.0112*** 0.0546***
[0.0113] [0.0113] [0.00401] [0.00374]
border 0.347*** 0.311*** 0.0870*** 0.123***
[0.0225] [0.0290] [0.00890] [0.00852]
Observations 30164 30164 30164 30164
R-squared 0,764 0,723 0,346 0,482
Note: Total firm-product combinations (T ) are decomposed into Td,c = Pd,cp¯d,c, where Pd,c is
the number of exported products from country c to destination d and p¯d,c is the average number
of firms per products exported. Equivalently, Td,c can also be decomposed into Td,c = Fd,cf¯d,c
the number of exporting firms in c with shipments to destination d and the average number
of products per exporter from c to d, f¯d,c. The results from ordinary least squares regressions
for the dependent variable normalized by the import expenditure share are noted at the top
of each column projected on the covariates listed in the first column. All regressions include
origin country, time and origin country fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parentheses:
***, **, * marks statistically significant diﬀerence from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively.
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Table 2.9 – Relationship between market size and the
number firms and products including proxies for fixed costs
Dependent variable
log(Number log(Number
of firms) of products)
(1) (2)
log(Market size) 0.195*** 0.108***
[0.0169] [0.0178]
log(Expenditure Share) 0.240*** 0.252***
[0.00591] [0.00622]
log(Distance) -0.662*** -0.632***
[0.0149] [0.0156]
log(GDP per capita) 0.502*** 0.574***
[0.0285] [0.0300]
Border 0.162*** 0.0632***
[0.0221] [0.0233]
% of urban population 0.00263*** 0.00391***
[0.000294] [0.000309]
log(Landsize km2) -0.0577*** -7,82E-05
[0.00834] [0.00878]
log(Container Traﬃc) 0.234*** 0.225***
[0.0102] [0.0107]
log(Rail km) 0.156*** 0.140***
[0.0120] [0.0126]
log(Nr. of internet subscribers) 0.03739 0.05841
[0.04124] [0.04183]
log(Electricity per capita) -0.392*** -0.487***
[0.0212] [0.0223]
Observations 11.096 11.096
R-squared 0,867 0,843
Note: All regressions include time and origin country fixed
eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by
country time): ***, **, * marks statistically significant dif-
ference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Chapter 3
The causal impact of migration
on U.S. intermediate goods’
trade: Evidence from a natural
experiment
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3.1 Introduction
Are international trade and migration substitutes or complements? An im-
portant strand of thought has maintained that trade and migration are, in
fact, complementary, see Egger et al. [2012]. International migrants can in-
crease international trade flows via two distinct mechanisms. First, migrants
shift preferences towards the goods of their country of origin, thus gener-
ating demand for imports of those goods by their host country. Second,
migrants reduce transaction costs between countries, either by holding infor-
mation about relevant market characteristics or by attenuating frictions due
to imperfect contract enforcement.
This paper studies the impact of immigrants on intermediate goods imports
by studying geographical variations across US states for the period 1970 to
2005. To generate our results, we follow a gravity approach and regress
the log of intermediate imports on the log of recent immigrants. We ad-
dress reverse causality, and more broadly endogeneity, and find evidence of a
significantly positive eﬀect of immigrants on US intermediate imports. To es-
timate a causal relationship, we analyze the exogenous allocation of refugees
within the US refugee resettlement program. Our results are robust to an
alternative identification strategy, based on the large influx of Central Amer-
ican immigrants to the United States after hurricane Mitch. We find that a
10 percent increase in recent immigrants to a given US state raises imports
from those immigrants’ country of origin by 1.5 percent. Overall, our results
suggest that immigrant networks play an important role in promoting trade
across countries
There are two important diﬀerences between our analysis and previous stud-
ies. First, we focus on regional variations in immigration and intermediate
imports within the United States. This approach allows us to estimate the
trade-migration relationship leaving aside the potential correlation between
trade and migration policy at the national level. Since there are no data on
the distribution of intermediate imports across US states for the time period
under review, we apply a procedure based on Anderson and Yotov [2010] to
infer this distribution. Using data from the County Business Pattern and ap-
plying the techniques from Autor et al. [2013] for each US state, we calculate
the intermediate imports as the sum of industry-specific imports. The latter
are modeled as depending on the relative size of the industry and on bilat-
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eral trade costs with respect to each trading partner (geographical distance,
border and the value-to-weight ratio). This method allows us to project the
observed national import flows by industry onto the state level. To assess
the appropriateness of our method, we use data available for recent years on
the distribution of intermediate imports across US states and compare the
constructed import flows with the observed ones. We find a high correlation
between the two flows, i.e. a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.85. In addition, using
recent observed import data, we find estimates of the impact of migration
on trade to be qualitatively similar to the ones based on constructed import
flows for the 1970-2005 period. 1
Second, and most importantly, we address endogeneity by focusing on ex-
ogenous shocks to immigration. Endogeneity arises because immigrants’ de-
cisions regarding their settlement within the United States are likely to be
correlated with several variables, such as income, employment opportunities
and/or preferences, which in turn are correlated with trade, see Borjas [1999].
An additional source of endogeneity arises in the form of reverse causality,
i.e. immigrants from a given country are likely to settle in states that trade
a lot with their country of origin. As a first step towards addressing these
issues, we focus on recent immigrants and include the number of non-recent
immigrants living in the state as a control variable. The non-recent immi-
grant population of a given origin will capture the unobserved preferences of
immigrants of that origin for a specific location. It will also account for the
impact of better income and employment opportunities in a state that are
specific to immigrants of that origin, see Clark et al. [2007]. In addition, and
most importantly, we address endogeneity and reverse causality by estimat-
ing an IV specification. First, we use the exogenous allocation of political
refugees across US states within the refugee resettlement program. Second,
we take advantage of an exogenous shock that forces people to migrate. In
particular, we look at of the large influx of Central American immigrants to
nearby US states following hurricane Mitch in October 1998. The IV ap-
proach removes the endogenous component of migration decisions whereby
individuals might move to those regions with the best trading opportunities.
Starting with the pioneering work of Gould [1994], there exists ample empiri-
cal literature that argues that immigrants increase trade across international
1. Before 2008, only national US import data are available.
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borders. Gould [1994] studies the eﬀect of migration on aggregate US ex-
ports and imports for the years 1970-1986. He estimates a gravity model
of trade on migration and finds evidence of a strong positive relationship.
Many authors follow Gould and study immigration into a single country, for
example Head and Ries [1998] examine Canada and Girma and Yu [2002] the
United Kingdom. The drawback of focusing on the aggregate level is that
these studies cannot account for correlation in migration and trade policies.
More recent studies exploit the regional distribution of immigrants and look
at the bilateral trade relationship between US regions and foreign countries,
see Bardhan and Guhathakurta [2004], Dunlevy [2006] and Parsons and Véz-
ina [2014]. While these studies focus exclusively on US exports, this paper
is the first to present evidence on US imports at the state level.
In a recent literature review, Felbermayr et al. [2012] argue that the main
concern for the identification of the causal eﬀect of immigration is reverse
causality. To deal with this issue, authors have adopted diﬀerent approaches.
Drawing upon the seminal work of Card [2001], several papers (see for ex-
ample Peri and Requena-Silvente [2010]) instrument changes in immigrants
at the sub-national level by applying the growth in immigrants from a given
country of origin at the national level to the distribution of immigrants from
a given country of origin across regions at a previous point in time. Still,
historical migrant stocks can have direct eﬀects on trade even many years
after their arrival, therefore violating the exclusion restriction.
The only other paper that has recourse to a natural experiment for identifica-
tion is Parsons and Vézina [2014]. Their strategy is based on the combination
of an immigration shock caused by the exogenous allocation of Vietnamese
Boat People across US states and a concurrent trade embargo. They use the
cross section variation in Vietnamese immigrants and US exports across the
50 US states to estimate the impact of Vietnamese migration on US exports.
Rather than focusing on a particular group of migrants at a given point in
time, this paper uses data on political refugees to the U.S. from all countries
between the years of 1970 and 2005. To establish the causal relationship, our
analysis takes advantage of the fact that political refugees to the U.S. are
exogenously allocated across locations once we control for the existence of
families ties of migrants. As a robustness check, we use the migration flows
from several Central American countries following hurricane Mitch. Overall,
our findings show that the trade-enhancing eﬀect of immigrants found by
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Parsons and Vézina [2014] also holds in a general setting where we consider
regional intermediate imports from many countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the identifi-
cation strategy as well as the details of the natural experiments, the political
refugees and hurricane Mitch, which allow us to establish causality between
trade and migration. Section 2 also contains the import demand model used
to project the aggregate US data onto the state level. Section 3 covers the
data and the summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the obtained OLS and
IV results. Section 5 discusses the robustness of our findings and section 6
concludes.
3.2 Identification strategy
Our identification strategy looks at variations in intermediate imports and
the number of recent immigrants across US states. Once migrants settle
in a US state, international trade between the state of residence and their
respective home countries is expected to increase. This eﬀect is likely to
take place through the following channels. First, migrants might provide
information that reduces transaction costs. Second, trade might increase
simply because migrants have a preference for the goods from their country
of origin. However, in our analysis we do not explicitly distinguish between
the two mechanisms.
The reason why we focus on intermediate imports is that, for our sample
period, we have no information on regional trade data in the United States.
Instead, we infer the distribution of trade flows across US states via an inter-
mediate input demand model. This model allows us to project the observed
aggregate trade data onto the state level. A key element in the calculation
of regional intermediate imports is production data by region and industry.
Since consumption data by region and industry is not available, we cannot
assess regional imports for final goods. We then discuss the estimation equa-
tion and identification issues, followed by the procedure for inferring regional
intermediate import data.
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3.2.1 Regression specification
To analyze the impact of immigration on intermediate imports, we follow the
literature, Felbermayr et al. [2012], and employ the gravity equation. The
gravity equation relates trade flows between state i and country j to the
relative sizes of the participating economies (which in our specification are
captured by fixed eﬀects). The log of the import flow of state i from country
j for the period t, Xijt, is given by
log(Xijt) =  1 log(Immijt) +  2 log dij +  3bij +
+  4 logPImmijt + fjt + fit + "ijt (3.1)
The regressor Immijt indicates the number of foreign-born individuals above
the age of 21 who immigrated from country j to state i in any of the 5 years
prior to time t. The other regressors are the log of the distance, dij, between
the capital of state i and the capital in country j, measured in kilometers. bij
represents a dummy variable that indicates whether state i shares a border
with country j. PImmijt is the number of foreign-born individuals above the
age of 21 who immigrated from country j to state i more than 10 years prior
to time t. In addition, we also introduce time varying state and country fixed
eﬀects, fit and fjt respectively. The coeﬃcient of interest is  1. If  1 > 0,
then the presence of recent immigration increases intermediate imports.
Equation 3.1 represents the ideal regression in the case of import flows being
observed. Given that we approximate import flows within an intermediate
input demand model, we introduce a measurement error, uijt. The estimation
equation becomes
log(Xˆijt) =  1 log(Immijt) +  2 log dij +  3bij +
+  4 logPImmijt + fit + fjt + vijt (3.2)
and
log(Xˆijt) = log(Xijt) + uijt
where Xˆijt represents the estimated state import flows and vijt the error
in the OLS regression.  1 is consistently estimated if Cov(Immijt, uijt) =
Cov(Immijt, vijt) = 0. Due to the presence of the measurement error, the
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standard errors are larger and the likelihood of not rejecting the null hypoth-
esis of  1 = 0 increases, see Wooldridge [2010]. Thus, a significant eﬀect
of migration on trade will reinforce our confidence in the results obtained.
Equation 3.2 will be our main regression specification.
In terms of identification of  1, it is important to control for geography, since
both migration and trade are correlated with distance and border, see Head
and Mayer [2013]. States import more from countries that are relatively close
by and with whom they share a common border. At the same time, relatively
more people migrate to neighboring countries that are close by. Neglecting
these eﬀects will introduce an omitted variable bias.
Note that, by analyzing the trade migration relationship across US states,
we directly address the criticism of Hanson [2010] with respect to the earlier
literature. He argues that “It is diﬃcult to draw causal inference from results
based on international trading and migration patterns, since immigration
may be correlated with unobserved factors that also aﬀect trade, such as
the trading partners’ cultural similarity or bilateral economic policies (e.g.,
preferential trade policies or investment investment treaties that raise the
return to both migration and trade)”. Trade policies and investment treaties
are negotiated at the federal level and are thus controlled for by fixed eﬀects
specific to the country of origin, fjt. These fixed eﬀects also control for any
eﬀects that are common to all regions in the United States. For example, if a
country experiences a positive productivity shock, trade might increase since
all regions will face lower import prices from this country and emigration
might decrease because of better employment opportunities.
A further concern for the identification of parameter  1 is the presence of
time-varying state-specific characteristics that may be correlated with trade
flows as well as immigration. One such candidate is, for instance, economies
of agglomeration, i.e more immigrants are likely to settle in larger states and
those states have higher demand for intermediate goods. For this reason, we
include time-varying state-fixed eﬀects, fit, that control for any state-specific
eﬀects, such as local demand and income shocks, which are common to all
migrants.
By looking at regional variations and including state and country time-
varying fixed eﬀects, we follow the recent literature, see Dunlevy [2006] and
94
Bardhan and Guhathakurta [2004]. The key diﬀerence of this paper with re-
spect to the literature is that we oﬀer a new approach to resolving endogene-
ity. Endogeneity arises because immigrants’ decisions regarding settlement
within the United States is likely to be correlated with several variables, such
as income, employment opportunities and/or preferences, which in turn are
correlated with trade, see Borjas [1999]. An additional source of endogeneity
arises in the form of reverse causality, i.e. immigrants from a given country
of origin are likely to go to states that trade a lot with that country.
To tackle endogeneity, we proceed in two steps. First, we distinguish between
diﬀerent groups of immigrants according to their arrival date. Specifically,
we focus on newly arrived immigrants and include the previous number of
immigrants as an additional control variable, PImmijt. This allows us to
account for the fact that immigrants are not randomly distributed across
geographical locations. Consider for example Austrian immigrants, who have
a specific knowledge of the production of skies and decide to emigrate to the
United States in order to make use of this knowledge. They may prefer to
go to Colorado rather than Texas because of the relatively higher demand
for skies, and thus the greater business and employment opportunities for
them in the Rocky Mountains. In a similar vein, Italians may prefer to
move to California in order to start producing wine rather than to Montana
where climatic conditions prevent wine from growing. In both scenarios, the
settlement choice diﬀers across migrants of diﬀerent origins and is correlated
with business and employment opportunities and/or preferences, which in
turn are correlated with imports from their countries of origin. We mitigate
the resulting bias by looking at the impact of recent immigrants on trade
and, at the same time, controlling for the previous number of immigrants
from the same country of origin already living in the region. Of course, this
hinges on the assumption that recent immigrants’ settlement preferences are
not fundamentally diﬀerent to those of previous immigrants.
As a second step, we focus on exogenous shocks to migration. These exoge-
nous shocks address endogeneity arising from reverse causality, i.e. immi-
grants from a given country of origin are likely to go to states that trade
a lot with that country. Gould [1994] argues that immigration occurs be-
fore the onset of trade and is therefore predetermined. This is true if the
migration decision is based on current or past levels of trade. However, if
the migration decision is forward-looking and dependent on expected future
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trade (for example people emigrate in order to take advantage of information
arbitrage, which leads to trade), past immigration is endogenous. As a re-
sult, the number of immigrants and the level of trade are jointly determined
by 2 equations. The first equation captures the preference/trade cost eﬀect
of immigrants, where trade is a function of the number of immigrants. The
second equation describes the information arbitrage eﬀect, where the num-
ber of immigrants is a function of expected levels of trade. The resulting
simultaneity bias renders the OLS estimates inconsistent.
To solve for the resulting bias, the literature follows Card [2001] and in-
struments changes in immigrants at the sub-national level by applying the
growth of immigrants from a given country of origin at the national level to
the distribution of immigrants from that country of origin across regions at
a previous point in time, see for example Peri and Requena-Silvente [2010].
Still, historical migrant stocks could have established long-standing trade re-
lationships, with direct eﬀects on the current level of trade. This will violate
the exclusion restriction of the instrument. Instead, we take advantage of
an exogenous shock that forces people to migrate independently of trading
opportunities. This shock influences only the preference/trade cost equation
and is independent of the information arbitrage equation, thus insulating our
results from any endogenous migration decisions, whereby individuals might
move to those regions with better trading opportunities.
The only other paper that provides evidence of a natural experiment on the
trade migration relationship is Parsons and Vézina [2014]. Their identifica-
tion strategy is based on the combination of an immigration shock driven by
the exogenous allocation of Vietnamese Boat People by the US government
across US states and a concurrent trade embargo. They use the cross section
variations in the share of Vietnamese immigrants and US exports to Viet-
nam of the 50 US states. They show that after the end of the 1994 trade
embargo US states with a higher share of Vietnamese immigrants exported
significantly more to Vietnam. The key identification assumption is that the
settlement choice of Vietnamese immigrants before the trade embargo is ex-
ogenous to US exports after the embargo. In contrast, our analysis considers
2 diﬀerent natural experiments. First, we use the exogenous allocation of
political refugees across US states within the refugee resettlement program.
Second, we make use of a natural disaster, Hurricane Mitch. As we argue
below in more detail, this hurricane led to the mass immigration of several
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hundred thousand people from Central America to the US.
The main diﬀerences with respect to Parsons and Vézina [2014] are the follow-
ing. First, we focus on regional diﬀerences in US imports, whereas they focus
on US exports. Second, our analysis resolves reverse causality by examining
the panel structure of exogenous migration within two natural experiments.
As a result, the number of observations increases significantly compared to
Parsons and Vezina’s cross section of 50 US states. A further benefit from
working with the panel structure is that we can exploit the bilateral variation
over time and control for any state and country time-varying fixed eﬀects.
The third distinction is that we include the pre-existing number of immi-
grants as an additional regressor. This allows us to control for unobserved
settlement preferences. Finally, we use the exogenous allocation of the US
refugee resettlement program, where migrants’ only influence in the settle-
ment decision is to decide whether to be close to family members already
living in the United States or not. Given that we control for the number
of previous immigrants, the exogenous variation in the migration decision is
solely driven by the allocation of "free" application cases, i.e. those where
the political refugee has no family ties and friends in the US.
Overall, we see our approach as complementary to that of Parsons and Vézina
[2014] and as a test of external validity in a multi-country setting.Parsons
and Vézina [2014] focus on a specific group of migrants at a given point in
time. This paper uses data on refugees to the U.S. from all countries in the
period of 1970 to 2005, leading to a more comprehensive sample, both in
terms of years and countries of origin. Next, we describe our IV strategy in
more detail. We start with the allocation of political refugees in the United
States and then discuss hurricane Mitch.
3.2.2 Refugees
Refugees are people who have fled their home country and cannot return
because they have a well-founded fear of persecution based on religion, race,
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group (Im-
migration and Nationality Act, Sect. 101[a][42]). Each fiscal year, the US
government sets an overall refugee admissions limit based on regional allo-
cations. The limit varies from year to year. For example, in 2005, 53,738
refugees were admitted to the United States, primarily from Laos (8,487), So-
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malia (10,106) and the former USSR (11,272). The total number of refugees
per country of origin is given in Table 3.2. Figure 3.2 plots the regional
distribution of refugees. Over the whole sample period, the state that took
in the most refugees is California with 277,395 refugees. New York ranked
second with 144,273 refugees, followed by Florida with 111,657 refugees.
The assignment of refugee settlement is not random. The US Refugee Ad-
missions Program attempts to place refugees in the same community as their
family members living in the United States, if the former stated a family
relationship in the application process. If not, refugees are placed in a dif-
ferent state to avoid the concentration of ethnic groups, as was the case for
Cuban refugees in Florida in the 1970s, see Kerwin [2012]. For this reason,
we include the previous number of immigrants living in the state as a control
variable.
The resettlement of refugees is decided by the US Department of State and
it depends on the capacity of the local organizations to take care of the
refugees, see David [2004]. To control for a potential correlation between a
state’s capacity to host refugees and the level of its income, and in further
instance trade, we include time-varying state fixed eﬀects. Controlling for
time-varying state fixed eﬀects and the number of previous immigrants living
in the state will ensure the appropriateness of the instrument. This is true as
long as the assignment process of refugees across states does not discriminate
on the basis of the migrant’s nationality (other than the family relationship).
In the first stage, we regress the log of the number of refugees who arrived
in the 5 years prior to year t from country j and settle in state i (Refijt)
on the number of immigrants who arrived in the past 5 years (Immijt). The
first-stage equation is given by:
log(Immijt) = ↵0 + ↵1 logRefijt + ↵2 log dij +
+ ↵3 logPImmijt + fit + fjt + ✏ijt (3.3)
where fit and fjt are country and state year pair fixed eﬀects. As already
mentioned, we include the number of previous immigrants, PImmijt, in state
i from j to account for the fact that refugees may have a family member
already living already in that state. The state-year eﬀects, fit, control for any
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state specific change in the allocation of refugees over time that is common
to all countries. Country-year fixed eﬀects, fjt, control for country of origin
specific eﬀects that are common to all states in the United States, such
as the nature of the conflict that forced people to emigrate or any other
macroeconomic condition in the country of origin. Finally, dij measures the
distance in kilometers between the capital of country j and the capital of
state i. We exclude the border eﬀect because there are no refugees from
Mexico or Canada who migrated to the United States in our sample period
The main advantages of using refugees are that (1) refugees cannot freely
choose where they settle in the United States, (2) the refugee sample includes
a wide variety of countries and (3) these countries represent a large share of
US imports, see Table 3.1 2. However, the correlation between refugees and
migrants may potentially be weak because only a limited number of refugees
are allowed to enter the United States every year. In addition, the underlying
reasons why refugees flee their home country vary greatly across countries
and individuals and we have no information on the underlying circumstances
that trigger the migration choice.
3.2.3 Consequences of Hurricane Mitch for Migration
To address the concerns about the generality of migration and trade eﬀects
based on political refugees, we also focus on the trade-migration relationship
with Central American countries and the United States after hurricane Mitch.
We argue that the natural disaster forced people to migrate, while they would
not have done so otherwise. We show that (1) migrants choose to settle in
states that are close to their home country and (2) the increase in immigrants
from hurricane-aﬀected countries reduces the eﬀect of distance on trade.
Hurricane Mitch hit Central America during the last week of October 1998.
The countries impacted the strongest were Honduras and Nicaragua, but
Guatemala and El Salvador (and to a much lesser extent Belize) were also
aﬀected. The hurricane destroyed a large part of these countries’ trans-
portation and social infrastructure, including roads, hospitals and schools,
see Worldbank [2001]. According to the World Bank, people from Central
America responded to the disaster by migrating to the United States. As a
2. We discuss the summary statistics in detail below after presenting the data sources.
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formal response to the migration generated by hurricane Mitch, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) announced in a news release the
designation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to countries hit by the
hurricane for a period of 18 months, which was later extended, see Kugler
and Yuksel [2008]. As a consequence, Central Americans, who entered dur-
ing this period, were not subject to deportation from the United States and,
at the same time, were eligible to work in the United States. The INS esti-
mates that by 2003, close to 50,000 Hondurans and Nicaraguans had been
granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to allow them to stay and work
in the United States. This massive inflow of Central Americans was accom-
panied by a large amount of illegal immigration, such that the number of
Central Americans who came from these countries was probably higher than
this oﬃcial number. According to the immigration data from the US cen-
sus, a total 637 thousand persons from El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Guatemala and Belize migrated to the United States, which was significantly
higher than in previous years. 3
Based on Figure 3.1, the migration decision is correlated with distance. Be-
cause these migrants have a preference for the goods from their home country
and they carry information about the economic conditions in both countries,
we consequently expect an increase in trade flows between the two regions.
In particular, we expect a lower eﬀect of distance on trade flows. The basic
idea is that if immigrants move to states that are closer to their country
of origin and immigrants have trade enhancing eﬀects, then these regions
will trade disproportionally more with the immigrants country of origin than
those regions further away. As a result, we expect that the eﬀect of distance
on trade between the respective state and country of origin increases.
The first-stage equation for the IV estimates is:
log(Immijt) = ↵0 + ↵1 log dijdPostit + ↵2 log dij + ↵3bij +
+ ↵4 logPImmijt + fit + fjt + ✏ijt (3.4)
3. In the appendix we formally estimate the increase in the number of immigrants per
US state following a diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach. The results show that the increase
in the number of immigrants was 53 percent higher than the increase in immigrants from
other Latin American countries.
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where fit and fjt are country and state-year fixed eﬀects. We include destination-
specific time eﬀects as well as destination origin specific eﬀects to check
whether the increase in the share of immigrants in close-by states simply is
due to an ongoing trend or whether there is indeed a discernible break after
Mitch. dPostit is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the immigrant from
country i arrived after hurricane Mitch and zero otherwise. dij is a vari-
able which measures the Euclidean distance in kilometers from the capital in
country j to the capital of state i. 4 bij indicates whether the state is border-
ing Canada or Mexico and PImmijt is the previous number of immigrants
from country j living in state i at time t.
Our instrument is represented by the interaction between a post-Mitch dummy
and distance from Central America to various states in the United States. It
captures the idea that after the hurricane close-by states received relatively
more immigrants from Central America. This alters the eﬀect of distance
on trade and as a result close-by states trade more with Central American
countries.
An important assumption for the validity of our instrument is that the eﬀect
of the hurricane was exogenous to export capabilities of the immigrants’
country of origin and that the immigrants were the only factor that reduced
the eﬀect of distance on trade. Given our discussion about the hurricane
destroying large parts of the local infrastructure and production facilities, this
assumption is likely to be violated. Exports from hurricane-aﬀected countries
decreased significantly after Mitch. For this reason, we include a country of
origin-year fixed eﬀect (fjt) in regression 3.4. As long as the reduction in
exports does not diﬀer significantly across US states, these dummies capture
the reduction in trade after the hurricane.
In the previous paragraphs we described our estimation equation together
with the IV strategy. We next describe the intermediate input demand model
that generates the distribution of intermediate import flows across US states.
The OLS and IV estimation results will follow in section 4.
4. 3The appendix contains detailed information on the method for calculating the dis-
tance between US states and the immigrants’ country of origin
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3.2.4 Inferring regional-industry level trade
To project trade flows onto the state level, we use data on the regional in-
dustry production structure and apply the intermediate input demand model
put forward by Anderson and Yotov [2010]. The model relates industry spe-
cific trade flows between the exporting country and the geographical location
in the United States. To begin, consider the unobserved true level of inter-
mediate imports of state i from country j in year t, (Xijt). These aggregate
regional imports can be written as the sum over all industries within the
state:
Xijt =
KX
k=1
wkijtX
k
jt
where wkijt is the regional import share of industry k in state i and Xkjt
represents the aggregate US import expenditure of industry k from country
j. These aggregate US industry specific imports from country j are observed.
Hence we estimate the unobserved regional import share. To do so, we
follow Anderson and Yotov [2010]. Assume that final good producers in a
particular state i have the following CES demand for the aggregate quantity
of intermediate inputs in industry k (Qkit):
Qkit =
 
JX
j=1
 kjt
 
qkijt
 1 1/ k! k/(1  k)
where qkijt is the quantity of intermediate inputs from country j demanded
by industry k.  kj is a share parameter specific to the country of origin and
the industry but common to all regions within the United States.  k is the
industry specific elasticity of substitution. Total industry specific interme-
diate import expenditure, Xkit =
PN
j=1X
k
ijt, is then given by the quantity
demanded, Qkit, times the price index, P kit. Given the CES demand function,
we can express the bilateral import expenditure, Xkijt, as the value of ship-
ments at destination prices from the country of origin j to the geographical
region i in industry k.
Xkijt =
 
 kjtp
k
jtt
k
ijt
P kit
!1  k
Xkit (3.5)
Destination prices are the product of the factory gate prices pkjt and trade
costs tkijt   1 of the shipment of goods from i to j in industry k. The key
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assumption is that producers in country i charge the same factory gate price
to all buyers within the United States. Prices within the United States vary
only due to industry-region specific trade costs. The CES price index is given
by P kit =
hPJ
j=1
 
 kjtp
k
jtt
k
ijt
 1  ki1/(1  k).
Note that aggregate US country specific imports are simply the sum over
all states, i.e. Xkjt =
PJ
i 6=j X
k
ijt. We write the normalized industry specific
regional import share as:
wkijt =
XkijtPI
i=1X
k
ijt
=
 
tkijt/P
k
it
 1  k XkitPI
i=1
 
tkijt/P
k
it
 1  k Xkit (3.6)
which depends on the total expenditure of state i on the goods of industry
k, the price level and trade costs. States with lower trade costs and higher
expenditure import more. In order to calculate the regional import share,
we follow Stumpner [2013] and assume the following trade cost function
log(tkijt) =  1 log(Distanceij)   2 log(Distanceij) log(Value-to-weightkt ) 
   3Borderij (3.7)
Trade costs increase with distance and decrease if the state shares a border
with Mexico or Canada and/or if the value-to-weight ratio is high. Model-
ing trade costs using an interaction between distance and the value-to-weight
ratio will capture the heterogeneous eﬀect of distance on trade flows across in-
dustries. Industries with a high value-to-weight ratio, for example computer
chips, have relatively lower trade costs than industries with a low value-to-
weight ratio, for example car engines. Stumpner [2013] presents evidence
that this parameterization of trade costs reflects well US inter-state trade
flows at the industry level. Unlike Stumpner, we include a dummy variable if
the region borders Canada or Mexico to account for potential border eﬀects.
The problem in estimating the trade elasticities  1  3 in equation 3.7 is that
industry specific international trade flows at the state level are not available.
To circumvent this problem, we oﬀer two alternative approaches. First, we
follow Stumpner [2013] and use his elasticities based on US inter-state trade:
 1 = 0.667,  2 = 0.081 and  3 = 0. However, these estimates are derived
from trade between US states and do not take into account international
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flows. The resulting trade cost function may not be suitable if there are
discontinuities in trade costs when crossing an international border. In an
alternative approach, we estimate the trade elasticities using aggregate US in-
dustry specific international trade data and impose the estimated elasticities
on the regional level. Following the estimation procedure described in detail
in the appendix, we obtain elasticities similar to Stumpner, i.e.  1 = 0.691,
 2 = 0.154 and  3 = 1.897. Note that the results reported below are based
on the elasticities using the international trade data and are robust to the
values used by Stumpner [2013].
To calculate wkij in equation 3.6, we require information on the intermediate
input expenditure. We follow Autor et al. [2013] and assume that the indus-
try’s expenditure can be proxied by the total number of workers in industry
k in region i. This assumption is reasonable if expenditure on intermediate
inputs within an industry is proportional to total production, which again is
proportional to employment. 5 Finally, we assume a common demand elas-
ticity  k =   and that the law of one price within an industry k holds across
the United States, i.e. P ki = P k. The resulting weights are then given by
wˆkijt =
  
tkijt
 1  
LkjtP
j
 
tkijt
 1  
Lkjt
!
The intermediate import flow at the state level is simply the sum of the in-
dustry specific estimated weights times the industry specific national import
flow.
Xˆijt =
X
k
wˆkijtX
k
jt (3.8)
By summing over all industries, we minimize measurement errors due to
the assumption that the law of one price holds at the industry level. This
assumption can be problematic if relative prices across regions vary in a
systematic way, i.e. a region has significantly higher industry prices than
others. To capture aggregate price diﬀerences across states, we include time-
varying state fixed eﬀects in our main regressions. These fixed eﬀects will
control for state specific price diﬀerences common to all industries.
5. If we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with labor (L), intermediate in-
puts and potentially other input factors, then demand for intermediate inputs is propor-
tional to total labor employed.
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The calculated import flows in equation 3.8 form the basis of our empirical
analysis. The following section explains in detail the underlying data needed
to apply equation 3.8. Afterwards, we discuss the estimation results.
3.3 Data and summary statistics
This section describes the data used and provides basic summary statistics.
Particular emphasis is placed on trade flow and industry data. The latter
allows us to map aggregate trade flows across states at the industry level.
We then provide an overview of the other datasets and discuss the summary
statistics
3.3.1 Import data
The import data comes from the US Census Bureau provided by Schott [2008]
for the years 1972 to 2005. 6 The data contains import flows at the 5 digit
SITC product level to 183 trading partners by mode of transportation, i.e.
either air or sea. The import value of shipments is defined as the net selling
value exclusive of freight charges and excise taxes. To calculate the interme-
diate import levels at the industry level, we use a correspondence table from
the World Bank that converts 5 digit SITC codes into the Broad Economic
Categories (BEC) developed by the United Nations. The BEC classification
enables us to group each SITC code into intermediate and final goods so that
we obtain product specific intermediate imports for each trading partner. 7
To make the trade flows directly comparable to the industry employment
records at the state level, we convert the 5 digit SITC codes into SIC87 in-
dustry codes using the procedure described in Feenstra [1996]. As a result,
we obtain the intermediate import value for each 4 digit SIC 87 industry
code (409 industries). These values are used as Xkjt in equation 3.8.
6. We consider the trade data of 1970 to be similar to the trade flows in the year 1972.
This enables us to use an additional year of immigration data. In the appendix, we present
the results when the year 1970 is excluded.
7. Intermediate goods are defined as the sum of the categories: Processed food and
beverages (12), Industrial supplies (2), Capital goods (4) and Parts of transport equipment
(53).
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3.3.2 Trade cost data
The average value-to-weight ratio per SIC 87 industry is calculated as follows.
For each 4 digit SIC 87 code, we divide the total import value by the total
weight and convert it into tons. To compute the average value-to-weight ratio
for each industry, take the average value-to-weight ratio across all trading
partners for each mode of transportation, i.e. air or sea, and weight the
importance of the transportation mode by its share in the total import value
per industry.
To calculate the bilateral distances used in the trade cost function, we adopt
the procedure used by Mayer and Zignago [2011]. dij is the distance between
the capital of state i and the capital of country j measured in kilometers and
calculated by the Great Circle Distance Formula. Like Mayer and Zignago
[2011], we use 32.19 kilometers as inner-city distance. All data on latitudes
and longitudes are from the Global Administrative Areas (GADM) database,
see Hijmans et al. [2010].
3.3.3 Industry data
To measure the industry structure at the state level, we follow Autor et al.
[2013]. We take the local employment structure from the County Business
Patterns (CBP) for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2005. The CBP
is an annual data series that provides information on employment, firm size
distribution and payroll by county and industry and covers all of the United
States. Based on the data and the approach of Autor et al., we calculate
total employment per state and SIC 1987 industry code and use it as a proxy
for intermediate input demand in the regional import weight. 8
3.3.4 Immigration data
Our measures of the immigrant population are based on data from the Census
Integrated Public Use Micro Samples compiled by Ruggles et al. [2004] for
the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000, and the American Community Survey
8. Given a Cobb-Douglas production function, the demand for intermediate inputs will
then be proportional to total employment per industry. As long as this proportionality
factor does not vary across US states within an industry, total employment will be a proxy
for intermediate input demand within an industry.
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(ACS) for 2005. The 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census samples include 5 percent
of the US population, while the pooled ACS and 1970 Census samples in-
clude 3 and 1 percent of the population respectively. The main explanatory
variable in our regressions, i.e. recent immigrants, is defined as the number
of immigrants who immigrated up to 5 years prior to the census year. In
the robustness section, we control for pre-existing immigrants by all those
immigrants who live in the respective state and immigrated ten years or more
prior to the census year. We focus only on immigrants who are older than
21 at the census year. We then aggregate the number of immigrants at the
state level using the census sampling weight.
As an alternative identification strategy, we use political refugees as an in-
strument for immigration in the import regression. Data on the number of
refugees per US state come from the Oﬃce of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).
The ORR provides the option to download refugee arrival data sorted by
country of origin and state of initial resettlement in the United States for
the years 1984 to 2005. Each fiscal year, the US government sets an overall
refugee admissions limit based on regional allocations. The limit for refugee
admissions varies from year to year depending on the Congress and the geopo-
litical situation. Figure 3.2 plots the number of refugees for each state over
the period 1985 to 2005. 9 In order to make the refugee data compatible with
the immigration data, we add up the refugee data per country of origin and
state for all 5 years prior to the census years 1990, 2000 and 2005 census
years. Table 3.2 contains the total number of refugees per country of origin
who arrived in the United States during our sample period.
3.3.5 Country treatment
Finally, we should mention that several countries changed their names and
borders during the 1970-2005 sample period. Since we cannot identify the
origin of earlier immigrants, for example the number of Ukrainian immigrants
prior to 1990 in the United States, we keep the country borders of the year
1970. We group all imports and migrants from former Soviet republics into
9. See US Department of Homeland Security. 2005 yearbook of immi-
gration statistics. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Secu-
rity. Available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005
/OIS_2005_Yearbook.pdf.
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one country, i.e. the USSR 10. Immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, and Slovenia are all
included in Yugoslavia. Slovakia and the Czech Republic form Czechoslovakia
and Eritrean immigrants count as Ethiopians even though Eritrea became a
separate nation in 1993. The exception is Germany, which we assume to be
unified as of 1970.
3.3.6 Summary statistics
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for each of the 5 census years,
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2005. Columns 1 to 5 show the total number of
immigrants, the number of newly arrived immigrants and the trade statistics
for each census year. The total number of immigrants to the United States
grew from 9.7 million in 1970 at an annual growth rate of 3.8% to 36.1 million
in 2005, which is reflected in the steady rise of recent immigrants, i.e. those
immigrants who arrived up to 5 years prior to the census year. From 1965 to
1970, only 1.7 million people arrived, whereas from 2000 to 2005 that number
grew to 8.1 million. Immigration became also more diversified. The number
of diﬀerent countries from which immigrants migrated rose from 67 in 1970 to
138 in 2005. During the same period, the total value of intermediate imports
increased from USD 2.3 billion in 1970 to USD 82.7 billion in 2005. This
increase corresponds to an annual growth rate of 10.7%, much higher than
the growth rate of the immigrant population. Overall, the summary statistics
suggest a positive relationship between the number of recent immigrants and
intermediate imports.
To infer a causal link between migration and trade, we take advantage of
the exogenous variation in migration in the form of a natural experiment.
In particular, we use the emigration caused by hurricane Mitch and refugees
from other geopolitical conflicts. For this reason, Table 3.1 splits the sam-
ple into three country groups: countries aﬀected by hurricane Mitch, Latin
American countries and refugee countries. Hurricane-aﬀected countries are
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Belize. Latin American
countries are all American countries beside the United States and Canada;
they act as a control group for migration caused by hurricane Mitch. Refugee
10. The former USSR includes the following present-day nations: Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.
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countries are all countries that sent refugees to the United States over the
1985-2005 period.
With respect to the diﬀerent country groups, the total number of immi-
grants from hurricane Mitch aﬀected countries only account for a small share
of US immigration and trade. In 2005, they represented 6.7% of total im-
migrants, while their contribution to intermediate import flows was 0.18%.
When compared to other Latin American countries, their share rises to 16%
in terms of immigration and 1.4% in terms of total intermediate imports
from Latin America to the United States. Given the low representation of
hurricane-aﬀected countries in overall trade, we compare the migration and
import decisions of these countries relative to other Latin American coun-
tries. Below, we argue in more detail that these countries are more similar in
their unobserved trade and migration characteristics, which helps to reduce
potential omitted variable biases.
To further address concerns about the generality of the migration and trade
eﬀects in the case of Central America, we also focus on the trade-migration
relationship for countries that sent political refugees to the United States. As
in the case of migration caused by hurricane Mitch, refugees take their migra-
tion decisions independently of economic reasons and act as an instrument in
our empirical analysis. The advantage of looking at the allocation of political
refugees is that these refugees come from a wide range of countries, which
trade a lot with the United States. Between 2001 and 2005, refugees from 83
countries settled across the United States and the combined import share of
these countries was 72%. 11 However, the correlation between refugees and
migrants may be weak because the share of refugees in the total number of
immigrants is only 3.3%.
3.4 Results
This section shows empirically that the migration channel was important for
increasing intermediate imports across US states. We start by a simple OLS
regression of equation 3.2. The results are presented in Table 3.3. Columns
(1) to (3) show the estimation results for all countries, where we observe
11. Table 3.2 contains the number of refugees per country of origin over the whole sample
period, while figure 3.2 plots the distribution of refugees across states.
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migration and trade data. Columns (4) to (6) contain the results for the
restricted sample, where we only consider Latin American countries. Overall,
we find a positive and significant migrant trade eﬀect on intermediate imports
across all specifications. The baseline OLS results in columns 1 and 4 suggest
that a 10% increase in the number of recent migrants raises intermediate
imports by 0.49% in the full and 0.78% in the restricted sample. When
testing for significant diﬀerences between the restricted and the full sample,
the results show that the eﬀect is significantly higher for Latin American
countries.
Both the magnitude of the migration elasticity for Latin American countries
(0.0784) and for all countries (0.049) are significantly lower than the val-
ues found in the literature. Looking at the national level of US imports for
the period 1870 to 1910, Dunlevy and Hutchinson [1999] found a value of
0.28. Other studies at the regional level also found significantly higher val-
ues. Combes et al. [2005] found a value of 0.12 in the case of France. Wagner
et al. [2002] found a value of 0.28 using a variation across Canadian provinces
and Bratti et al. [2011] found a value of 0.32 for Italy. There are at least
two explanations for the low migration elasticities. First, the literature does
not distinguish between intermediate and final goods. The above-mentioned
papers focus exclusively on aggregate imports and consider both the pref-
erence eﬀect and the trade cost reducing eﬀect of immigrants. Second, this
paper focuses on newly arrived immigrants. Thus, it sets their eﬀect on trade
apart from the already established trade network eﬀects created by previous
immigrants.
In columns (2) and (3) as well as (5) and (6), we add the number of previous
immigrants as an additional control variable. It is likely that the migration
decision of recent immigrants is not random and influenced by the presence of
previous immigrants from the same country of origin. If the omitted variable
drives both trade and migration, the previous results will be biased. For
example, assume migrants move to states where there are already previous
migrants for cultural or economic reasons. If these regions then experience
positive demand shocks that lead to more production and employment, it
is unclear whether the demand for intermediate imports increases because
of the new immigrants or just because of the positive demand shock on the
already established trade network. As a result, we expect the trade cost eﬀect
through the arrival of recent immigrants to be lower than in the absence
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of previous immigrants. The resulting bias from the omission of previous
immigrants in the regression may overestimate the true eﬀect.
To control for the number of previous immigrants, we follow two distinct
approaches because immigrants are likely to change location between the
year they arrived in the United States and the year the census took place.
In columns (2) and (5) we add the number of immigrants who arrived 10 or
more years ago and reported to be living in state i in the year the census
was conducted. In columns (3) and (6) we use the number of immigrants
before the first year of trade is observed. More precisely, we the number of
immigrants who arrived up until in 1960 and reported to be living in state
i in 1970. Previous immigration will be correlated with actual immigration
if recent immigrants prefer to settle in states where there exists a large pre-
existing community. However, the specification is less demanding because it
is based on the distribution of immigrants in the year 1960.
Table 3.3 presents the results. When we control for pre-existing immigrants,
the migration elasticity on intermediate imports increases slightly. For Latin
American countries, the coeﬃcient decreases from 0.078 to 0.062 when using
the number of immigrants who arrived ten years ago and from 0.049 to 0.04
for the full sample. In the case of the immigrant distribution in the year
1960, the coeﬃcient increases to 0.07 and 0.012 respectively. However, while
these coeﬃcients are not significantly diﬀerent from the baseline results, they
point to a potential upward bias in excluding the previous immigration. Note
that the combined eﬀect of previous and recent immigrants is larger and
comparable to values found in the literature.
3.4.1 Instrumental variable results
Note that the OLS results might be biased, for example if people immigrate
in order to take advantage of trading opportunities, i.e. trade causes immi-
gration. To resolve the question of endogeneity, we consider the following two
approaches. First, we use geopolitical conflicts that forced people to leave
their home country. Second, we make use of a natural disaster, Hurricane
Mitch. We start by discussing the results based on political refugees before
showing the results in the case of hurricane Mitch.
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3.4.1.1 Refugees
The first stage results are presented in columns (1) to (3) of Table 3.4. First,
the number of refugees is positive and significantly correlated with the num-
ber of immigrants in all specifications. Note that the positive eﬀect decreases
in magnitude once we add the number of previous immigrants as an addi-
tional control variable, see columns (2) to (3). The reason is that part of the
refugees are settled in states where they have family members living already
in the US.
Before turning to the IV baseline results, we say a few words on the validity
of our instrumental variable. To confirm the validity of the IV regressions, we
include the Cragg-Donald F statistics and the Kleibergen-Paap test p-values
at the bottom of our tables. The Kleibergen-Paap test examines whether the
excluded instrument is correlated with the endogenous regressors conditional
on the control variables. A p-value below 0.1 indicates that we can reject
the null hypothesis of no correlation and that the instrument is statistically
significant. The Cragg-Donald F statistic provides an indication of the signif-
icance of our instrument. If the instrument is only weakly correlated with the
endogenous regressor, the IV estimator is not valid. To assess the weakness
of our instrument we need to compare these F statistics with the Stock-Yogo
critical values for the Cragg-Donald F-statistic with one endogenous regres-
sor (Stock and Yogo [2002]). As a rule of thumb, an F-statistic above 10
indicates that the IV is acceptable.
Columns (4) to (6) in Table 3.4 contain the results of the second stage IV re-
gression. The coeﬃcient on the number of recent immigrants is significantly
positive with an elasticity higher than in the OLS regression for all specifica-
tions. However, performing a Hausman test does not reveal any significant
diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients. Overall, our results suggest that a 10% increase
in the number of immigrants in the past five years increases intermediate
imports by 1.8%.
There are potential concerns that countries where political refugees are com-
ing from do not form a representative sample for US trade. Table 3.2 shows
that the majority of refugees are either from current or former communist
countries (USSR, Vietnam, Cuba) or from countries with whom the US has
political tensions (Cuba, Iran, Myanmar). Furthermore, correlation between
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refugees and migrants may potentially be weak because only a limited num-
ber of refugees are allowed to enter the United States every year, i.e. the
share of refugees in terms of total number of immigrants is 3-5 percent. For
this reason, we consider an alternative instrument, i.e. hurricane Mitch. The
argument supporting the validity of the instrument is outlined in section 2
and parallels the argument in the case of political refugees. Hurricane Mitch
forced people to migrate who would have not done so otherwise.
3.4.1.2 Hurricane Mitch
Columns (1) to (3) in Table 3.5 present the results of the first stage IV
regression with diﬀerent control variables. First, distance has a significant
negative eﬀect: immigrants move to states that are closer to their country
of origin. The variable instrument, capturing the eﬀect of distance after the
hurricane, is significant and positive. While the overall eﬀect of distance on
the migration decision of Central Americans is still negative, migrants from
Central America moved relatively further away from their country origin after
the hurricane. Note that this eﬀect is robust to the inclusion of the previous
stock of previous immigrants in the state, see columns (2) and (3).
Focusing on the p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap test, we can reject the null
hypothesis of no correlation between the endogenous variable and the instru-
ment at the 1% level in all specifications. The Cragg-Donald F statistic is
higher than 10 and therefore increases our confidence in the validity of the
instrument.
Columns (4) to (6) in Table 3.5 contain the second stage IV regression,
where the number of recent immigrants is instrumented by the log of distance
interacted with a post-time dummy for hurricane Mitch. The coeﬃcient on
recent immigrants is significant and positive with an elasticity higher than
in the OLS regression for all specifications. Thus, states that received more
Central American immigrants after hurricane Mitch face a lower distance
elasticity and import more. The estimated immigrant elasticity is 0.13 and
comparable in magnitude to the eﬀect when using political refugees as an
exogenous migration variation. 12
12. As noted in section 2, the identification assumption is that the only reason why
the elasticity of trade with respect to distance between US states and Central American
countries changed is because (1) these states received relatively more immigrants from
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Overall, the similarity between the estimated coeﬃcients leads us to conclude
that immigrants have a significant and positive impact on intermediate im-
ports. A 10 percent increase in the number of immigrants in the past five
years increases intermediate imports by 1.5 to 1.8 percent.
3.5 Robustness
In this section, we check the robustness of our main findings using an IV strat-
egy, conducting the following two falsification/robustness exercises. First, we
address the potential measurement bias that arises from the fact that we con-
struct intermediate import flows via a demand model. To do so, we use recent
observed US state import data and compare them to the constructed import
flows. Second, given our discussion about the fact that after hurricane Mitch
Central American migrants moved predominantly to the United States, we
should find that Central American exports to the United States increased
more strongly than those to other countries. The following paragraphs ad-
dress each of these points separately.
3.5.1 Observed import data
As mentioned above, we do not observe intermediate imports over the period
from 1970 to 2005. However, the US Census provides state specific import
flow data for the years 2008 to 2012. For these years, we can compare the
estimated import flows with the observed import flows and check the robust-
ness of our estimation method. We proceed in two stages. First, we use the
import demand model from section 2 together with the national US inter-
mediate import data and generate state specific import data for the years
2008 to 2012. We then compare this estimated import flow with the observed
import flow for the same years. If the model works well, we should expect a
high correlation between the two flows. Second, we compare the estimated
migration elasticity from the observed import flows with the elasticity based
on the estimated import flows in the previous section. If the measurement
error of the demand model is uncorrelated with immigration, then the two
elasticities should not be significantly diﬀerent from each other.
Central America and (2) immigrants have trade enhancing eﬀects by providing information
or having preferences for goods of their country of origin.
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To construct the import flow data, we apply equation 3.8 to the trade cost
function specified in equation 3.6 and use the industry and aggregate US
trade data for the years 2008 to 2012. We then calculate a correlation coef-
ficient between the two series and obtain a coeﬃcient of 0.85. This suggests
that our procedure approximates the true import flows quite well.
We then use the estimation equation 2 and replace the calculated import
flow with the observed import flow. We focus on the cross section of the
year 2010. The reason for this is that we do not have trade data over a 5
year interval so as to use the number of immigrants who arrived in the past
5 years as an explanatory variable. 13 The precise regression model for the
year 2010 is:
log(Xij) =  1 log(Immij) +  2 log dij +  3bij +
+ + 4 logPImmij + fi + fj + vij (3.9)
Table 3.6 plots the OLS estimates for Latin American countries and for all
countries. The results are similar to the OLS estimates in the constructed
sample, see Table 3.3. The level of the coeﬃcients is similar and the elasticity
for Latin American countries is higher than for all countries. The only ex-
ception is that in the Latin American sub-sample the immigration elasticity
is not significant when we include the number of immigrants who migrated
10 or more years before.
Since the hurricane occurred in 1998, our instrumental variable identification
strategy for the year 2010 is solely based on the number of refugees who came
to the United States between 2005 and 2010. Table 3.7 shows the results. The
13. For example, if we use the number of immigrants who arrived in the past 5 years
as an explanatory variable in the year 2012 within the panel structure, then the previous
import flow should correspond to the year 2007. This ensures independence between the
previous trade flow and the arrival of immigrants in the past 5 years. If the two periods
overlap, the number of immigrants and the trade flow are correlated. Note that we do
not observe the import data for the year 2007. Once the trade data of the year 2013
become available, we can conduct a panel analysis and use the period 2008 to 2013. We
experiment with the period 2008 to 2012 and use the number of immigrants who arrived
in the past 4 years as an explanatory variable. The results are quantitatively similar to
the ones reported in Table 3.6.
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first stage results are reported in columns 1 to 3. We find that the number
of refugees is positively correlated with the number of immigrants over the
past five years in all specifications. The F statistics are larger than 10 and
the Kleinbergen-Papp P-value are smaller than 0.05, which suggests that our
instrument is appropriate. Columns 4 to 6 present the second stage IV. The
number of immigrants has a significant impact on the trade level in all but
column 5, where we include the number of immigrants who came at least ten
years ago to the United States. Overall, the results and the magnitude of the
coeﬃcients are similar to our previous results. These findings suggest that
our results are robust to the introduced measurement error of the calculated
trade flows.
3.5.2 Eﬀect on the exports of the country of origin
In the previous section, we use the variation in immigrants and Central Amer-
ican exports across US states. Next, we use the variation in the export rev-
enue of Central American countries across all possible destinations in the
world. According to our discussion in the previous section, Central Amer-
icans mainly responded to the disaster by migrating to the United States.
Given this argument, Central American exports to the United States should
be higher than those to other countries. We consider the following regression
log(Xijt) =  1DUS,2000 + dij + djt + ✏ijt (3.10)
where the Xijt is total intermediate exports from country i to country j in
year t. Exporting countries are El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
and Belize. Importing countries are all countries in the world. To focus on
long-term eﬀects, we consider 5 year intervals. The years considered are 1975,
1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. DUS,2000 is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the year is 2000 or 2005 and the importing country is the United
States. Otherwise, the dummy takes the value zero. This dummy captures
whether exports from hurricane-aﬀected countries to the United States were
significantly higher than to other countries after the hurricane in the year
2000. The model includes importing country year fixed eﬀects, dit, as well
as exporting-importing country pair fixed eﬀects dik. dit controls for any ex-
porting country-time specific eﬀects, such as aggregate demand shocks. dik
is a dummy variable that controls for any pair fixed eﬀects, such as distance,
preferences or other bilateral characteristics that are constant over time.
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Table 3.8 shows the results. The dummy coeﬃcient is significant, which
shows that between 1995 and 2000 exports from hurricane-aﬀected countries
increased significantly in comparison to other countries. The average per year
eﬀect is: (1.81/1)(1/5) 1 = 12.6%. While we cannot attribute the increase in
exports entirely to the number of immigrants, it is consistent with the idea
that migration fosters trade between countries.
3.6 Conclusion
Immigrants carry information about the goods and market conditions of the
country of origin as well as the country of destination. By providing this infor-
mation, immigrants reduce bilateral trade costs and increase trade between
countries. This paper focuses on the trade cost reducing eﬀect of immigrants
by looking at the relationship between intermediate import demand and im-
migration across US States. Using the exogenous migration decision brought
about by a natural experiment (hurricane Mitch), we establish the causal
relationship between immigrants and imports. Our results indicate a strong
positive impact of migration on trade. We find that a 10 percent increase in
immigrants raises trade by 1.5 to 1.8 percent.
Policy makers may want to take into account the pro-trade eﬀect of immi-
grants. By providing information on market conditions in both countries,
the country of origin as well as the country of destination, they reduce trans-
action/trade costs for importers and exporters. As a result, industries can
purchase cheaper intermediate inputs from abroad and produce more eﬃ-
ciently.
Taking a broader perspective, immigrants may also have knowledge of pro-
duction techniques used in their country of origin, which can increase the
comparative advantage of industries in their country of destination, see Ba-
har and Rapoport [2014] for empirical evidence on this issue. All in all, these
results suggest that the mobility of people between countries can serve as
a key element in enhancing industrial productivity growth. However, more
research is needed to assess the long-term impact of immigration on the
economy.
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1 – The log of the number of immigrants who immigrated from hurri-
cane Mitch aﬀected countries (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and
Belize) over the period from 1998 to 2005.
118
Figure 3.2 – The log of the number of refugees who immigrated to the United
States over the period from 1985 to 2005.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1 – Summary Statistics
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Nr. of immigrants 9,752 13,700 23,100 32,300 36,100
Total Nr of immigrants last 5 years 1,708 3,054 5,508 7,783 8,056
Value of imports (USD millions) 2330 8510 24500 66100 82700
Nr. of nationalities among immig. 67 148 149 127 138
Nr of immigrants 1,189 3,089 7,566 13,100 15,500
Latin Nr of immigrants last 5 years 360 997 2,292 3,682 4,125
American Share of immigrants (%) 12.20 22.55 32.74 40.47 42.88
countries Share of immigrants last 5 years (%) 0.21 0.33 0.42 0.47 0.51
Value of imports (USD millions) 133 621 2270 9550 12700
Share of US imports 5.71 7.30 9.27 14.45 15.36
Nr of immigrants 80 253 1,051 1,871 2,260
Hurricane Nr of immigrants last 5 years 29 105 410 439 538
aﬀected Share of immigrants (%) 0.82 1.85 4.55 5.79 6.26
countries Share of immigrants last 5 years (%) 1.72 3.43 7.44 5.65 6.68
Value of imports (USD millions) 3.62 13.3 56.2 101 145
Share of US Imports 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.15 0.18
Nr of immigrants 8,664 12,567 25,993
Nr of refugees last 5 years 288 425 266
Refugee Share of immigrants (%) 37.51 38.91 72.00
countries Share of refugees last 5 years (%) 5.23 5.46 3.30
Value of imports (USD millions) 4340 15300 38600
Share of US imports 17.71 23.15 46.67
Nr. of nationalities among refugees 56 67 83
Note: Number of immigrants and refugees in thousands. Aﬀected countries: Belize, El Salvadore,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Value of exports and imports in current US dollars.
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Table 3.2 – Refugee-Sending Countries over the 5 years prior to the census years:
1985 to 1990, 1995 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010
Refugees Country Refugees Country Refugees Country
367995 USSR 267 Yemen 24 Senegal
284999 Vietnam 252 Central African Rep. 21 Lesotho
207944 Cuba 249 Cote d‘Ivoire 20 Seychelles
168788 Yugoslavia 239 Syria 19 Bangladesh
113607 Somalia 216 Lebanon 15 Germany
108372 Laos 213 Jordan 14 Benin
85652 Iran 201 Sri Lanka 14 Morocco
77766 Iraq 187 Chad 11 Argentina
66419 Myanmar 179 Malaysia 11 Spain
55781 Cambodia 178 South Africa 10 UAE
46875 Liberia 162 Gambia, The 10 Saudi Arabia
40797 Sudan 161 Nepal 9 Madagascar
39682 Ethiopia 151 Egypt 9 Venezuela
32096 Afghanistan 148 Indonesia 8 Burkina Faso
30873 Bhutan 147 Cameroon 8 Greece
21088 Poland 123 Algeria 8 Italy
20596 Romania 109 Kuwait 7 United Kingdom
12856 Haiti 95 North Korea 6 Bahrain
12658 Sierra Leone 93 Ghana 6 Brunei
10909 Burundi 91 Guinea 5 Mali
9833 Thailand 88 Equatorial Guinea 4 Ant. and Bar.
9683 DR Congo 83 Djibouti 4 Maldives
5806 Czechoslovakia 74 Zimbabwe 4 Mexico
4207 Hungary 61 Philippines 4 Panama
2506 Colombia 61 Turkey 3 Canada
2476 Rwanda 51 Namibia 3 Iceland
1801 Kenya 50 Honduras 2 Belgium
1511 Nigeria 50 Mozambique 2 Bahamas
1333 Togo 46 India 2 Guinea-Bissau
1258 Rep. of Congo 40 Zambia 2 Peru
801 Bulgaria 37 El Salvador 2 Paraguay
666 Israel 36 Gabon 1 Switzerland
631 Nicaragua 34 Botswana 1 Guatemala
611 Albania 34 Costa Rica 1 Jamaica
427 Angola 34 Ecuador 1 Japan
404 Mauritius 31 Austria 1 Mongolia
387 Pakistan 31 Tunisia 1 Niger
373 China 31 Tanzania 1 Palau
344 Uganda 25 Libya 1 Portugal
269 Mauritania 24 Malawi 1 Taiwan
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Table 3.8 – Eﬀect of Hurricane Mitch on to-
tal exports from hurricane-aﬀected countries.
Dependent variable log(Total exports)
Dummy_US_2000 0.811**
[0.337]
Observations 948
R-squared 0.897
Note: Regression includes exporting country,
importing country, time, importer-time and
exporter-importer fixed eﬀects. ***, **, * indi-
cate the statistically significant diﬀerence from
zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Appendix Chapter 1
Lemma: The import expenditure distribution is Fréchet distributed. Im-
port concentration on the intensive margin depends only on the degree of
comparative advantage ✓ and the elasticity of substitution ⌘.
Proof: Producers in country n import goods from country i if they ob-
tain the lowest price for a particular good x in n
p(x)ni = B(
w i p
1  
mi
ni!ni
)x✓i (4.11)
where Bw i p
1  
mi are the unit costs of production in country i, ni!ni are the
trade costs from n to i, xi is the realization of the random productivity draw
and ✓ describes the variance of productivity draws. If we rewrite equation
(3.8) in terms of x, the probability of country i to obtain a price smaller than
p in country n is given by:
Gni(p) = 1  Fi( i(w
 
i p
1  
mi
ni!ni
) 
1
✓ p
1
✓ ) (4.12)
where Fi() is the cdf of the exponential distribution. The probability that p
is the minimum price in country n is given by:
Gn(p) = 1 
IY
i=1
(1 Gni(p))
Substituting equation 4.12 into the previous equation, we can write the dis-
tribution function of minimum prices:
Gn(p) = 1 
IY
i=1
(e  i(
w
 
i p
1  
mi
ni!ni
) 
1
✓ p
1
✓
) = 1 (e 
PI
i=1  i(
w
 
i p
1  
mi
ni!ni
) 
1
✓ p
1
✓
) = 1 (e 'np✓)
where
'n =
IX
i=1
 i(
w i p
1  
mi
ni!ni
) 
1
✓
We proof two useful properties of the price distributions:
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1.) The price distribution of country n is independent of source
country i.
The probability that country i provides a good at the lowest price in country
n is :
Dni = Pr[Pni < min(Pn1...Pns), s 6= i]
Dni =
ˆ 1
0
IY
s 6=i
(1 Gns(p))dGni(p)
This means that the probability that country i obtains the minimum price in
country n is the probability that no other country oﬀers a lower price than
p in country n,
QI
s 6=i(1   Gns(p)). To obtain the probability, we solve the
following integral.
Dni =
ˆ 1
0
(e 
PI
s 6=i  s(
w
 
s p
1  
ms
ns!ns
) 
1
✓ p
1
✓ )gni(p)dp
Dni =
ˆ 1
0
 i(
w i p
1  
mi
ni!ni
) 
1
✓
1
✓
p
1
✓ 1e 
PI
i=1  i(
w
 
i p
1  
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ni!ni
) 
1
✓ p
1
✓
dp
Define u =
PN
s=1  i(
w i p
1  
mi
ni!ni
) 
1
✓ p
1
✓ and du = 'n 1✓p
1
✓ 1dp = 1✓
u
pdp, we get:
Dni =
 i(
w i p
1  
mi
ni!ni
) 
1
✓
'n
ˆ 1
0
1
✓
u
p
(e u)
p
u
✓du
Dni =
 i(
w i p
1  
mi
ni!ni
) 
1
✓
'n
Note that the distribution of prices that country i provides to country n is
given by the conditional probability that i supplies the minimum price:
Pr(pn  p|pni  minj 6=i(pnj)) = Pr(pn  p, pni  minj 6=i(pnj))
Pr(pni  minj 6=i(pnj))
and note that Pr(pni  minj 6=i(pnj)) = Dni where pn = minj(pnj). Now
suppose that pni is the minimum price and calculate the joint probability by
Pr(pn  p, pni  minj 6=i(pnj)) =
ˆ p
0
ˆ 1
pnj 6=i
g(pni)...g(pnj 6=i)dpnj 6=i...dpni
144
By independence, we can solve for all integrals but pn,i and obtain
Pr(pn  p|pni  minj 6=i(pnj)) = 1
Dni
ˆ p
0
NY
s 6=i
(1 Gns(pni))dGni(pni)
Pr(pn  p|pni  minj 6=i(pnj)) = 1
Dni
 i(
w i p
1  
mi
n,i!ni
) 
1
✓
'n
ˆ p
0
'n
1
✓
q
1
✓ 1(e 'nq
1
✓ )dq
Define u =
PN
s=1  i(
w i p
1  
mi
ni!ni
) 
1
✓ q
1
✓ and du = 'n 1✓q
1
✓ 1dq = 1✓
u
q dq, we get:
Pr(pn  p|pni  minj 6=i(pnj)) = 1
Dn,i
Dni
ˆ p
0
(e u)du
Pr(pn  p|pni  minj 6=i(pnj)) = 1  e 'np
1
✓
which is independent of the source country i. This implies that every country
oﬀers the same price distribution to country n.
2.) The import expenditure distribution in country n follows a
Fréchet.
Note, the set of imported goods is defined as the sum over all the fraction of
goods imported from all other countries in the world economy. Dn,k describes
the fraction of goods country n imports from country k. Given that a country
imports a good from only 1 source country (so the sets of products imported
from diﬀerent countries are mutually disjoint), implies that we can sum the
fraction of goods imported over all trading partners to obtain the probability
to import.
Pr(imp) =
IX
k 6=n
Pr[Pn,k < min(Pns), s 6= k]
Pr(imp) =
IX
k 6=n
ˆ 1
0
NY
s 6=n
(1 Gns(p))dGnk(p)
Pr(imp) =
IX
k 6=n
Dnk
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The corresponding distribution function for prices (p) is given by:
Mn(p) =
PI
k 6=n
´ p
0
QN
s 6=n(1 Gns(q))dGnk(q)PI
k 6=nDnk
Mn(p) =
PI
k 6=nDnk
´ p
0 'n
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✓q
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✓ 1(e 'nq
1
✓ )dqPI
k 6=nDnk
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PN
s=1  s(
w s p
1  
ms
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) 
1
✓ q
1
✓ and du = 'n 1✓q
1
✓ 1dq = 1✓
u
q dq, we get:
Mn(p) =
ˆ p
0
(e u)du
Hence, the import price distribution is independent of the source countries:
Mn(p) = 1  e 'np
1
✓ = Fn(p)
Using the import price distribution, we can derive the import expenditure
distribution by the following transformation. Note, import expenditures of
country n on good x in the case of CES preferences are given by:
qn(x)pn(x) =
 ✓
min
i 6=n
pi(x)
◆1 ⌘
p⌘mnqn
!
=
 
min
i 6=n
B(
w i p
1  
mi
ni!ni
)x✓i )
!1 ⌘
p⌘mnqn
(4.13)
and the probability of importing at price p is given by Mn(p). Hence, we can
write the distribution function of import expenditure at price p as
En(p) = 1  e 'nk
1
(1 ⌘)
n (p)
1
✓(1 ⌘)
where kn = (p⌘mnqn) is a constant. The corresponding Fréchet pdf is
e(p) =
1
✓(1  ⌘)'n
✓
p
kn
◆ 1
✓(1 ⌘)
✓
1
p
◆
e 'n(
p
kn )
1
✓(1 ⌘)
with location parameter sn = kn 1'✓(1 ⌘)n and shape parameter ↵ =  1✓(1 ⌘) .
14
14. The generic form of the Fréchet probability density function is: f(x) =
↵
s
 
x
s
  1 ↵
e (x/s)
 ↵
.
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Given that the price distribution is independent of the source country and
follows a Fréchet distribution, we can calculate the corresponding concentra-
tion indexes analytically. The Theil index on the intensive margin for country
n can be approximately written in terms of the continuos probability density
function:
TWn =
"
1
Na
X
k2Ga
✓
Rk
R¯a
◆
ln
✓
Rk
R¯a
◆#
⇡
ˆ 1
0
✓
R
R¯a
◆
ln
✓
R
R¯a
◆
f(R)dR
Plugging in the density of the Fréchet distribution with location parameter
sn = kn 1'
✓(1 ⌘)
n and shape parameter ↵ =  1✓(1 ⌘) , we get:
TWn =
ˆ 1
0
✓
R
R¯a
◆
ln
✓
R
R¯a
◆
↵
sn
✓
R
sn
◆
 ↵ 1e (R/sn)
 ↵
dR
R¯a is the mean import expenditure. Substituting for the mean of the Fréchet
distribution R¯a = sn (1  1↵), we can write the integral as:
TWn =
1
sn (1  1↵)
✓ˆ 1
0
ln (R)Rf(R)dR 
ˆ 1
0
ln
✓
sn (1  1
↵
)
◆
Rf(R)dR
◆
TWn =
1
sn (1  1↵)
✓ˆ 1
0
ln (R)↵
✓
R
sn
◆
 ↵e (R/sn)
 ↵
dR
◆
  ln
✓
sn (1  1
↵
)
◆
Performing the following change of variables u = (R/sn) ↵ and dR = ( 1/↵)u( 1/↵ 1)sndu
with limR!0 u =1 and limR!1 u = 0, we get:
TWn =
1
sn (1  1↵)
✓ˆ 1
0
ln
 
snu
( 1/↵)  snu( 1/↵)e udu◆  ln✓sn (1  1
↵
)
◆
which simplifies to the following expression
TWn =
1
 (1  1↵)
✓ˆ 1
0
ln
 
u( 1/↵)
 
u( 1/↵)e udu
◆
  ln
✓
 (1  1
↵
)
◆
(4.14)
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The Theil index on the intensive margin of imports does not depend on the
scale parameter sn and is hence identical across countries. The index is com-
pletely determined by the shape parameter ↵ =  1/(✓(⌘   1)) and depends
only on the elasticity of substitution ⌘ and the degree of comparative ad-
vantage ✓. The integral in equation 4.14 cannot be solved analytically. To
compute the exact Theil index implied by the shape parameter ↵, I approx-
imate the integral numerically via the Gauss Laguerre procedure.
The share of products exported
The concentration index of exports on the extensive margin is given by the
number of products exported to any destination divided by the total number
of products in the world. The Law of Large Numbers implies that a country’s
probability to export a good is equal to the share of products exported.
Define the set of products that country n exports as the union of the set of
products exported to each destination j, Uex =
  [Ij 6=nBjn  . Note that the
set of products exported to destination j overlaps with the set of products
exported to destination k. The total number of products exported to both
countries is the sum of the two sets minus the number of products that are in
both, i.e. |Bjn [Bkn| = Bjn+Bkn Bjn\Bkn. Generalizing this expression
to all possible destinations implies that the share of products country n
exports follows the Inclusion and Exclusion Principle and is given by
Uex =
I 1X
i=1
(Ai) 
X
i,j:1i<jI 1
(Ai \ Aj) +
+
X
i,j,k:1i<jI 1
(Ai \ Aj \ Ak)  · · · + ( 1)I 2 (A1 \ · · · \ AI 1)
where Ai defines the event that a product is exported to destination i, i.e. Ai
contains all products where country i obtains the minimum price in country
n, Ai = pn,i(x)  minj 6=n [pn,j(x)]. If we denote the intersection of all Ai’s
with an index L
AL :=
\
i2L
(Ai)
we can rewrite the set of products exported in a more compact form
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Uex =
I 1X
i=1
( 1)k 1
X
L⇢{1,...,I 1},|L|=k
(AL)
The last sum runs over all subsets L of the indices 1, ..., I 1 where k describes
the number of destinations a product is exported to.
In the special case of symmetric countries, the number of products exported
to k destinations is the same for all destinations and the intersection AL only
depends on the cardinality of L. As a result, we can write the event to export
to k destinations as the L = k intersections of A,
ak = (AL)
and the set of products exported simplifies to
Uex =
I 1X
k=1
( 1)k 1
✓
I
k
◆
ak
where I   1 is the total number of destinations. The resulting share of prod-
ucts exported can readily be calculated. For example, the share of products
country n exports to one particular destination j is given by a1 = Djn and
is equal to
a1 =
()1/✓
(1 + (I   1)()1/✓)
The share of products country n exports to any pair of destinations j and
k is given by the probability of obtaining the minimum price in those two
destinations.
a2 = Pr
⇢✓
pj(x) = pij(x)  min
l 6=i
[plj(x)]
◆
^
✓
pk(x) = pik(x)  min
l 6=i
[plk(x)]
◆ 
where the price of good x oﬀered by country n in destination j is pn,j(x) =
B
⇥
x✓n
⇤ 8j 6= n and at home pn,n = Bx✓n. Notice that the only diﬀerence
between prices oﬀered is whether the country sells in the home market or
in the foreign market. Since  < 1 implies that pjj < pjl and pkk < pkl
8j, k 6= l, we can write the set of products exported to destinations j and k by
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the corresponding probability to obtain the minimum price in the respective
destinations
a2 = B Pr
⇢
x✓i  min
l 6=i,j,k,
⇥
x✓j , x
✓
k,x
✓
l
⇤ 
By the properties of the exponential distribution, this probability is equal to
a2 =
()1/✓
2 + (I   2)()1/✓
Proceeding in similar manner, one obtains the probability to export (and
hence the share of products exported) to k destinations
ak =
()1/✓
k + (I   k)()1/✓
As a result, we can write the extensive Theil for exports as the inverse of the
log of the share of products exported to any destination as
T exti,X =   ln
 
IX
i=1
( 1)k 1
✓
I
k
◆
ak
!
where
ak =
()1/✓
k + (I   k)()1/✓
Trade Data
To build my empirical evidence, I use the Comtrade data set collected by the
United Nations and choose the 6 digit HS 1992 product classification scheme
as the preferred level of disaggregation. I follow (Hummels and Klenow, 2005)
and refer to import flows of the same 6-digit product from diﬀerent trading
partners to diﬀerent varieties of the same product. I assume that the tradable
goods sector corresponds to manufactures defined to be the aggregate across
all 34 BEA manufacturingindustries. Using a correspondance table provided
by the United Nations, I identify 4529 tradable manufacturing products. The
baseline sample covers 160 countries representing all regions and all levels of
development between 1992 and 2009 (16 years), including 129 developing
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countries, defined by the World Bank as countries with per capita GDP
under $16,000 in constant 2005 PPP international dollars.
Following Waugh [2010], I assume that the tradable goods sector corresponds
to manufactures. I construct trade shares D following Eaton and Kortum
[2002] and Waugh [2010] in the following manner:
Di,j =
Importsi,j
Gross Mfg. Productioni - TotalExportsi + Importsi
In the numerator is the aggregate value of manufactured goods that country
i imports from country j. These data are from the Unite Nations Comtrade
database. Manufacturing goods are defined to be the corresponding HS codes
of the the 34 BEA manufacturing industries used in Feenstra et al. [1997].
In the denominator is gross manufacturing production minus total manufac-
tured exports (for the whole world) plus manufactured imports (for only the
sample), see Eaton and Kortum [2002]. Basically, this is simply computing
an expenditure share by dividing the value of inputs consumed by country
i imported from country j divided by the total value of inputs in country i.
Gross manufacturing data are from either UNIDO (2012) or imputed from
value added data from the World Bank. 15
To get the traded goods of the manufacturing sector, I use the correspon-
dance table provided by Feenstra et al. [1997] to identify manufacturing trade
sectors at the 4 digit SITC rev.2 level. Using the correspondance table from
the United Nations, I can then identify the corresponding HS 1992 6 digit
manufacturing products. The resulting number of manufacturing products
comprises 4529 product lines. 16
SITC 4 digit industry classification
In the paper I analyzed total net trade flows at the 6 digit HS industry
classification. This sections shows that the results found in the main part
15. The trade share matrix is the same as in Waugh but I since the product level data
does not include South Africa, I renormalize the trade share such that the expenditure
shares add up to 1.
16. The correspondance table between the SITC Rev.2 codes and the HS 1992 codes
comes from the United Nations http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/conversions/HS Corre-
lation and Conversion tables.htm
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of the paper are not driven by the industry classification scheme and do
apply in a more general sense. As a robustness check, I use the 4 digit SITC
classification scheme which implies a total number of products of 642.
Table A.1 – Descriptive statistics for net trade flows based on the 4 digit SITC
industry classification: 160 countries
Gini Theil Exports (X) Theil Imports (M)
X M
Ext. Int.
Total
Ext. Int.
Total
Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar.
Mean index
0.98 0.86 2.16 1.86 4.01 0.70 1.29 1.99
(SITC 4 digit)
% share of overall
54% 46% 35% 65%
concentration
Mean index
0.98 0.91 2.60 2.13 4.73 1.10 1.61 2.71
(HS 6 digit)
% share of overall
55% 45% 40% 60%
concentration
Correlation 0.95 0.88 0.94 0.91 0.95 0.50 0.82 0.64
Table A.1 present the descriptive statistics for the SITC sample and the cor-
relation coeﬃcient with the 6 digit HS net trade flow sample. The empirical
estimates of the SITC industry classification are very similar. The correlation
coeﬃcient is 0.95 for exports and 0.64 for imports with respect to the 6 digit
HS code sample. In addition, the cross country patterns are almost identical.
Exports are more concentrated than imports on all margins. Strikingly, the
L pattern of the extensive margin also appears when using the SITC classi-
fication. The diﬀerences across countries on the intensive margin are more
pronounced as one would expect when choosing a higher level of aggregation.
However, the overall pattern, with a cluster slightly above the 45 degree line,
remains. Also, the shares of the decomposition are roughly the same. For
exports, the intensive and extensive margin contribute almost to the same
extent to the overall level of concentration. For imports, the intensive margin
accounts for 66 percent of overall concentration.
152
Poisson parameter approach
The data contains intra-industry trade whereas the model is a pure Ricar-
dian model. In this section I outline an alternative approach that converts
the measurement of product units in the model to product units in the data.
Suppose that the true level of disaggregation of Ricardian products, as de-
fined in the Eaton and Kortum [2002] model, is unobserved and the clas-
sification scheme measures only an aggregate of those Ricardian products.
For example, when products, in the sense of the Eaton and Kortum [2002]
model, arrive at the boarder, custom agents aggregate those products into
an industry according to the HS classification standard. The number of EK
model products that custom agents assign to an HS industry classification is
unobserved to the researcher. Given this interpretation, I model the classi-
fication process as a randomization device following a Poisson process with
parameter µ. The parameter µ informs on how many EK Ricardian prod-
ucts, on average, comprise one HS code (the observed product unit in the
data).
To estimate the Poisson parameter, I proceed as follows. By the law of
large numbers, the probability of importing a particular EK product equals
the share of the number of EK products imported with respect to the total
number of EK products. In the model, the probability that an EK product is
imported equals P (impEKprod) = 1 Dii, where Dii is the probability of not
importing an EK product. By independence, the probability of not importing
any EK product within an HS code is Dµii, where µ is the average number
of products that comprise an HS code. As a result, we get the probability
of importing an HS code (product unit in data), which corresponds to one
minus the probability of not importing any EK products in that industry,
P (impHScode) = 1   Dµii. Since the probability of importing a product just
equals the share of products imported, NM/N , we can use the definition of
Theil index on the extensive margin,
T bmi =   ln(NM/N) =   ln (1 Dµii)
to back out µ:
µi =
 
ln
 
1  exp( T bmi )
 
ln(Dii)
!
153
We compute the Poisson parameter for each country and take the average
value as our estimate of µˆ = 1/I
PI
i=1 µi. The results imply that on average
µˆ = 0.94 EK products comprise an HS code.
code.
Empirical evidence and simulation results
In my simulation the total number of intermediate goods (N) is the product
of the 4529 industries in the data times 0.94, the average number of products
in an industry, N = 4258. One advantage of the this approach is that we can
make use of the full data sample and do not lose 35 percent of trade flows
when converting the data into net trade flows. Next, I present the empirical
results for the full sample together with the corresponding simulation results
that replicate the data.
Table A.2 – Mean concentration indexes for gross trade flows over 2676 country-
year pairs
Gini Theil Exports (X) Theil Imports (M)
X M
Ext. Int.
Total
Ext. Int.
Total
Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar.
Level of
0.96 0.89 1.81 2.59 4.40 0.94 1.76 2.70
concentration
% share of total
41% 59% 34% 66%
concentration
Correlation
0.98 0.87 0.96 0.45 0.87 0.98 0.82 0.90
with net trade
Figure A.2 shows that, in general, the pattern of export and import con-
centration in the full sample is similar to the pattern in the net trade flow
sample. Exports are more concentrated than imports for almost all countries
and on all margins. The pattern on the extensive margin is displayed in
Figure 4.2(d). Figure 4.2(c) shows the patterns on the intensive margin.
Turning our attention to the quantitative diﬀerences, we observe that the
overall level of concentration decreases with respect to the net trade flow
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sample for both exports and imports. The decomposition reveals that the
eﬀects are diﬀerent across the margins. In the case of the extensive margin,
concentration decreases with respect to the net trade flow sample whereas
on the intensive margin concentration increases thus reversing the relative
importance of each margin in terms of overall export concentration. Intra-
industry trade increases the number of products traded and the sales value of
the respective product. As a result, we observe a lower(higher) concentration
index on the extensive(intensive) margins. The overall concentration index
is primarily driven by the intensive margin with a share of 59% for exports
and 66% for imports. Table A.2 presents the summary statistics.
Table A.3 – Export and import concentration indexes for benchmark model and
symmetric costs with Poisson parameter µ = 0.94.
Gini Theil Exports (X) Theil Imports (M)
Parameters X M
Ext. Int.
Total
Ext. Int.
Total
Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar.
(⌘ = 7.4, = 1) 0.96 0.64 3.11 1.91 5.02 0.01 1.76 1.77
(⌘ = 7.4,  = 0.67, NT=8) 0.99 0.96 1.83 2.55 4.38 0.94 1.76 2.70
Data (gross trade flows) 0.96 0.89 1.81 2.59 4.40 0.94 1.76 2.70
Data (net trade flows) 0.98 0.91 2.60 2.13 4.73 1.10 1.61 2.71
Table A.3 presents the simulation results. Given the benchmark parameters
for ✓,   and ↵, I calibrate the elasticity of substitution to the level of the
intensive concentration of imports. I obtain a value of ⌘ = 7.4 slightly higher
than in the net trade flow. The first row of table A.3 contains the result-
ing concentration indexes. The obtained concentration levels of exports are
too high and too low for imports. In particular, the extensive concentration
of imports is too low. For this reason, I introduce 50 percent trade costs
( = 0.67). The introduction of symmetric trade costs does not reduce the
gap between import and export concentration. Consequently, I reduce the
number of trading partners to 8 partners in order to ease the competition in
the export and domestic market. This increases the probability of obtaining
the minimum price in foreign markets and reduces the extensive concentra-
tion of exports. The results are showns in row 2 in Table A.3 and match the
data. Overall, the parameters chosen to replicate the mean concentration
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levels of gross trade flows are similar to the one found in the case of net trade
flows. The exception are the number of trading partners and trade costs,
which are with 0.67 significantly higher. On the other hand, the elasticity of
substitution ⌘ = 7.4 is very close to the one found in the net trade version.
Table A.4 – Simulated concentration level with Poisson parameter µ = 0.94 and
exporter fixed eﬀect
Gini Theil Exports (X) Theil Imports (M)
X M
Ext. Int.
Total
Ext. Int.
Total
Model Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar.
Simulation
0.99 0.89 4.97 3.32 8.29 1.15 1.76 2.91
60% 40% 39% 61%
Data
0.96 0.89 1.81 2.59 4.40 0.94 1.76 2.70
41% 59% 34% 66%
In this paragraph, I estimate trade cost and technology parameters based
on bilateral trade shares using the models structure and check whether for
given trade shares, the model is able to generate the observed specialization
pattern in the gross trade data. Based on the estimated trade costs and
technology levels, I simulate the model, calculate the resulting concentration
indexes using the Poisson measurement device and compare the simulated
results with the data. Table A.4 shows the results. Export concentration
is higher than import concentration on all margins. With respect to the
decomposition, similar to the net trade case, the extensive margin dominates
overall concentration for exports and the intensive margin dominates for
imports. The obtained concentation levels of imports are close to the one in
the data. In the case of exports, simulated concentration levels are too high.
In terms of the cross country concentration pattern, the calibrated model
fits the data well, particularly for exports. However, similar to the net trade
results, the model cannot capture the negative relationship between import
concentration and GDP.
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Figure A.1 – Export versus import concentration on the 4 digit SITC level
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Figure A.2 – Export versus import concentration for gross trade flows
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(a) Overall concentration of exports
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(b) Overall concentration of imports
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Figure A.3 – The relationship of export and import concentration verus GDP
across 160 countries based on gross trade flows.
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Appendix Chapter 2
Robustness
I conduct robustness tests to support the empirical result that product fixed
costs are the dominant entry barrier. I also look at origin market character-
istics. In particular, following the argument of Hummels and Klenow [2005]
I suspect that the size of the home market is important to overcome fixed
costs to export.
Cross-country diﬀerences
In this subsection, I analyze cross-country diﬀerences in the estimated entry
elasticities. In regression 2.5, I pooled all observations across countries and
reported a common entry elasticities for all countries. Now I impose less
restrictions and allow for diﬀerent entry elasticities depending on the origin
country c. Instead of running country by country OLS regressions, I pool
all observations to explicitly account for potential correlation across origin
countries in the destination. I then test whether entry elasticities diﬀer across
exporting countries. I reject the hypothesis of a common slope coeﬃcients
on market size at the 1 percent level. 17 Given cross country diﬀerences, I
test for diﬀerences between the product and the firm elasticity on a country
per country basis. The results show that for 37 countries the entry elasticity
of products with respect to market size is smaller than for firms, in 2 cases
I do not find any significant diﬀerences and in the case of Niger the entry
elasticity of firms is lower than for products. Overall, the results that fixed
costs at the product level is the main entry barrier applies to the majority
of the countries in the sample.
Digging deeper into cross-country diﬀerences, I investigate whether entry
elasticities vary with the market size of the exporting country. Hummels
and Klenow [2005] suggest that the size of the home market is important to
overcome fixed costs to export. Economies of scale imply that firms make
more profits in larger markets. Thus, if home sales are important to pay for
fixed costs, firms from a larger home market have a competitive advantage
over firms from a smaller market simply because they operate at a larger
17. This finding is contrary to Eaton et al. [2011], who do not find significant diﬀerences
in the entry elasticity of firms for France, Denmark and Uruguay.
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scale. As a result, firms from a larger home market will have higher entry
rates than firms from smaller economies. To investigate whether home market
size matters, I estimate regression 2.5 and include an interaction term of the
log of destination market size with the log of home market size. We expect
that the entry elasticity of firms with respect to destination market size is
higher for countries with a larger home market. If there is no home market
eﬀect, only export sales are relevant and the change in the number of firms
and products should be independent of home market size. 18
I find that entry elasticities increase significantly with origin market size.
Given an increase in demand (i.e. increasing the destination market size),
relative more firms and products from larger home markets enter. The larger
revenue in domestic markets facilitates firm and product entry in all destina-
tions. This interpretation implies that products from larger markets have a
production eﬃciency advantage over products from smaller markets because
the exporting firms operate at a larger scale. Small economies are partic-
ularly aﬀected from fixed costs. The low level of domestic demand implies
that relative few firms are able to benefit from economies of scale resulting in
less export activity and relative high prices for domestic consumers. More-
over, because of the low demand, few foreign firms find it profitable to export
to them. The limited entry results in even higher prices due to the lack of
competitive pressure.
Poisson Maximum Likelihood
Silva and Tenreyro [2006] argue that in the presence of heteroskedasticity the
elasticity estimates in Table 2.4 are biased. Consider equation 2.3 with the
respective elasticities. To allow for deviations from the theory, we write
Nd,c,t = ⇡
b
d,c,tX
 
d,t⌘d,c,t (4.15)
where ⌘d,c,t is an error factor with E(⌘d,c,t|Xd, ⇡d,c) = 1. As Silva and Ten-
reyro [2006] show the standard practice of log-linearizing equation 4.15 and
estimating   by OLS is inappropriate for mainly two reasons. First, Nd,c can
be 0, in which case log-linearization is infeasible. This is not an issue. If there
are no exporters, then there is no trade. Second, even if all observations of
Nd,c are strictly positive, the expected value of the log-linearized error will
18. Table A.5 in the appendix shows the results.
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in general depend on the covariates, and hence OLS will be inconsistent. To
see the point more clearly, notice that equation 4.15 can be expressed as
yd,c,t = exp( Zd,c,t)⌘d,c,t, with E(⌘d,c,t|Zd,c,t) = 1. Assuming that yd,c,t is posi-
tive, the model can be made linear in the parameters by taking logarithms of
both sides of the equation, leading to log yd,c,t =  Zd,c,t+ log ⌘d,c,t. To obtain
consistent estimates of  , it is necessary that E(log ⌘d,c,t|Zd,c,t) does not de-
pend on Zd,c,t. Notice that the expected value of the logarithm of a random
variable depends both on its mean and on the higher-order moments of the
distribution. However under the presence of heteroskedasticity, the expected
value of log ⌘d,c,t will also depend on the regressors, rendering the estimates
of   inconsistent. For example, suppose that ⌘d,c,t is log normally distributed
with E(⌘d,c,t|Zd,c,t) = 1 and variance  2d,c,t = f(Zd,c,t). The error term of
the log linearized representation will then follow a normal distribution, with
E(log ⌘d,c,t|Zd,c,t) =  1/2 log(1 +  2d,c,t), thus implying inconsistency.
To estimate the elasticities, i.e.  , in equation 4.15 consistently, Silva and
Tenreyro [2006] suggests a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator.
Before applying the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator, I test
for the presence of heteroskedasticity in equation 2.5 for each of the two
diﬀerent dependent variables. In all tests, I reject the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity at the 1 precent level.
Table A.6 plots the results for Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood approach.
Qualitatively the results do not change. The signs of the coeﬃcients do
not change with respect to the log linear results. The elasticity of firms
with respect to market size is significantly higher than for products implying
that firm fixed costs are more important than product fixed costs. The key
diﬀerences are quantitatively. All estimated elasticities slightly increase. The
estimated entry elasticity of firms is 1.05 and 0.62 for products.
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Table A.5 – Relationship between market size and the number firms and products
taking into account cross-country diﬀerences
Dependent variable
log(Number log(Number
of firms) of products)
(1) (2)
log(Market Size - Destination) -0.215*** -0.0890***
[0.0243] [0.0262]
log(Market Size - Destination) * log(Market Size - Origin) 0.127*** 0.0868***
[0.00469] [0.00505]
log(Distance) -0.792*** -0.822***
[0.00866] [0.00933]
log(Expenditure Share) 0.200*** 0.196***
[0.00294] [0.00317]
log(GDP per capita) 0.144*** 0.0992***
[0.00488] [0.00526]
Border 0.332*** 0.301***
[0.0157] [0.0169]
Constant 2.234*** 2.675***
[0.04] [0.05]
Observations 28.978 28.978
R-squared 0,678 0,635
Note: All regressions include time and origin country fixed eﬀects. Robust standard er-
rors in parentheses (clustered by country time): ***, **, * marks statistically significant
diﬀerence from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table A.6 – Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood
log(Number log(Number log(Number log(Number
Dependent variable
of firms) of products) of firms) of products)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Market Size ) 1.049*** 0.619*** 0.866*** 0.557***
[0.0177] [0.00806] [0.0155] [0.00874]
log(Expenditure Share) 1.244*** 0.966*** 0.732*** 0.594***
[0.0244] [0.0102] [0.0189] [0.0109]
log(Distance) -0.836*** -1.036***
[0.0357] [0.0220]
log(GDP per capita) 0.371*** 0.0785***
[0.0252] [0.0143]
Border 0.380*** -0,021
[0.0566] [0.0345]
Observations 30164 30164 30164 30164
R-squared 0,612 0,679 0,661 0,694
Note: The results from Poisson maximum likelihood regressions for the dependent variable
noted at the top of each column projected on the covariates listed in the first column. All
regressions include origin country, time and origin country - time fixed eﬀects. Robust
standard errors in parentheses: ***, **, * marks statistically significant diﬀerence from
zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Appendix Chapter 3
Estimation of industry specific trade costs
To consistently estimate the eﬀect of trade costs on trade flows, we follow
the literature on estimation of gravity equations Head and Mayer [2013]. A
wide variety of trade models yields an expression for trade flows that can be
written in log form as follows:
log(Xkijt) =   log(t
k
ijt) + f
k
it + f
k
jt + e
k
ijt (4.16)
In this expression, fki denotes all factors that promote exports of industry
k in country i to all destinations, and fkj all factors that promote imports.
  represents the trade cost elasticity. We are only interested in estimation
the bilateral trade costs independent of the origin and destination specific
eﬀects. To do so, we follow Stumpner [2013] and consider the following
industry specific trade costs function
log(tkijt) =  1 log(dij)   2 log(dij) log(vkt )   3bij (4.17)
where dij is distance measured from capital in state i to the capital in country
j. vk is the value to weigh ratio calculated by the total value in dollars divided
by the total weight in tons. bij indicates whether state i shares a border with
a land with country j. We can now plug in the trade cost function, equation
4.17, into the trade flow equation, equation 4.16, and estimate the distance,
value to weight and border elasticities.
log(Xkijt) =  1 log(dij)   2 log(dij) log(vkt )   3bij + fkit + fkjt + ekijt (4.18)
Since we do not observe regional trade flows and we cannot estimate equation
4.18 at the state level. Instead, we consider the following two alternatives to
construct trade costs. First, we suppose that the inter state trade cost func-
tion from Stumpner [2013] holds on the international level as well. He finds
 1 = 0.666,  2 =  0.0803 and  3 = 0. Alternatively, we can estimate equation
4.18 at the international level using aggregate US international trade flows
and and suppose that the parameters are valid at the regional trade level. To
estimate the eﬀect of trade costs on trade flows, we re-write equation 4.18 at
the national level by aggregating trade flows over all US states. Aggregate
US intermediate imports, Xkj , from country j in year t are now given by
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log(Xkjt) =  1 log(dj) +  2 log(dj) log(v
k
t ) +  3bj +  4wjt + d
k
t + e
k
j (4.19)
where dj is the distance from the capital of country j to the capital of the
United States. bj is a border dummy equal to 1 for Mexico and Canada and
vkt is the value to weight in US dollars per ton shipped. In addition, we use
industry-time fixed eﬀects to control for industry specific variations. wjt are
control variables that are common to all regions within the United States
but maybe correlated with distance and/or border. The bilateral control
variables are a common currency indicator, a trade agreement indicator and
an indicator whether the partner country shares a common language with
the US. Furthermore, we include PPP converted GDP and population from
the Penn World Table. Results are in Table A.7. As expected, they show a
strong negative eﬀect of distance on trade flows, which is muted in industries
with high value-to-weight ratios. Sharing a border with the United States
increases the exports to the United States.
Given the estimated parameters, we suppose that the estimated aggregate
trade costs elasticities ( ˆ1    ˆ3) hold on the state level. As a result, we
calculate industry specific trade costs using
log tkijt = 0.691 log dij   0.154 log dij log vkt   1.897bij
where dij represents the distance from the capital of state i to the capital
of country j. bij equals one if the state i shares a land border with Canada
or Mexico and vkt remains the average value-to-weight ratio of industry k at
year t.
Calculation of the value-to-weight ratio
We calculate the average value to weight ratio per SIC 87 industry as follows.
The data used are drawn from Feenstra [1996] for 1972 and 1980 and Schott
[2008] for the years 1990, 2000 and 2005. They record the customs value of
all US imports by exporting country and year from 1990 to 2005 according
to SIC 87 codes and the corresponding value and weight of trade shipped
by air and shipped by sea. For the years 1972 and 1980, we convert the
seven-digit Tariﬀ Schedule of the United States (TSUSA) to SIC87 codes
following the correspondence table of Feenstra [1996]. Next, we compute the
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total import value and the average weight for each industry code and for
each transportation mode, i.e. shipped by air or by sea. To compute the
average value to weight ratio, we divide the total value shipped by its weight
and convert it to tons for each mode of transportation and industry pair. We
then weight the importance of the transportation mode by its share in the
total per industry import value.
Calculation of intermediate imports
We classify goods according to the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) in-
dustry classification scheme of the United Nations. Intermediate goods are
defined as the sum of the categories: Processed food and beverages (12),
Industrial supplies (2), Capital goods (4) and Parts of transport equipment
(53). To map the import data into the BEC categories, we use the concor-
dance table from the World Bank that created a mapping between SITC
Revision 2 codes and BEC categories. To convert the SITC Revision 2 codes
into SIC 1987 codes, we follow the procedure outlined in Feenstra [1996]. Fi-
nally, intermediate imports are then simply the total value of all intermediate
imports per SIC code.
Immigration response to hurricane Mitch
In this paragraph, we test whether hurricane Mitch increased immigration.
We apply the diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimation procedure. Consider the
following regression model
log Immijt =  0 +  1Xij +  2Dijt + dij + bij + fit + fjt + ✏ijt
where Immijt is number of immigrants from country j living in state i at
time t. Xij is dummy variable equal to 1 if immigrants are from the hur-
ricane aﬀected countries. dij controls for distance and bij for border eﬀects
between state i and country j. fit are state-year and djt origin country
year fixed eﬀects. Dijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country j was af-
fected by hurricane Mitch and the observation period is year 2000 or 2005.
✏ijt is an error term. The variable of interest is  2 and measures the ef-
fect of hurricane Mitch on immigration from the aﬀected countries, i.e. El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, to the United States. The
control group consists of Latin American immigrants, i.e. immigrants from
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the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
We distinguish between 2 definitions of immigrants: classical and new. A
classical immigrant is a foreign born individual that migrated to the US at
any point in time. On the other hand, a new immigrant is a foreign born
individual that migrated to the US within the last 5 years.
Table A.8 shows the results. The treatment dummy is significant and nega-
tive implying that the level of migration from the hurricane aﬀected countries
is significantly lower than from other Latin American countries. The coeﬃ-
cient on the diﬀerence in diﬀerence dummy is statistically significant. The
number of immigrants and the number of newly arrived immigrants increased
significantly after hurricane Mitch. Column (1) shows that while the num-
ber of immigrants from aﬀected countries is 74.3 percent lower than from
other Latin American countries, the number of immigrants from those coun-
tries significantly increased by 53 percent after the hurricane. Column (2)
presents the results for the new immigrants who arrived during the last 5
years. The estimates reveal that new immigrants increased more strongly
from aﬀected countries in comparison to other Latin American countries.
After the hurricane, the number of new immigrants per state grew even
stronger by an additional 75.3 percent. Overall, the evidence in Table A.8
supports our prior that hurricane Mitch caused significantly more immigra-
tion from the aﬀected countries to the United States in comparison to other
Latin American countries.
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Table A.7 – Eﬀect of transport costs on industry trade flows in gravity
model.
Dependent variable log(intermediate imports)
log(Distance) -0.691***
[0.107]
log(Distance)*log(Value-to-weight) 0.154***
[0.022]
Border 1.897***
[0.430]
Trade agreement 0.420***
[0.062]
Common language 0.235***
[0.035]
Common currency 0.093*
[0.057]
log(GDP of exporter) 0.990***
[0.011]
log(Population of exporter) 0.024*
[0.012]
Industry FE Yes
Observations 61796
R-squared 0.449
Note: Regression includes exporting country, importing country, time,
exporter-time and exporter-importer fixed eﬀects. ***, **, * marks sta-
tistically significant diﬀerence from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively.
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Table A.8 – Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence estimation: Number of migrants
after Hurrican Mitch
Dependent variable log(number of log(number of immi-total immigrants) grants last 5 years)
(1) (2)
Treatment Dummy -0.743*** -0.760***
[0.254] [0.202]
Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence 0.530* 0.753*
[0.283] [0.385]
log(Distance) -0.991*** -1.237***
[0.0461] [0.0376]
Border 1.111*** 1.351***
[0.127] [0.117]
Constant 13.26*** 15.64***
[0.427] [0.346]
Observations 15,633 15,633
R-squared 0.723 0.817
Note: All regressions include origin country, host country and time fixed
eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country
time): ***, **, * marks statistically significant diﬀerence from zero at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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